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ABSTRACT 
The term “cheap stock” describes undervalued stock options granted to CEOs and other 
key employees prior to initial public offerings (IPOs).  Pre-IPO firms have incentives to issue 
cheap stock as compensation because it results in lower compensation expense on the income 
statement and in large cash windfalls to CEOs subsequent to the IPO.  Because cheap stock 
results in an overstatement of earnings, the Securities and Exchange Commission frequently 
challenges the valuations of these grants, which makes cheap stock a key accounting issue in 
many IPOs.  Using a sample of firms that completed IPOs between 2004 and 2007, I investigate 
the effect of corporate governance structures, outside monitors, and other factors on the level of 
cheap stock grants.  My results suggest that higher-quality governance structures, specifically 
audit committee accounting experts and more independent boards, constrain the level of cheap 
stock granted to CEOs.  I also find that when CEOs have a stronger intrinsic commitment to the 
firm and when firms receive independent stock valuations on option grant dates, CEOs receive 
lower levels of cheap stock.  Greater levels of cheap stock are granted when directors receive 
pre-IPO stock options and when CEOs are hired in the two-year period before the IPO.  
Additionally, I find a negative relation between CEO cheap stock and future firm operating and 
stock return performance.  Overall, my results illustrate the importance of corporate governance 
structures in IPO firms and suggest that greater levels of cheap stock are an indication of agency 
problems, which in turn, adversely affect shareholder value.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
“Cheap stock” refers to undervalued stock options granted to key firm employees prior to 
initial public offerings (IPOs).  These undervalued stock option grants are labeled cheap stock 
because they result in lower stock option exercise prices that allow key employees to purchase 
firm stock at deep discounts after the IPO.  The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
frequently challenges the valuations of stock options granted to employees during the 12 to 18 
months prior to an IPO because undervaluations indicate potential overstatements of earnings 
(Evans 2012).  For example, eToys’ IPO offer price was $20, but its employees received stock 
options with exercise prices ranging between $0.03 and $11.00 in the 18-month period prior to 
its IPO.  Because of this discrepancy, eToys was forced to record nearly $60 million in cheap 
stock charges in the periods prior to the IPO.  These charges were necessary to properly record 
the related compensation expense in the current and future periods.
1
  Undervaluations of stock 
options can result in delayed IPOs and restatements of historical financial statements (Ernst & 
Young 2011).  In this paper, I investigate the determinants of cheap stock granted to Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs), and the effect of cheap stock on future operating and stock return 
performance.   
Boards of directors grant stock options to executives to attract and retain top managerial 
talent, as well as to incentivize the executives to maximize shareholder value.  Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) requires that firms measure compensation expense 
related to stock option grants on the grant date and recognize the stock option-related 
compensation expense over the stock option vesting period.  Pre-IPO firms, however, have 
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 Buckley (1999) reports that the SEC aggressively questions firms about pre-IPO stock option 
valuations.  She suggests that firms use cheap stock to attract and secure talented employees, but 
fail to record the related compensation expense in the IPO prospectuses (Buckley 1999). 
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incentives to “low-ball” the estimated fair values of the options, thus reducing the stock option-
based compensation expense on their IPO prospectuses while providing CEOs and other 
executives with large cash windfalls as their options vest after the IPOs.
2
  Stock option 
accounting for publicly traded firms is less complex than for private firms because public firms’ 
stock prices are readily available.
3
  Determining the fair value of a private firm’s stock is very 
complex and is based on many estimates and assumptions that are subject to managerial 
discretion and manipulation, which could materially affect the valuation.  Mark Rubash, a 
PricewaterhouseCoopers partner in the global services group, commented that “[c]ompanies are 
pricing stock options at 60 to 80% discounts from preferred stock or the IPO price” (Buckley 
1999).  He further added, “the SEC isn’t buying it.  If the company’s valuation of stock options 
appears too low …, the SEC fires back with a cheap stock charge” (Buckley 1999).  The threat of 
a cheap stock charge may not be a large enough deterrent to prevent firms from aggressively 
undervaluing their stock at the time of the stock option grants.  Randy Bolten, the Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO) of BroadVision suggests that larger cheap stock charges may be 
advantageous because they can be segregated from the other operating expenses on the income 
statement (Buckley 1999).   
Not only does cheap stock impact firm earnings, it may indicate agency problems and 
rent extraction.  Bebchuk et al. (2002) define rent extraction as executive pay in excess of levels 
that would be optimal for shareholders.  Prior research suggests that compensation structures, 
                                                          
2
 The mean (median) stock option vesting period in my sample is 3.74 (4.00) years, while 
approximately 7% vest in one year or less.   
3
 Although the stock prices of publicly traded firms are known, estimates used in determining the 
fair value of stock options are still subject to managerial discretion.  Aboody et al. (2006) 
investigate whether publicly traded firms understate stock option-based compensation expense.  
They find that firms manage input assumptions in option pricing models to report lower stock 
option-based compensation expense and thus, higher earnings. 
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including stock option grants, that lead to rent extraction often result from weaker governance 
structures (e.g., Schleifer and Vishney 1997; Yermack 1997; Core et al. 1999; Bebchuk and 
Fried 2004; Collins et al. 2009).  Yermack (1997), for example, finds that CEOs of firms with 
weaker corporate governance influence the timing of their stock option grants around news 
announcements because the grant timing in relation to the news announcements could 
considerably impact CEO wealth for reasons unrelated to firm performance.  Bebchuk et al. 
(2002, 2) warn that inefficient pay structures “weaken or distort incentives and that thus, in turn, 
further reduce shareholder value.”  An IPO is a unique setting that provides an executive with the 
opportunity to influence personal wealth through the timing of stock option grants (prior to the 
IPO) and by underestimating the value of the options granted.  Because cheap stock generally 
results in lower stock option exercise prices, the CEO benefits from option undervaluations, 
which have little to do with managerial effort or performance.  Thus, cheap stock is potentially 
an inefficient pay structure that raises concerns about the effectiveness of corporate governance 
in setting executive pay.
4
   
To perform my analyses of cheap stock, I use IPOs successfully completed between 2004 
and 2007.  For each sample IPO firm, I hand collect information relating to CEO characteristics 
and compensation, firm governance, and board characteristics from the IPO prospectus (Forms 
S-1 and 424B) and the first proxy statement filed subsequent to the IPO (Form DEF 14A).  I use 
four measures of cheap stock that are intended to capture firms’ aggressiveness in undervaluing 
their stock on the option grant dates prior to the IPOs.  For each CEO, I measure cheap stock 
during the 18-month period prior to the IPO by calculating the intrinsic value per grant.  The 
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 CEOs can influence the total value of their stock option grants through a combination of both 
the valuation of the firm’s stock on the grant date and the number of shares granted.  The 
measures of cheap stock I use capture both of these aspects since I multiply the intrinsic value by 
the number of shares granted.   
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intrinsic value is equal to the number of options granted multiplied by the difference between the 
return-adjusted IPO offer price and the option exercise price, where the return-adjusted IPO offer 
price is equal to the IPO offer price adjusted by either the median (three-digit SIC code) industry 
buy and hold stock return over the period the stock options were outstanding or the return over 
the same period for a firm matched on (three-digit SIC code) industry and ROA in the year prior 
to the IPO.
5
  I perform these adjustments to the IPO offer price to alleviate concerns that 
differences between the IPO offer price and the exercise price are the result of industry and 
economic factors and firm performance over the time period the options were outstanding.  I use 
the log of the intrinsic value as well as the intrinsic value scaled by CEO cash compensation (i.e., 
salary and bonus) as measures of cheap stock in my models.   
I examine the determinants of the level of CEO cheap stock grants.  The first set of 
determinants I include examines specific board of director attributes.  Specifically, I include 
accounting expertise on the audit committee and on the board of directors.  Accounting experts 
possess knowledge and understanding of accounting regulations, which make them effective 
monitors over firms’ financial accounting and reporting processes.  As a result, they are more 
likely to ensure that pre-IPO stock options are properly valued and accounted for in accordance 
with GAAP.  I also include board of director independence.  Prior studies show that less 
independent boards of directors lead to overcompensation and inefficient contracting (Core et al. 
1999; Collins et al. 2009).   
The second set of determinants I include examine CEO related factors.  Consistent with 
stewardship theory, CEOs who helped create and build their firms possess high levels of intrinsic 
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 For example, if a firm’s IPO offer price is $15 and the median industry buy and hold return for 
the time period between the option grant and the IPO is 40%, then the industry return-adjusted 
IPO offer price is $10.71 ($15 / (1 + 0.40)).  
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motivation and are expected to pursue organizational interests rather than their personal interests 
(Davis et al. 1997).  Thus, I construct a CEO Steward Index which incorporates three measures 
of CEO stewardship characteristics: (a) CEO founder (i.e., the CEO is a firm founder), (b) CEO 
tenure, and (c) CEO duality (i.e., the CEO also serves as the chairman of the board).  I next 
include a measure that identifies CEOs hired shortly before the IPO.  Hiring a CEO prior to an 
IPO may indicate a firm’s need for specific experience in taking the firm public or in managing a 
public firm (Engel et al. 2009).  Cheap stock may be granted to new CEOs in an attempt to 
attract needed expertise and experience and to meet the new CEO’s compensation demands.  
Finkelstein (1992) suggests that managers with specific expertise have power and influence over 
the board of directors.   
Third, I investigate two additional factors that potentially influence the level of cheap 
stock grants.  First, I examine whether the firm engaged an independent valuation specialist to 
value the stock price on the option grant date because independent valuations should be less 
biased.  Second, I examine whether CEOs are granted greater levels of cheap stock when at least 
one independent director also received stock option grants during the 18-month period prior to 
the IPO.  Independent directors may be more willing to grant cheap stock to CEOs when they 
also benefit from cheap stock grants, which is consistent with agency problems.   
Finally, I examine the effect of external monitor quality on the level of cheap stock 
grants.  Because prior research finds that certain outside monitors are associated with improved 
financial reporting quality in IPOs, I include indicators for the use of a Big N accounting firm 
(Beatty 1989), for the use of a prestigious underwriter (Morsfield and Tan 2006; and Lee et al. 
2012), and for venture capital backing (Morsfield and Tan 2006).     
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I find that higher quality corporate governance structures are negatively associated with 
the level of cheap stock granted to CEOs.  In particular, I find that the level of cheap stock is 
significantly lower when at least one member of the audit committee is an accounting expert and 
when boards of directors are more independent.  These results suggest that audit committee 
accounting experts and independent directors are effective monitors that impact the quality and 
reliability of the financial statements and also constrain CEO rent extraction.  I also find that 
when CEOs have a stronger intrinsic commitment to the firm and when firms receive 
independent stock valuations on the option grant dates, CEOs are granted lower levels of cheap 
stock.  I find some evidence that CEOs are granted greater levels of cheap stock when they are 
hired in the two-year period prior to IPO, consistent with new CEOs exhibiting power over the 
board and demanding additional compensation for their expertise and experience.  I also find that 
CEOs are granted greater levels of cheap stock when board members are also granted pre-IPO 
stock options, suggesting that board members are more willing to grant undervalued options 
when they also benefit from the undervalued options, which is indicative of agency problems.    
In my next analyses, I identify firms that record a “cheap stock charge” which results 
from a retrospective revaluation of the firm’s stock as of the option grant date.  This measure 
provides particularly strong evidence that firms grant undervalued stock option-based 
compensation to executives since the retrospective revaluations indicate that the original 
valuations were too low.  I find that independent stock valuations reduce both the occurrence and 
magnitude of revaluations.  This result emphasizes the important role independent valuations 
play in pre-IPO stock option accounting and confirms the emphasis placed on independent 
valuations by practitioners and accounting guidance issued by the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (AICPA).  In addition, revaluations occur less frequently when boards are 
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more independent and when CEOs have a higher intrinsic commitment to the firm.  I also find 
that the occurrence and magnitude of revaluations is greater when the firm is venture capital 
backed, suggesting that venture capital firms do not necessarily reduce firms’ aggressiveness in 
granting undervalued stock options, but they appear to understand the financial reporting issues 
surrounding cheap stock in IPOs and influence firms to perform revaluations prior to IPOs when 
necessary.   
Finally, I examine whether the level of cheap stock is associated with lower future firm 
performance (i.e., lower future ROA, cash flow from operations, and stock returns).  I find that 
the level of cheap stock is negatively associated with operating and stock return performance 
over the three years following the IPO.  These results suggest that firms granting CEOs more 
cheap stock have greater agency problems that enable the CEOs to extract rents from their firms.  
Furthermore, the results suggest that granting a CEO cheap stock is an inefficient form of 
compensation that leads to poor performance subsequent to the IPO and has a negative impact on 
shareholder value. 
In additional analyses, I investigate the determinants of firms obtaining independent stock 
valuations on the option grant dates, which is a key factor in reducing the likelihood and 
magnitude of retrospective revaluations resulting in cheap stock charges.  I find that audit 
committee accounting experts and Big N auditors influence pre-IPO firms to obtain independent 
valuations, consistent with these factors improving accounting quality.  I also examine the effect 
of cheap stock on IPO underpricing.  The lower stock valuations used when firms grant cheap 
stock may lead to lower IPO valuations.  Furthermore, CEOs may negatively influence the IPO 
offer price in order to reduce scrutiny of the undervalued stock options and to avoid cheap stock 
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charges.  I find that cheap stock is positively associated with IPO underpricing in option granting 
firms, suggesting the cheap stock comes at the expense of pre-IPO shareholders.   
My study makes a number of contributions to the literature.  Several prior studies suggest 
that opportunistic stock option-based compensation is evidence of inefficient CEO compensation 
and rent extraction (e.g., Core et al. 1999; Brenner et al. 2000; Heron and Lie 2007; Collins et al. 
2009).  For example, Collins et al. (2009) suggest that stock option backdating firms experience 
greater managerial rent extraction problems, and Core et al. (1999) find that poor governance 
quality is associated with overcompensation.  I add to this literature by providing evidence that 
weaker corporate governance structures are associated with greater CEO cheap stock and that 
cheap stock is an inefficient form of compensation.  I add to the literature investigating corporate 
governance in pre-IPO firms by providing evidence of the importance of higher-quality 
governance structures, including accounting expertise and board independence in firm 
accounting and compensation decisions prior to IPOs.  Prior research investigates the effect of 
corporate governance on the compensation decisions of firms recently completing IPOs (Engel et 
al. 2002).  My research; however, investigates corporate governance and compensation contracts 
prior to IPOs, where CEOs can benefit from opportunistically undervalued stock option grants.  
Finally, I contribute to research investigating whether firms underestimate stock option values.  
Aboody et al. (2006) provide evidence that public firms understate stock option-based 
compensation expense by using managerial discretion to influence key inputs to the option 
pricing models.  My research provides evidence of an additional setting where firms potentially 
overstate earnings by opportunistically undervaluing CEO stock options.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the related 
research and develops my hypotheses.  Section 3 describes the sample selection and research 
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design.  Section 4 reports descriptive statistics and the results of my tests.  Section 5 reports 
robustness tests, and I summarize my findings and conclude in Section 6. 
 
2. BACKGROUND, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND EMPIRICAL PREDICTIONS 
 
2.1 Stock Options 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that one way to minimize agency conflicts is to 
provide managers with incentive contracts that align their interests with those of the 
shareholders.  Consistent with the economic theory of optimal contracting, Core and Guay 
(1999) predict and provide evidence that firms award stock options and restricted stock to correct 
deviations from optimal incentive levels.  Furthermore, Hanlon et al. (2003) find that the value of 
stock options granted to executives is positively associated with future operating income.   
On the other hand; however, executive compensation continues to be a topic of 
controversy among academics, journalists, politicians, and regulators.  Stock option-based 
compensation has received significant attention because many view it as camouflaged 
compensation that can be used to extract rents (Bebchuk et al. 2002).  Critics argue that the link 
between executive pay and performance is weak and that underperforming executives are still 
excessively compensated (Steverman 2009).  Furthermore, Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) 
warn that stock options can create adverse incentives.  They state that “[t]ying management 
incentives to the stock price may have had the perverse effect of encouraging managers to 
exploit their discretion in reporting earnings, with an eye to manipulating the stock prices of their 
companies” (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006, 528).  CEOs manipulate their stock option-related 
wealth through opportunistic behavior both prior to and subsequent to stock option grants.  Prior 
to stock option grants, CEOs attempt to decrease stock option exercise prices by managing the 
10 
 
timing of good or bad news (Chauvin and Shenoy 2001), by issuing less optimistically biased 
management forecasts (Aboody and Kasznik 2000), and by reporting greater income decreasing 
discretionary accruals (Baker et al. 2003).  In addition, CEOs have incentives to take actions that 
maximize the value of their existing options.  Prior research finds that CEOs with greater levels 
of equity incentives report more positive discretionary accruals (Bergstresser and Philippon 
2006), are more likely to meet or just beat analysts’ forecasts and report large earnings surprises 
(Cheng and Warfield 2005), and are more likely to adopt aggressive accounting practices that 
misreport earnings (Burns and Kedia 2006).  I contribute to the literature investigating 
opportunistic behavior around stock option grants by investigating cheap stock.  Cheap stock 
enables the CEO to purchase firm stock at a deep discount after the IPO, which significantly 
increases CEO wealth for reasons unrelated to firm performance. 
Undervalued stock option grants result in earnings overstatements.
6
  Aboody et al. (2006) 
provide evidence that public firms use discretion in determining the inputs to option pricing 
models in order to understate reported stock option-based compensation expense.  They suggest 
that firms understate stock option-based compensation expense because doing so increases 
                                                          
6
 My sample period, which includes IPOs between 2004 and 2007, includes two different stock 
option accounting regimes.  Firms in my sample that complete IPOs in 2004 and 2005generally 
follow Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 123.  SFAS 123 allows firms use 
one of two methods to account for stock option grants.  Under the first method, firm can elect to 
follow Accounting Principles Board (APB) Opinion No. 25, “Accounting for Stock Issued to 
Employees.”  APB Opinion No. 25 requires firms to record compensation expense for the 
difference, if any, between the fair value of the firm’s stock price and the option exercise price 
on the grant date.  No compensation expense is recorded when the exercise price is equal to or 
greater than the fair value of the stock.  The second method is the fair value method.  Under the 
fair value method, firms expense the fair value of the stock options, where the stock options are 
valued using an option pricing model, which incorporates factors such as the volatility of the 
underlying stock, the expected life of the options, expected dividends, the stock price on the 
grant date, expected forfeitures, and the option exercise price.  Under both methods, the stock 
option-based compensation is expensed over the vesting period of the options.  For fiscal years 
beginning on or after December 15, 2005, firms are required to adopt SFAS 123(R) (codified as 
FASB ASC 718), which requires firms to follow the fair value approach.   
11 
 
investors’ outlook on firms’ profitability.7  For pre-IPO firms, one critical component used in 
determining the stock option-based compensation expense is the stock value on the option grant 
date.  Stock undervaluations on the option grant dates result in earnings overstatements.  Because 
improperly reported earnings do not reflect the long-term prospects of IPO firms (Teoh et al. 
1998), cheap stock is of particular concern to the SEC.   
Overall, cheap stock is an additional mechanism that can be used to opportunistically 
influence CEO wealth because it provides CEOs with large cash windfalls subsequent to IPOs, 
while overstating earnings.  I next describe the corporate governance structures that I predict 
affect the level of cheap stock granted to CEOs. 
2.2 Audit Committee and Board Accounting Experts 
Audit committees are the most critical monitor of the financial reporting process (Blue 
Ribbon Committee 1999).  The audit committee’s role is to oversee the effectiveness of 
management’s financial reporting policies, and accounting experts on the audit committee play a 
key role in this responsibility.  Accounting experts’ training and knowledge base provide them 
with the ability to monitor and assess the appropriateness of firms’ accounting policies and 
decisions, while concerns about professional reputational losses in the event of misstatements or 
fraud provide them with an incentive to be more vigilant monitors (Krishnan and Visvanathan 
2008; Dhaliwal et al. 2010).  Defond et al. (2005) suggest that accounting expertise on the audit 
committee may be more important than other expertise because audit committee members are 
responsible for tasks that require a high degree of accounting sophistication and judgment.  Prior 
research investigates the effect of audit committee accounting experts on financial reporting 
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 Aboody et al. (2004) provide evidence that investors view stock option compensation as an 
expense and impound the stock option-based compensation expense into their valuation 
assessments.   
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quality and finds that accounting conservatism is greater (Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008) and 
financial reporting quality is higher (Dhaliwal et al. 2010) for firms with audit committee 
accounting experts.  These studies suggest that audit committee accounting experts are effective 
monitors over the financial reporting process and they perform a vital role in reducing the agency 
costs associated with improper financial reporting.  In addition, investors recognize the value of 
audit committee accounting experts in improving the quality of the financial reporting 
environment.  Defond et al. (2005) find a positive market reaction to the announcement of new 
directors with accounting expertise, but not to the announcement of non-accounting financial 
experts.    
Stock option accounting for non-public firms is an especially complex process that 
requires considerable expertise and judgment.  Firms that underestimate the fair value of stock 
option grants generally overstate earnings in the current and future periods.  Because accounting 
for stock options is a key issue in many IPOs, I expect that audit committee accounting experts 
will be particularly sensitive to the cheap stock issue and will exert their expertise and influence 
to reduce firms’ aggressiveness in undervaluing stock options and ensure that they are properly 
accounted for in accordance with GAAP.   
2.3 Board Independence  
Executive compensation practices are often criticized because of the belief held by many 
that the CEO’s influence over the board of directors results in excess compensation that does not 
incentivize the CEO to maximize shareholder value and does not represent pay for performance 
(Bebchuk et al. 2002).  Blanchard et al. (1994) suggest that deficiencies in corporate governance 
enable managers to “grab whatever profits they can get away with” (Blanchard et al. 1994, 346).  
Prior research investigates the effect of corporate governance quality on the level of CEO 
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compensation and on the ability of the CEO to extract rents from the firm.  Core et al. (1999) 
investigate the effect of board of director characteristics, including board independence, on CEO 
compensation and find that CEO compensation is greater when governance structures are less 
effective.  Furthermore, Collins et al. (2009)  and Bebchuk et al. (2010) find that stock option 
backdating is more likely when firms have weaker corporate governance structures (e.g., less 
independent boards). 
Corporate governance structures not only affect firm compensation practices, but they are 
also established to monitor and provide credibility to firms’ financial statements.  Prior research 
finds that greater board independence is associated with lower abnormal accruals (Klein 2002), 
greater accounting conservatism (Ahmed and Duellman 2007), and fewer instances of financial 
reporting fraud (Beasley 1996; Dechow et al. 1996).  Overall, these findings suggest that more 
independent boards of directors constrain opportunistic CEO compensation and financial 
reporting decisions through more effective monitoring.  Thus, I predict a negative association 
between board independence and cheap stock.   
2.4 CEO Stewardship and New CEOs 
Agency theory predicts that agency costs arise in firms where the interests of self-serving 
agents diverge from those of the principal (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  Stewardship theory, on 
the other hand, suggests that in some situations executives’ interests are aligned with those of the 
principal and that these executives pursue the organizations’ interests rather than their own 
(Davis et al. 1997; Wasserman 2006).  Wasserman (2006, 961) suggests that executives who 
play a key role in the creation of the organization and have a sense of “attachment and personal 
psychological ownership” exhibit behavior consistent with stewards.  Fama and Jensen (1983) 
argue that there is less of a separation of ownership and control in young entrepreneurial firms 
14 
 
when compared with larger, more complex firms and, as a result, agency theory is less applicable 
in younger firms.  Stewardship theory is particularly applicable to CEOs in my study because 
IPO firms are generally younger and less mature.  Wasserman (2006) suggests that executives 
who have a stronger intrinsic commitment to the firm will accept less cash compensation for 
their services consistent with stewardship theory; however, “professional executives” who did 
not play a key role in building the organization are more likely to require higher compensation 
consistent with agency theory.  Consistent with his predictions, Wasserman (2006) finds that 
CEO cash compensation is lower when the CEO is the founder and when CEO tenure is greater.  
He (2008) investigates CEO compensation in newly-public firms and finds founder CEO 
compensation is lower than non-founder compensation, also consistent with stewardship theory.   
 I predict that CEOs with greater intrinsic commitment to the firm (i.e., founder CEOs, 
longer tenured CEOs, and CEOs who also serve as the chairman of the board) are less likely to 
demand higher levels of cheap stock.  I also predict; however, that CEOs hired shortly before the 
IPO are less likely to have a sense of psychological ownership.  Furthermore, firms are more 
likely hire new CEOs prior to IPOs because firms need the specific experience and expertise to 
guide the firm through the IPO.  Consistent with Finkelstein (1992) this experience may provide 
the CEO with power that enables them to influence the board of directors.  Thus, I predict the 
CEOs hired shortly before IPOs will demand greater levels of cheap stock. 
2.5  Other Factors and External Monitors  
Management, boards of directors, or third-party valuation experts generally perform the 
valuations of the stock underlying stock option grants.  The AICPA practice aid “Valuation of 
Privately-Held Company Equity Securities Issued as Compensation” suggests; however, that 
private firms should obtain stock price valuations from independent valuation specialists on the 
15 
 
stock option grant dates to provide assurance that the stock options are properly accounted for.  
Furthermore, practitioners suggest that the SEC places greater confidence in third-party 
valuations than in board or management valuations because third party valuations are more 
independent and objective (Ernst & Young 2011).  I predict a negative association between 
independent stock valuations and the level of cheap stock grants since I expect that independent 
valuations are less biased than firm or board of director valuations.   
Directors who receive undervalued stock options may also influence the levels of cheap 
stock granted to CEOs.  Bebchuk et al. (2010) find that the probability of opportunistically timed 
stock option grants to CEOs is greater when independent directors also receive opportunistically 
timed option grants.  Since directors may be more willing to grant cheap stock to CEOs when 
they also benefit from cheap stock grants, I expect a positive association between pre-IPO 
director stock option grants and the level of CEO cheap stock. 
I also explore the effect of certain key outside monitors on the level of cheap stock 
granted prior to IPOs.  Aharony et al. (1993) investigate the impact of both high quality auditors 
and underwriters on IPO earnings management.  Under the Securities Act of 1933, both 
underwriters and auditors are liable if a company’s prospectus contains untrue statements or 
omits material facts.  As a result, the reputation and litigation concerns for failing to detect 
material misstatements incentivize higher quality auditors and underwriters to provide more 
accurate information about IPOs than other lower quality auditors and underwriters.  Although 
Aharony et al. (1993) do not find results that support these expectations, subsequent research 
investigates the effects of underwriters and auditors on IPO financial reporting quality.  
Morsfield and Tan (2006) and Lee et al. (2012) find that that underwriter quality is negatively 
associated with earnings management in IPO firms, and Carter et al. (1998) find that IPO 
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underpricing is lower when firms use higher quality underwriters.
8
  Relating to auditor quality, 
Beatty (1989) finds a negative relation between auditor reputation and IPO underpricing, 
suggesting that financial statements audited by higher quality auditors are less likely to contain 
management misrepresentations.  Venture capital firms are additional outside monitors that have 
significant influence over the firms they invest in.  Prior research finds that firms that are venture 
capital backed have less IPO-year abnormal accruals (Morsfield and Tan 2006).  I predict that 
firms using prestigious underwriters, Big N auditors, and venture capital backing grant lower 
levels of cheap stock because these external monitors understand the issues related to cheap 
stock and they influence firms to properly value pre-IPO stock options in order to protect their 
reputations. 
2.6 Compensation and Future Firm Performance 
Greater levels of cheap stock potentially indicate that the CEO is exerting influence over 
the board to extract rents.  On the other hand; however, cheap stock may align the interests of 
managers with those of the shareholders and may also indicate the firm’s demand for a high-
quality CEO.  Prior studies investigate the impact of excess compensation on future 
performance.  Core et al. (1999) find a negative association between predicted excess 
compensation and future firm operating and stock return performance, and Collins et al. (2009) 
find that predicted excess compensation is more negatively associated with future firm 
performance when firms backdate options.  The authors suggest that weaker governance 
structures lead to inefficient compensation contracting and rent extraction, which adversely 
affects shareholder value.  Hanlon et al. (2003); however, find a positive association between 
                                                          
8
 IPO underpricing occurs when the firm’s closing stock price on the IPO date is greater than the 
firm’s IPO offer price.  Many believe IPO underpricing is used to induce investors to participate 
in riskier IPOs.  IPO risk generally relates to technological or valuation uncertainty (Loughran 
and Ritter 2004). 
17 
 
executive stock option grant values and future operating income.  I investigate the effect of cheap 
stock on firms’ future operating and stock return performance.  Since cheap stock may represent 
either a form of rent extraction or a tool to align the incentives of CEOs with shareholders, I do 
not make a directional prediction on the association between cheap stock and future 
performance.   
 
3. SAMPLE SELECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Sample Selection 
 My sample consists of IPOs completed in 2004 through 2007.  I obtain all domestic IPOs 
of United State (U.S.) firms from the Thomson Financial SDC Platinum Global New Issues 
Database (SDC Platinum), where I also obtain IPO details including the IPO date, IPO offer 
price, auditor, underwriters, and whether the firm was venture capital backed.  I obtain all pre- 
and post-IPO accounting related data from the Annual Industrial Compustat files, and I obtain 
returns used to calculate firm and industry buy and hold annual returns from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP).  I begin with 995 domestic, U.S. IPOs.  Consistent with 
Boulton et al. (2011), I exclude IPOs that are units of shares or unit trusts (9), real estate 
investment trusts (REITs) (43), limited liability interests (8), and limited partner interests (35).  I 
next remove income deposit securities (2), blank check IPOs (2), IPOs that are spinoffs from 
public firms (18), firms without Compustat data in years t-1 through t+3 (288), and firms without 
CRSP data (3).
9
  I exclude IPOs where the firm either did not have a CEO or the CEO did not 
receive any compensation in the year of or prior to the IPO (2).  I then delete all financial firms 
(193) to arrive at a final sample size of 392 IPO firms.   
                                                          
9
 Because I require each sample firm to have three years of post IPO performance, future 
performance models may be influenced by survivorship bias.   
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 For each observation, I hand collect data from the IPO prospectus (Forms S-1 and 424B) 
and the first proxy statement (DEF-14A) following the IPO.  These SEC filings contain detailed 
information about the CEO, the board of directors, and executive compensation prior to the IPO.  
Specifically, I use the prospectus to collect the CEO hire date and determine whether the CEO is 
the chairman of the board of directors.  The prospectus also contains brief biographies for each 
director, which I use to collect the number of directors, the date they became a director, whether 
they are independent, whether they sit on the audit committee, and whether the director is an 
accounting expert.
10
  Following prior literature (Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008; Dhaliwal et al. 
2010), a director is classified as an accounting expert if he or she is a certified public accountant 
(CPA) or has experience as a CFO, chief accounting officer (CAO), controller, or auditor.  Using 
the prospectus and proxy statement, I obtain details for each CEO stock option grant during the 
18-month period prior to the IPO, including the grant date, the number of options granted, and 
the exercise price.
11
  I collect salary and bonus amounts for the fiscal year ended prior to the IPO 
for each CEO and executive listed in the prospectus.
12
  I also use the prospectus and the proxy 
statement to identify whether directors receive stock option grants in the 18-month period prior 
to the IPO.   
 
 
 
                                                          
10
 The prospectus provides the composition of the board of directors at the time of the IPO, 
including the date the individual became a director.  I use these dates to determine the board 
composition at the time of the option grants.   
11
 The prospectus contains grant details for the options granted during the fiscal year ended prior 
to the IPO, and the proxy statement contains details for grants made between the fiscal year 
ended prior to the IPO and the IPO date.   
12 If the CEO did not receive compensation in the form of salary or bonus during the fiscal year 
prior to the IPO, I collect the salary and bonus for the fiscal year of the IPO. 
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3.2 Determinants of Cheap Stock Grants 
 To investigate the determinants of cheap stock grants, I estimate the following model for 
all sample firms as well as for option granting firms only:
13
 
14
  
Cheap Stock Grant= α + β1 Audit Committee Accounting Expert + β2 Board Accounting 
Expert Only + β3Board Independence + β4CEO Steward Index + β5Pre IPO New CEO + 
β6Valuation + β7Director Options + β8Big N + β9VC Backed + β10Prestigious 
Underwriter + β11ROA + β12Size + β13Firm Age + β14Tech + ε,              (1) 
 
where each variable is defined below. 
 
 Cheap Stock Grant is one of four measures used to proxy for the level of cheap stock.  
For each measure, I first calculate the intrinsic value of each stock option grant during the 18-
month period prior to the IPO by multiplying the number of options granted by the difference 
between the return-adjusted IPO offer price and the original option exercise price.
15
 
16
 
17
 The 
return-adjusted IPO offer price is calculated using one of two methods.  The first, the industry 
                                                          
13
 A Tobit regression would normally be used to estimate this model because the dependent 
variable is left censored at zero.  However, when all sample firms are included in the model, the 
dependent variable takes the value of zero when the firm either did not grant the CEO options or 
when the return-adjusted IPO offer price is less than or equal to the option exercise price.  It is 
important to differentiate between these two types of observations, thus I include an indicator 
variable equal to one if the firm granted the CEO stock options, and zero otherwise.  Because the 
Tobit model cannot be estimated when this variable is included, I estimate the model for the full 
sample based on ordinary least squares (OLS).  I estimate a Tobit model for the option granting 
firms only sample, since non-option granting firms have been removed.     
14
 Since option granting and non-option granting firms may be fundamentally different, I use a 
Heckman (1979) model to control for endogeneity and selection bias.  Results of the second 
stage model are generally similar to those presented in Table 3, Panel A, although some results 
are somewhat weaker.  These tests are discussed and presented in Section 5.1. 
15
 I assume that the stock option exercise price is equal to the firm estimated stock value on the 
option grant date since nearly all firms grant stock options with exercise prices equal to the 
estimated stock fair value (Yermack 1997). 
16
 I focus on stock options granted during the 18-month period prior to the IPOs since many 
practitioners warn that the SEC highly scrutinizes the valuations of stock options granted during 
that period (Ernst & Young 2011; Evans 2012). 
17
 In additional tests, I calculate cheap stock using stock options granted in the 12 months prior to 
the IPO rather than 18 months.  The results are generally consistent with those presented.  These 
tests are reported in Section 5.7. 
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return-adjusted IPO offer price, is calculated by adjusting the IPO offer price by the median 
(three digit SIC code) industry buy and hold stock return for the period between the option grant 
date and the IPO date.
18
  The second, the ROA match return-adjusted IPO offer price, is 
calculated by adjusting the IPO offer price by the buy and hold stock return over the period 
between the option grant date and the IPO date for a firm matched on (three-digit SIC code) 
industry and ROA  in the year prior to the IPO.
19
  The purpose of the offer price adjustments is to 
alleviate concerns that differences between the IPO offer price and the exercise price result from 
industry and economic factors and firm performance over the time period the options are 
outstanding.
20
  If the exercise price is greater than or equal to the return-adjusted IPO offer price, 
the intrinsic value is zero.  The return-adjusted intrinsic values are intended to capture the in-the-
money value of the stock options awarded to the CEO and the aggressiveness of firms in 
undervaluing the underlying stock price on the option grant date.  I calculate the Log of Cheap 
Stock, as the log of the return adjusted intrinsic value of the options.  The second measure, Cheap 
Stock / Cash Comp, is calculated as the return adjusted intrinsic value of the stock options scaled 
by the sum of the CEO’s salary and bonus during the fiscal year prior to the IPO.   
To capture the effect of accounting experts on audit committees, I determine whether the 
audit committee includes an accounting expert on the option grant date.  If options are not 
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 As described in the introduction, if a firm’s IPO offer price is $15 and the median industry buy 
and hold return for the time period between the option grant and the IPO is 40%, then the 
industry return-adjusted IPO offer price is $10.71 ($15 / (1 + 0.40)). 
19
 I also calculate the return-adjusted intrinsic value using the closing price of the stock on the 
first day of trading rather than the IPO offer price since the closing price may be considered the 
“true” value of the stock on the IPO date.  The results are generally consistent with those 
presented.  These tests are reported in Section 5.4. 
20
 In robustness tests, I construct additional measures of cheap stock by adjusting the IPO offer 
price by the buy and hold returns for the period between the option grant date and the IPO date 
of firms matched on industry and sales growth in the year prior to the IPO and on industry and 
assets in the year prior to the IPO.  The results are generally consistent using these additional 
measures.  These tests are reported in Section 5.3. 
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granted to the CEO, I determine whether the audit committee includes an accounting expert as of 
the fiscal year end prior to the IPO.  I follow prior studies (e.g., Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008; 
Dhaliwal et al. 2010) and classify directors as accounting experts if their biographies in the 
prospectus indicate prior work experience as a CPA, CFO, CAO, controller, or auditor.
21
  Audit 
Committee Accounting Expert is coded as a one if at least one audit committee member is an 
accounting expert, and zero otherwise.  I also measure the accounting expertise of non-audit 
committee directors since directors other than those on the audit committee influence executive 
compensation contracts and decisions.  Board Accounting Expert Only is coded as a one if there 
are no audit committee accounting experts, but at least one non-audit committee director is an 
accounting expert, and zero otherwise.
22
  I next include Board Independence, which is calculated 
as the percentage of independent directors on the option grant date.  Non-independent directors 
include the firm’s CEO, employees, former employees, and founders as indicated in director 
biographies in the prospectus.  
Stewardship theory defines settings where the interests of the CEO are aligned with the 
principals or shareholders (Davis et al. 1997).  This alignment is more likely to occur when the 
CEO helped create and grow the organization and when he/she has the ability to influence and 
control its direction (Davis et al. 1997; Wasserman 2006).  Since CEO stewardship is multi-
faceted and may not be captured by a one-dimensional measure, I create a CEO Steward Index, 
constructed similar to other CEO related indexes used prior research (Grinstein and Hribar 2004; 
                                                          
21
 If an audit committee does not exist prior to the IPO, I assume that the entire board of directors 
functions as the audit committee and determine whether a non-CEO director is an accounting 
expert. 
22
 I also construct a variable that indicates whether any member of the board of directors, 
excluding the CEO, is an accounting expert.  The results using this measure are consistent with 
the results using Audit Committee Accounting Expert and Board Accounting Expert Only.  The 
tests are reported in Section 5.5. 
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Adams et al. 2005; Henderson et al. 2010).  I include three characteristics that reflect increasing 
levels of CEO stewardship.  I first include CEO founder (i.e., whether the CEO was a firm 
founder) because CEO founders are expected to pursue organizational interests rather than their 
personal interests due to their larger equity ownership and their commitment to the firm.  The 
second component is CEO tenure (i.e., the number of years the CEO has been in office on the 
IPO date).  Longer tenured CEOs are more likely to have helped create and grow the firm, and 
thus are more committed to its long-term success.  The final component I include is CEO duality 
(i.e., the CEO also serves at the firm’s board chairman).  I include CEO duality because 
executives that have the ability to determine the firm’s direction are more likely to have a sense 
of “attachment and personal psychological ownership” (Wasserman 2006, 961).  I construct CEO 
Steward Index by summing the three categorical variables, CEO founder, CEO tenure, and CEO 
duality.  Each firm is assigned a one if the CEO is a founder, if CEO tenure is greater than the 
sample median CEO tenure, or if the CEO also serves as the chairman of the board.  CEO 
Steward Index therefore ranges between zero and three, three representing the greatest level of 
CEO intrinsic commitment to the firm.
23
  I next include Pre IPO New CEO, which is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the CEO’s tenure on the IPO date is two years or less, and zero 
otherwise.   
I include additional factors that might influence the level of cheap stock grants.  First, I 
include Valuation, an indicator variable equal to one if the prospectus indicates that the firm 
obtained an independent valuation of its stock price on the option grant date, and zero otherwise.  
Second, I include Director Grants, which is an indicator variable equal to one when at least one 
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 I also perform tests using the individual components of CEO Steward Index.  These results are 
discussed and presented in Section 5.6. 
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of the firm’s directors also receives stock option grants during the 18-month period prior to the 
IPO, and zero otherwise. 
I next include three measures of external monitoring that prior research suggests improve 
accounting quality.  The first, Big N, is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm’s auditor is 
one of the Big 4 accounting firms (i.e., Ernst & Young, PriceWaterhouse Coopers, Deliotte and 
Touche, or KPMG), and zero otherwise.  The second, Prestigious Underwriter, is an indicator 
variable equal to one for top tier underwriters, and zero otherwise.  I obtain the lead underwriters 
for each IPO in my sample from SDC Platinum and assign each underwriter a rank between zero 
and nine based on the underwriter prestige rankings of Loughran and Ritter (2004).
24
  Consistent 
with Loughran and Ritter (2004), prestigious underwriters are underwriters that are ranked either 
eight or nine.  The third, VC Backed, is an indicator variable equal to one if SDC Platinum 
indicates that the IPO was venture capital backed, and zero otherwise. 
I add several variables to control for firm specific characteristics that may affect the level 
of cheap stock grants.  Size is calculated as the natural log of total assets measured as of the fiscal 
year end prior to the IPO.  Firm Age is the natural log of the number of years between the date 
the firm was founded and the IPO date, and Tech is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm 
is in a high-tech industry and zero otherwise.
25
  To eliminate concerns about correlations across 
time, I include IPO-year fixed effects.   
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 Underwriter rankings are provided by Jay Ritter on his website: 
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm.  Underwriters are ranked based on the pecking 
order as documented in the prospectus.  Underwriters that are ranked 8 or 9 are considered to be 
prestigious national underwriters.  Underwriters ranked 5.0 through 7.9 are considered regional 
or niche underwriters.  Underwriters ranked less than 5.0 are generally associated with penny 
stocks.  Consistent with Loughran and Ritter (2004), if more than one underwriter is listed, I use 
the rank of the bookrunner, and if multiple bookrunners are listed, I use highest bookrunner rank.   
25 Consistent with Loughran and Ritter (2004) and Chahine and Goergen (2011)  firms with the 
following SIC codes are classified as Tech firms: 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578 (computer 
24 
 
3.3 Determinants of Revaluations 
In my review of IPO prospectuses, I identify firms that record a “cheap stock charge,” 
which results from a retrospective revaluation of the firm’s stock on the option grant date.  These 
revaluations identify stock option grants where the original stock valuations were too low, 
leading to an understatement of stock option-based compensation expense.  Some prospectuses 
indicate that revaluations were performed based on suggestions from the underwriters or because 
the board determined it was necessary in preparing for the IPO.  The SEC also requires some 
firms to record cheap stock charges when they determine that firms’ stock was undervalued on 
the option grant dates.  Revaluations are particularly interesting because they provide greater 
evidence that the initial stock option grants were undervalued, resulting in overstated earnings 
before the revaluation.  Furthermore, because revaluations have no effect on the CEO’s option 
exercise price, the CEO is rewarded for the undervaluation.  I investigate the determinants of 
revaluations by estimating the following model: 
Revaluation= α + β1 Audit Committee Accounting Expert + β2 Board Accounting Expert 
Only + β3Board Independence + β4CEO Steward Index + β5Pre IPO New CEO + 
β6Valuation + β7Director Options + β8Big N + β9VC Backed + β10Prestigious 
Underwriter + β11ROA + β12Size + β13Firm Age + β14Tech + ε,           (2) 
 
where Revaluation is measured as either Revaluation Occurrence, Revaluation Amount, or 
Revaluation %.  Revaluation Occurrence is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm performs 
a revaluation that results in a change in the stock value on the option grant date, and zero when 
the firm either did not revalue the stock or the revaluation had no effect on the CEO’s stock 
option grants.  Revaluation Amount captures the magnitude of the revaluation and is calculated 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
hardware), 3661, 3663, 3669 (communications equipment), 3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 
3679 (electronics), 3812 (navigation equipment), 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829 (measuring and 
controlling devices), 3841, 3845 (medical instruments), 4812, 4813 (telephone equipment), 4899 
(communications services), and 7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, and 7379 (software). 
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as the difference, if any, between the revalued stock price and the stock option exercise price 
multiplied by the number of options granted.
26
  Revaluation % captures the revaluation 
percentage of the grant on a per share basis.  Revaluation % is measured as the difference 
between the revalued stock price, if any, and the stock option exercise price, scaled by the option 
exercise price.  I estimate a probit model when Revaluation Occurrence is the dependent 
variable, since the dependent variable is a binary variable.  I estimate a Tobit model when 
Revaluation Amount or Revaluation % are the dependent variables since these variables are left 
censored at zero.  I exclude non-option granting firms from these tests since a revaluation is only 
possible when stock options are granted.  I predict Audit Committee Accounting Expert and 
Board Accounting Expert Only to be negatively associated with Revaluation.  If accounting 
expertise reduces the level of stock option undervaluation aggressiveness, then I expect a 
negative association between accounting experts and revaluations.  I also predict the coefficient 
on Valuation to be negative.  Since independent valuations should be less biased, I expect that 
revaluations occur less frequently and the magnitude of the revaluations will be smaller when 
firms obtain independent valuations.  I do not make predictions for the other variables in the 
model since the other variables may influence the aggressiveness of the original stock valuation, 
but may also influence the decision of the firm to perform a revaluation prior to the IPO in order 
to properly report earnings in the IPO prospectus.   
3.4 CEO Cheap Stock and Future Firm Performance 
 I next examine whether post-IPO performance varies within firms with greater levels of 
CEO cheap stock.  Prior research investigates the effect of predicted excess compensation on 
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 There are 40 grants in my sample where documentation from the prospectus indicates that the 
original stock price on the grant date was revalued, but the revalued stock price is not provided.  
I exclude these observations from the analyses when Revaluation Magnitude or Revaluation % is 
the dependent variable. 
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future firm performance (Core et al, 1999; Collins et al. 2009).  Using cheap stock as a proxy for 
excess compensation and using independent variables similar to those used by Core et al. (1999) 
and Collins et al. (2009), I estimate the below models at the firm level to test the association 
between CEO cheap stock and future operating performance: 
Three Year Avg. ROAi,t+2 = α + β1Tot Cheap Stockit + β2MVEit  + β3ROAi,t-1 + β4Salesi,t-1 
+ εit,                                                      (3a) 
 
Three Year Avg. CFOi,t+2 = α + β1Tot Cheap Stockit + β2MVEit  + β3CFOi,t-1 + β4Salesi,t-1 
+ εit.                         (3b) 
 
Three Year Avg. ROA is the firm’s return on assets averaged over the three fiscal years ended 
subsequent to the IPO, and Three Year Avg. CFO is cash flows from operations scaled by sales 
averaged over the three fiscal years ended subsequent to the IPO.  Tot Cheap Stock is one of four 
measures.  For each of these measures, I first calculate the CEO’s total cheap stock by summing 
the return-adjusted intrinsic values of the stock option grants for each CEO during the 18 months 
prior to the IPO using both the industry return adjusted value and the ROA match return adjusted 
value.  I then calculate Log of Tot Cheap Stock as the log of the CEO’s total cheap stock, and Tot 
Cheap Stock / Cash Comp as total cheap stock scaled by the sum of the CEO’s salary and bonus 
for the fiscal year prior to the IPO.  MVEt is calculated as the stock price multiplied by the 
number of shares outstanding on the first day following the IPO that the firm’s data is available 
on CRSP.  ROAt-1 is income available to common shareholders before extraordinary items for the 
fiscal year ended prior to the IPO deflated by assets at year end, and CFOt-1 is cash flows from 
operations scaled by sales for the fiscal year ended prior to the IPO.  Salest-1 is total sales in the 
fiscal year prior to the IPO.  Each of the models includes IPO-year fixed effects to eliminate 
concerns about correlations across time. 
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 I use the following model to test the association between cheap stock and future stock 
returns:   
Returnsi,t+3 = α + β1Tot Cheap Stockit + β2ROAi,t-1 + β3MVEit  + ε,             (4) 
 
where Returns is measured as either Three Year Abnormal Returns or Three Year Buy and Hold 
Returns.  Three Year Abnormal Returns is calculated as the firm’s three-year buy and hold return 
beginning on the date of the IPO, less the three-year median buy and hold return for firms within 
the same CRSP size decile. Three Year Buy and Hold Returns is the three-year buy and hold 
return beginning on the date of the IPO.  All other variables have been previously defined.  The 
model includes IPO-year fixed effects. 
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Tables 
In Table 1, I present descriptive statistics.  Panels A and B include all sample firms, and 
Panels C and D include only those observations where the CEO receives stock option grants.  I 
make this distinction since option granting firms may be fundamentally different from non-
option granting firms.  In Panel A, I present descriptive statistics at a firm level for all 392 
sample IPO firms.  Pre-IPO firms granted their CEOs 207,508 options, on average.  The mean 
(median) Tot Cheap Stock (Non adjusted) is $ 1,739,787 ($0), with the maximum value equal to 
$58,267,501 and the minimum equal to $0.  These statistics illustrate the potentially large effect 
of cheap stock on CEO wealth.  The mean (median) Underpricing for IPOs in my sample is 
12.0% (6.9%).  Consistent with prior IPO studies (Teoh et al. 1998), I find that IPO firms are 
generally smaller and younger firms.  The mean (median) Size (measured as total firm assets at 
the fiscal year end prior to the IPO) is $354.267 million ($69.555 million), and the mean 
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(median) Firm Age (not logged) is 14.818 (8.023) years.  Also consistent with prior research 
(Teoh et al. 1998), IPO firms in my sample generally earn negative excess returns in the three 
years following the IPO.  The mean (median) Three Year Abnormal Returnst+3 is -0.064 (-0.277).  
Approximately 82% of my sample IPO firms are audited by Big N auditors, 49.7% are venture 
capital backed, 78.3% are underwritten by prestigious underwriters, and 47.7% grant their 
directors options in the 18-month period prior to the IPO.  The average CEO Steward Index is 
1.217, and 22.4% of the sample firms have a new CEO.  IPO offer prices range between $4.00 
and $85.00, and the mean (median) IPO offer price is $13.76 (13.00). 
In Panel B, I present descriptive statistics on a grant basis for all sample firms.  My 
sample on a grant basis includes 479 observations.  The 179 firms that did not grant CEOs 
options represent one observation each with zero stock options granted.  Firm board of director 
composition frequently changes during the time period leading up to an IPO in order to comply 
with exchange standards.  Thus, I examine board characteristics on the option grant dates.  When 
no options were granted, I use the board composition on the last day of the fiscal year ended 
prior to the IPO.  In the 18-month period prior to the IPO, CEOs are granted cheap stock with a 
mean (median) value of $1,423,792 ($131,068).  In 37.0% of the observations, audit committees 
include an accounting expert, and independent directors represent approximately 67.1% of total 
board membership, on average. 
Panel C presents descriptive statistics at a firm level for the 213 option granting firms.  
The average CEO receives 381,893 options.  The mean (median) Tot Cheap Stock is $3,201,862 
($1,250,000).  Other descriptive statistics for option granting firms are similar to those of the full 
sample in Panel A with two notable exceptions.  First, 68.1% of option granting firms are 
venture capital backed compared with 49.7% in the full sample.  Second, the mean Size of option 
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granting firms is $236.226 million compared with $354.267 million for the full sample, 
indicating that option granting firms are smaller on average than non-option granting firms. 
Panel D presents descriptive statistics on a grant basis for option granting firms only.  
The sample includes 300 option grants to CEOs from the 213 option-granting firms.  On an 
individual grant basis, CEOs receive 257,384 options on average.  The mean (median) exercise 
price is $6.03 ($5.00) and exercise prices range from less than $0.01 to $30.60.  The mean 
(median) value of cheap stock on a per grant basis is $2,273,322 ($732,330).  Independent 
valuation specialists valued the stock price at the time of the option grant for 18.7% of the grants 
in my sample.  Forty-seven percent of the option grants were subsequently revalued because the 
original stock value was underestimated.  The average revaluation magnitude is $269,125 with 
the maximum revaluation amount totaling nearly $9 million.  In 39.0% of the observations, at 
least one accounting expert is a member of the audit committee, and independent directors 
represent 71.9% of total board membership, on average. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Table 2 presents Pearson (above the diagonal) and Spearman (below the diagonal) 
correlations for observations on a grant basis.  All sample firms are included in Panel A, and 
Panel B includes option granting firms only.  In Panel A, I find that the four measures of cheap 
stock, Log of Cheap Stock (Industry Return Adj.), Cheap Stock / Cash Comp (Industry Return 
Adj.), Log of Cheap Stock (ROA Match Return Adj.), and Cheap Stock / Cash Comp (ROA Match 
Return Adj.) are significantly positively correlated.  Consistent with my prediction, I find 
negative correlations between the cheap stock measures and Audit Committee Accounting 
Expert; however, the correlations are insignificant.  The correlations between the cheap stock 
measures and the CEO Steward Index are generally negative and significant, while the 
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correlations between the cheap stock measures and Pre IPO New CEO are positive and 
occasionally significant.  Also consistent with my expectations, I find positive and significant 
correlations between each cheap stock measure and Director Options.  I generally find positive 
and significant correlations between the cheap stock measures and Board Independence, Big N, 
and VC Backed.   
In Panel B, which includes option-granting firms only, I again find that Log of Cheap 
Stock (Industry Return Adj.), Cheap Stock / Cash Comp (Industry Return Adj.), Log of Cheap 
Stock (ROA Match Return Adj.) and Cheap Stock / Cash Comp (ROA Match Return Adj.) are 
significantly positively correlated.  Furthermore, the correlations between the four cheap stock 
measures and Revaluation, Revaluation Amount, and Revaluation % are generally positive and 
significant.  Consistent with my expectations, the associations between the cheap stock measures 
and Audit Committee Accounting Expert are negative and significant.  The correlations between 
the cheap stock measures and Board Independence are negative, but are generally not significant.  
I generally find significantly positive associations between the cheap stock measures and both 
Pre IPO New CEO and Director Options, which are consistent with my expectations.  I also find 
that the correlations between the cheap stock measures and CEO Steward Index are negative and 
generally significant.  Shifting to the Revaluation correlations, I find negative and significant 
correlations between both Revaluation Occurrence and Revaluation Amount and Valuation, 
which is consistent with my expectations.  I also find that the correlation between each 
revaluation measure and VC Backed is generally positive and significant. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
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4.2 Empirical Results 
4.2.1 Determinants of CEO Cheap Stock 
 Table 3 presents multivariate results examining the factors that affect the level of cheap 
stock grants.  In Panel A, I present results on a per grant basis for all sample firms, and in Panel 
B, I present results on a per grant basis for option granting firms only.  In Columns (1) and (2) of 
each panel, cheap stock is calculated using the industry return-adjusted IPO offer price and in 
Columns (3) and (4), cheap stock is calculated using the ROA match return-adjusted IPO offer 
price.  In Columns (1) and (3) the dependent variable is Log of Cheap Stock, and in Columns (2) 
and (4) the dependent variable is Cheap Stock / Cash Comp, each using the respective 
adjustment. 
 In Panel A, I find that the coefficient on Audit Committee Accounting Expert is negative 
and significant in each column.  These results are consistent with my expectations and suggest 
that accounting expertise reduces firms’ aggressiveness in granting undervalued stock options.  I 
find that the coefficient on Board Independence is also negative in each column, but only 
significant in Column (1).  This result provides evidence that opportunistic executive 
compensation is more likely when insiders make up a greater percentage of board membership, 
consistent with prior research (Collins et al. 2009).  The coefficient on CEO Steward Index is 
negative and significant in Columns (1) and (3), suggesting the CEOs with a greater intrinsic 
commitment to the firm do not demand greater levels of cheap stock, consistent with stewardship 
theory.  The coefficient on Pre IPO New CEO is generally positive as predicted, but is 
significant only in Column (2).  This result is provides evidence that new CEOs possess power 
over the boards, which results from their experience and expertise.  Also consistent with my 
expectations, I find that the coefficient on Director Options is positive and significant in each 
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column, suggesting that directors receiving stock option grants are more willing to grant CEOs 
greater levels of cheap stock.  I do not find that Big N, VC Backed, and Prestigious Underwriters 
constrain the level of cheap stock grants. 
 In Panel B, I present results using individual option grants for option granting firms only.  
The results are generally similar to those in Table 3, Panel A.  Consistent with my expectations, 
the coefficient on Audit Committee Accounting Expert is negative and significant in each 
column, and the coefficient on Board Accounting Expert Only is negative in each column, but 
only significant in Column (3).  Also consistent with my expectations, the coefficient on Board 
Independence is negative in in each column, but significant only in Columns (1) and (2).  The 
coefficient on CEO Steward Index is negative in each column and is significant in Columns (1) 
and (3).  As predicted the coefficient on Pre IPO New CEO is positive and significant in 
Columns (2) and (4).  The coefficient on Valuation is negative in each column and is significant 
in Columns (1) and (3), which suggests that independent valuation specialists perform less biased 
stock valuations than managers or directors, thus reducing the magnitude of cheap stock granted 
to CEOs.  Also as predicted, the coefficient on Director Options is positive and significant in 
each column.  Similar to Panel A, I do not find that Big N, VC Backed, or Prestigious 
Underwriters constrain the level of cheap stock grants. 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
4.2.2 Determinants of Revaluations 
I examine the effect of corporate governance on the occurrence and the magnitude of 
revaluations in Table 4.  Columns (1), (2), and (3) present results estimating Model (2) where 
Revaluation Occurrence, Revaluation Amount, and Revaluation % are the dependent variables, 
respectively.  The model is estimated using a probit model in Column (1), and a tobit model in 
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Columns (2) and (3).  I find the coefficient on Audit Committee Accounting Expert is negative 
but insignificant.  As expected, the coefficient on Board Accounting Expert Only is negative in 
each column and is significant in Columns (2) and (3).  These results provide some evidence that 
board accounting experts reduce the magnitude of subsequent revaluations by reducing the 
aggressiveness of stock undervaluations.  The coefficient on Board Independence in Column (1) 
is also negative and significant and is consistent with more independent boards of directors 
constraining opportunistic compensation.  I find that CEO Steward Index and Pre IPO New CEO 
are negatively associated with the revaluation measures.  These results indicate that CEOs with a 
greater intrinsic commitment to the firm are less likely to demand cheap stock grants that result 
in revaluations, consistent with Table 3, Panel B.  Although Pre IPO New CEOs generally 
receive greater magnitudes of cheap stock as indicated in Table 3, Panel B, they may resist 
recording revaluations as indicated by the negative association between Pre IPO New CEO and 
each revaluation measure.  Consistent with my expectations, the coefficient on Valuation is 
negative and significant in each column, suggesting that independent valuations are less biased 
and that firms and the SEC place greater confidence in independent valuations.  The positive and 
significant coefficient on VC Backed in each column suggests that venture capital firms 
recognize the potential accounting issues related to cheap stock in the IPO process and influence 
firms to retrospectively revalue the stock options.  I do not find that Big N, Prestigious 
Underwriter, or Director Options impact revaluations. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
4.2.3 CEO Cheap Stock and Future Firm Performance 
I next examine whether the level of cheap stock is associated with future firm 
performance.  I report the results from estimating Model (3a) and (3b) in Table 5 and the results 
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from Model (4) in Table 6.  In Table 5, I estimate Model (3a) in Panel A, where the dependent 
variable is Three Year Avg. ROA.  In Panel B, I estimate Model (3b) where the dependent 
variable is Three Year Avg. CFO.  In each panel, the variable of interest is one of the four 
measures of cheap stock.  In Columns (1) and (2) of each panel, Tot Cheap Stock is calculated 
using the industry return-adjusted IPO offer price and in Columns (3) and (4), Tot Cheap Stock is 
calculated using the ROA match return-adjusted IPO offer price.  In Columns (1) and (3) the 
dependent variable is Log of Tot Cheap Stock, and in Columns (2) and (4) the dependent variable 
is Tot Cheap Stock / Cash Comp, each using the respective adjustment.  In each column, I find 
that Tot Cheap Stock is negatively and significantly associated with Three Year Avg. ROA.  In 
Panel B, I find that Tot Cheap Stock is negatively and significantly associated with Three Year 
Avg. CFO in Columns (1) and (3).   
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
In Table 6, the dependent variable is Three Year Abnormal Returns in Panel A and Three 
Year Buy and Hold Returns in Panel B.  In Columns (1) and (2) of each panel, Tot Cheap Stock 
is calculated using the industry return-adjusted IPO offer price and in Columns (3) and (4), Tot 
Cheap Stock is calculated using the ROA match return-adjusted IPO offer price.  In Columns (1) 
and (3) the dependent variable is Log of Tot Cheap Stock, and in Columns (2) and (4) the 
dependent variable is Tot Cheap Stock / Cash Comp, each using the respective adjustment.  In 
Panel A, I find that the coefficient on each measure of Tot Cheap Stock is negative and 
significant, with the exception of Column (3).  I find similar results in Panel B.  Each measure of 
Tot Cheap Stock is negatively and significantly associated with Three Year Buy and Hold 
Returns.  Overall, the results in Tables 5 and 6 suggest that the weaker corporate governance 
structures that give rise to greater levels of CEO cheap stock are also manifest in other 
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contracting inefficiencies that lead to weaker future firm performance.
27
  Furthermore, cheap 
stock does not appear to represent greater pay for high-performing CEOs, nor does it appear to 
effectively incentivize CEOs to improve firm performance and value. 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
4.3 Additional Tests 
4.3.1 Determinants of Independent Valuations 
 Practitioners warn that the SEC “vigorously” challenges stock option valuations when 
contemporaneous independent valuations are not obtained (Ernst & Young 2011; 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2010).  The AICPA practice aid “Valuation of Privately-Held 
Company Equity Securities Issued as Compensation” suggests that for any significant share-
based payment, firms should obtain stock price valuations from independent valuation specialists 
on the stock option grant dates.  Practitioners also highly encourage firms to obtain 
contemporaneous independent valuations at the time of option grants.  They suggest that the SEC 
places greater confidence in independent third-party valuations than in board or management 
valuations because third party valuations are presumably more independent and objective, and as 
a result are more persuasive (Ernst & Young 2011; PriceWaterhouseCoopers  2010). 
 The results documented in Table 3, Panel B suggest that contemporaneous independent 
valuations result in lower levels of cheap stock.  Furthermore, the results in Table 4 suggest that 
the occurrence, amount, and percentage of revaluations are lower when a contemporaneous 
independent valuation is obtained.  Since independent valuations are such an important factor in 
                                                          
27
 Since cheap stock may be a proxy for corporate governance quality in IPO firms, it is 
important to understand the effect of cheap stock on future performance while controlling for 
corporate governance characteristics.  I re-estimate Models (3a), (3b), and (4) and include 
controls for corporate governance characteristics.  The results are generally consistent with those 
presented in Tables 5 and 6 and are presented and discussed in Section 5.2. 
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correctly accounting for pre-IPO stock option grants, I examine the determinants of independent 
valuations.   
Audit committee accounting experts do not necessarily possess the skills necessary to 
perform accurate stock price valuations.  As a result, obtaining an independent valuation of the 
stock price on the grant date enables the accounting experts to place greater confidence in the 
stock option accounting.  Thus, I expect a positive association between both Audit Committee 
Accounting Expert and Board Accounting Expert Only and Valuation.  Auditors also play a key 
role in the financial reporting quality of IPO firms (Beatty 1989).  Big N audit firms audit a high 
percentage of firms going through the IPO process.  This experience makes them keenly aware 
of key accounting issues during the IPO process, including cheap stock.  In fact, Big N audit 
firms issue documentation strongly encouraging their clients to obtain contemporaneous stock 
valuations when options are granted (Ernst & Young 2011).  Because auditors are legally liable 
for untrue statements in the IPO prospectus, I expect that they are more likely to require that 
firms obtain independent stock price valuations on option grant dates so that they can place 
greater confidence in the stock option accounting.  Thus, I predict that Big N will be positively 
associated with Valuation.  To test the determinants of independent valuations, I estimate the 
following model: 
 
Valuation = α + β1 Audit Committee Accounting Expert + β2 Board Accounting Expert 
Only + β3Board Independence + β4CEO Steward Index + β5Pre IPO New CEO + 
β6Director Options + β7Big N + β8VC Backed + β9Prestigious Underwriter + β10ROA + 
β11Size + β12Firm Age + β13Tech + ε,                            (6) 
 
where all variables have been previously defined.   
 I report the results examining the determinants of Valuation in Table 7.  Column (1) 
presents the results for all observations, and Column (2) presents the results for option granting 
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firms only.  In both columns, I find a positive and significant association between Audit 
Committee Accounting Expert and Valuation, which is consistent with audit committee 
accounting experts making decisions that improve financial reporting quality.  I do not find an 
association between Board Accounting Expert Only and Valuation.  Also consistent with my 
expectations, I find a positive and significant association between Big N and Valuation, 
consistent with Big N auditors properly influencing their clients to obtain independent valuations 
when stock options are granted prior to IPOs.  These results suggest that although Audit 
Committee Accounting Experts and Big N are not negatively and significantly associated with the 
occurrence or magnitude of revaluations, they influence or require firms to obtain independent 
valuations, which is reduces the likelihood and magnitude of revaluations.   
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
4.3.2 CEO Cheap Stock and IPO Underpricing 
 CEO Cheap Stock may result in adverse shareholder consequences in addition to poor 
future performance.  Specifically, cheap stock may incentivize CEOs to set their firms’ IPO offer 
price too low, which comes at the expense of pre-IPO shareholders.  Chahine and Goergen 
(2011) and Lowery and Murphy (2007) investigate the association between the gains on stock 
options granted to CEOs on the IPO date and IPO underpricing.  Lowery and Murphy (2007) 
suggest that more powerful CEOs who influence their compensation packages should also have 
the ability to set IPO offer prices at an artificially low level in order to maximize the value of 
their option gains, thus extracting rents from firms’ pre-IPO shareholders.  Lowry and Murphy 
(2007) fail to find evidence of a positive association between the CEO’s gains on IPO date 
option grants and underpricing, but Chahine and Goergen (2011), find a positive association 
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between IPO underpricing and the CEO’s gains on IPO date option grants only when the venture 
capital firms and the CEO are more powerful.   
 In the pre-IPO setting, CEOs have incentives to undervalue the firms stock on the option 
grant date.  The undervaluations on the option grant dates may potentially influence future 
valuations used in setting the IPO offer price.  Furthermore, CEOs may influence valuations 
downward in attempt to avoid large cheap stock charges on the firm’s income statement and to 
decrease the suspicion and scrutiny that may be placed on undervalued stock option grants.  
Thus, I predict a positive association between CEO cheap stock and IPO underpricing.  The 
positive and significant univariate correlations between the cheap stock measures and 
Underpricing in Table 2, Panels A and B, support this prediction. 
 In order to test my prediction in a multivariate setting, I estimate the following model at 
the firm level to test the association between CEO cheap stock and Underpricing: 
Underpricing= α + β1Tot Cheap Stockit + β2 Audit Committee Accounting Expert + β3 
Board Accounting Expert Only + β4Board Independence + β5CEO Steward Index + 
β6Pre IPO New CEO + β7Valuation + β8Director Options + β9Big N + β10VC Backed + 
β11Prestigious Underwriter + β12ROA + β13Size + β14Firm Age + β15IPO Proceeds + 
β16Tech + β17Internet + β18Leverage + ε,                      (5) 
 
where Underpricing, the dependent variable,  is defined as the difference between the closing 
price of stock on the first day of trading and the IPO offer price, scaled by the IPO offer price.  
IPO Proceeds is the log of the total proceeds from the IPO.  Internet is a dummy variable that 
identifies internet firms as classified by Loughran and Ritter (2004).
28
  Leverage is equal to long-
term debt scaled by total assets at the end of the fiscal year prior to the IPO.  All other variables 
have been previously defined. 
                                                          
28
 Internet firms are provided by Jay Ritter on his website: 
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm.   
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 I report the results examining the effect of cheap stock on IPO underpricing in Table 8, 
Panels A and B.  Panel A presents results using the full sample, and Panel B presents the results 
using option granting firms only.  In Columns (1) and (2) of each panel, cheap stock is calculated 
using the industry return-adjusted IPO offer price, and in Columns (3) and (4), cheap stock is 
calculated using the ROA match return-adjusted IPO offer price.  In Columns (1) and (3), Cheap 
Stock Grant is measured as Log of Cheap Stock, and in Columns (2) and (4) Cheap Stock Grant 
is measured as Cheap Stock / Cash Comp, each using the respective adjustment. 
In Panel A, I find that the coefficient on each measure of cheap stock is positive, but only 
significant in Column (4).  In Panel B, using option granting firms only, I find that cheap stock is 
positively associated with underpricing in Columns (1), (2), and (3), providing some evidence 
that cheap stock leads to greater levels of underpricing, which comes at the expense of pre-IPO 
shareholders. 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
4.3.3 Determinants of Stock Option Vesting Periods 
 I next investigate the vesting terms of the stock options granted to CEOs during the 18 
months prior to the IPO.  The vesting term is the period over which the ownership of the options 
transfers to the grantee.  The stock option vesting period is an important factor in executives’ 
compensation packages.  Cadman et al. (2012) suggest that managers prefer shorter vesting 
periods because shorter vesting periods make their compensation more liquid and it limits the 
risk of wealth loss caused by the volatility in the firm’s stock price.  Firms however, may prefer 
longer vesting periods because longer vesting periods can be used as a tool to retain talented 
CEOs and incentivize them to focus on longer-term firm growth rather than short-term personal 
wealth accumulation.  Cadman et al. (2012) find that CEOs with greater power are granted 
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options with shorter vesting periods.  Consistent with Cadman et al. (2012) I predict that more 
powerful CEOs will be negatively associated with the Vesting Period and that Board 
Independence will be positively associated with Vesting Period.  I also predict that CEOs 
receiving greater levels of cheap stock are more likely require shorter vesting periods in order to 
limit risks associated with the volatility of the firms’ stock following the IPO.  Furthermore, 
CEOs who receive greater levels of cheap stock may have power over their compensation 
packages that enable them to influence the option vesting period.   
 For option granting firms only, I examine the determinants of option vesting periods on a 
grant basis using the following model: 
Vesting Period = α + β1Tot Cheap Stockit + β2 Audit Committee Accounting Expert + β3 
Board Accounting Expert Only + β4Board Independence + β5CEO Steward Index + 
β6Pre IPO New CEO + β7Valuation + β8Director Options + β9Big N + β10VC Backed + 
β11Prestigious Underwriter + β12ROA + β13Size + β14Firm Age + β15Tech + ε,             (7) 
 
where Vesting Period is the number of years between the option grant date the vesting date of the 
last stock option vesting tranche, and all other variables have been previously defined.  
 I report the results from tests examining the determinants of stock option vesting periods 
in Table 9.  Contrary to my expectations, I do not find a significant association between the 
measures of cheap stock and the vesting period.  The coefficients on CEO Steward Index are 
negative and significant, which suggests that CEOs who are founders, the board chair person, or 
who have longer tenures have the ability to influence their option vesting periods to their benefit.  
I also find that Pre IPO New CEO is negative, but insignificant in each column. 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
4.3.4 Future Stock Option Intrinsic Values 
 In order for the CEOs to realize the benefits associated with cheap stock, the stock price 
of the firm must remain at level greater than the original exercise price through the vesting 
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periods of the options.  In Table 6, I find a negative association between cheap stock and future 
returns.  Thus, is important to understand whether CEOs still realize future personal benefits 
from cheap stock grants even though shareholder wealth has decreased over the three years 
subsequent to the IPO.  Positive future intrinsic values of the pre-IPO stock options when buy 
and hold returns are decreasing in the level of cheap stock provide further evidence that cheap 
stock grants are a form of rent extraction.   
 In Table 10, Panel A, I provide the distribution of option venting periods.  Approximately 
90% of the options vest between three and five years following the option grant, with 67% of the 
options vesting over the four-year period following the option grant.  To determine whether the 
intrinsic values of the pre-IPO stock option grants are still positive over the vesting period, I 
determine the intrinsic value of each stock option grant at the first five annual anniversary dates 
of the option grant.
29
  I calculate the option intrinsic value per share at these dates by subtracting 
the option exercise price from the stock value at on each anniversary.  I also multiply the 
intrinsic value by the number of shares granted to determine the total intrinsic value.  The 
statistics are reported in Table 10, Panel B.  The mean (median) intrinsic value on the IPO date is 
7.168 (6.775).  The mean (median) intrinsic value per share after one year increases to $8.686 
($7.565).  Each year thereafter, the mean remains relatively constant, but the median drops 
steadily through the fifth anniversary to a value of approximately $1.19.  The percentage of 
grants with an intrinsic value equal to zero is 13% on the IPO date, 15% after one year, 20% 
after two years, 28% after three years, 37% after four years, and 46% after five years.  These 
statistics indicate that although the future intrinsic value of many options is zero, the majority 
                                                          
29
 Some options are granted more than 12 months before the IPO.  As a result, the stock price on 
the first anniversary date is not available.  For these observations, I assume the stock price is 
equal to the IPO offer price.  
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remain positive over the option vesting period.  These statistics suggest that even though firm 
stock returns are negatively associated with the magnitude of cheap stock grants, CEOs still 
benefit from cheap stock grants. 
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
5. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
5.1 Endogeneity 
In the pre-IPO setting, option granting firms may be fundamentally different from those 
that do not grant options.  To examine whether there are fundamental differences between the 
213 option granting firms and the 179 non-option granting firms in my sample, I perform t-tests 
examining the differences in means of variables used to estimate Model (1).  The results of these 
tests are presented in Table 11.  I find that significant differences exist between option granting 
firms and non-option granting firms.  Specifically, firms that grant options have more 
independent boards of directors, are more likely to be audited by a Big N accounting firm, are 
more likely to be venture capital backed, are more likely to use a prestigious underwriter, are 
more likely to grant directors pre-IPO options, are smaller, younger, and are more likely to be 
technology firms.  
[Insert Table 11 Here] 
 As a result of the differences between the option granting firms and non-option granting 
firms, I follow Heckman (1979) to control for endogeneity and the selection bias.  I first estimate 
a probit model that models the decision of a firm to grant pre-IPO options to the CEO.  I then use 
an OLS model to examine the determinants of cheap stock levels.  In order to properly 
implement the Heckman (1979) method, an exogenous independent variable must be identified 
and included in the probit model in the first stage, but should be excluded from the second stage 
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model (Lennox et al. 2012).  I include the level of research and development in the year prior to 
the IPO as the instrument in the first stage.  I expect that firms with greater levels of research and 
development will be more likely to grant stock options to CEOs prior to the IPOs.  Research and 
development intensive firms generally have greater growth opportunities, and stock options are 
granted to incentivize CEOs to realize the firms’ growth potential.  I do not; however, expect 
research and development to be associated with the magnitude of cheap stock when pre-IPO 
stock options are granted.  In untabulated univariate tests, I find that the research and 
development is positively associated with the decision to grant pre-IPO stock options, but it is 
not associated with the magnitude of cheap stock in option granting firms.  Thus, research and 
development appears to an acceptable instrumental variable.   
The first stage results are documented in Table 12, Panel A.  As expected, I find that 
R&D is positively and significantly associated with the decisions to grant stock pre-IPO stock 
options to the CEO.  I also find that the decision to grant CEOs pre-IPO stock options is 
positively associated with Board Independence, Director Options, VC Backed, and Prestigious 
Underwriter.  The second stage results, which include the Inverse Mills Ratio and exclude R&D, 
are presented in Table 12, Panel B.  I find that the results are generally consistent with the results 
in Table 3, although some results are weaker.  Audit Committee Accounting Expert is negatively 
and significantly associated with each measure of cheap stock.  The coefficient on Board 
Independence is also negative in each column, but is only significant in Column (1).  The 
coefficient on Pre IPO New CEO is positive in each column, but only significant in Column (4). 
I also find that the coefficient on Director Options is positive in each column, but is only 
significant in Columns (2) and (4).   
[Insert Table 12 Here] 
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5.2 CEO Cheap Stock and Future Firm Performance Controlling for Corporate Governance  
 In Tables 5 and 6, I find that cheap stock is negatively associated with future firm 
performance.  The magnitude of cheap stock, however, may be a proxy for the quality for 
corporate governance in IPO firms.  Thus, it is important to control for governance factors to 
determine the effect of both cheap stock and corporate governance measures on future 
performance.  To examine the effect of cheap stock and corporate governance on future 
performance, I estimate the following models: 
Three Year Avg. ROAi,t+2 = α + β1Tot Cheap Stockit + β2MVEit  + β3ROAi,t-1 + β4Salesi,t-1 
+ β5Audit Committee Accounting Expert + β6Board Accounting Expert Only + β7Board 
Independence + β8CEO Steward Index + β9Pre IPO New CEO + β10Big N + β11VC 
Backed + β12Prestigious Underwriter + εit,                      (8a) 
 
Three Year Avg. CFOi,t+2 = α + β1Tot Cheap Stockit + β2MVEit  + β3CFOi,t-1 + β4Salesi,t-1 
+ β5Audit Committee Accounting Expert + β6Board Accounting Expert Only + β7Board 
Independence + β8CEO Steward Index + β9Pre IPO New CEO + β10Big N + β11VC 
Backed + β12Prestigious Underwriter + εit, and                      (8b) 
 
Returnsi,t+3 = α + β1Tot Cheap Stockit + β2ROAi,t-1 + β3MVEit + β4Audit Committee 
Accounting Expert + β5Board Accounting Expert Only + β6Board Independence + 
β7CEO Steward Index + β8Pre IPO New CEO + β9Big N + β10VC Backed + 
β11Prestigious Underwriter + ε,                                  (9) 
 
where all variables have previously been defined.  To eliminate concerns about correlations 
across time, I include IPO-year fixed effects in each of the above models. 
I report the results from estimating Models (8a) and (8b) in Table 13 and the results from 
estimating Model (9) in Table 14.  In Table 13, Panel A, I estimate Model (8a), where the 
dependent variable is Three Year Avg. ROA.  In Panel B, I estimate Model (8b), where the 
dependent variable is Three Year Avg. CFO.  In each panel, the variable of interest is one of the 
four measures of cheap stock.  In Columns (1) and (2) of each panel, cheap stock is calculated 
using the industry return-adjusted IPO offer price and in Columns (3) and (4), cheap stock is 
calculated using the ROA match return-adjusted IPO offer price.  In Columns (1) and (3) Tot 
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Cheap Stock is measured as Log of Tot Cheap Stock, and in Columns (2) and (4) the Tot Cheap 
Stock is measured as Tot Cheap Stock / Cash Comp, each using the respective adjustment.  In 
Panel A, I find that the coefficient on Tot Cheap Stock is negative and significant in Columns (1) 
and (3) using a two-tailed test.  In Panel B, I find that Tot Cheap Stock is negative and significant 
in Column (1).   
[Insert Table 13 Here] 
In Table 14, the dependent variable is Three Year Abnormal Returns in Panel A and 
Three Year Buy and Hold Returns in Panel B.  In Columns (1) and (2) of each panel, cheap stock 
is calculated using the industry return-adjusted IPO offer price.  In Columns (3) and (4), cheap 
stock is calculated using the ROA match return-adjusted IPO offer price.  In Columns (1) and (3) 
Tot Cheap Stock is measured as Log of Cheap Stock, and in Columns (2) and (4) Tot Cheap 
Stock is measured as Cheap Stock / Cash Comp, each using the respective adjustment.  In Panel 
A, I find that the coefficient on each measure of Tot Cheap Stock negative and significant with 
the exception of Column (3).  I find similar results in Panel B, where each measure of Tot Cheap 
Stock is negatively and significantly associated with Three Year Buy and Hold Returns.  Overall, 
the results in Tables 13 and 14 generally confirm that cheap stock is negatively associated with 
future operating and stock return performance even when controlling for corporate governance 
factors. 
[Insert Table 14 Here] 
5.3 Alternative Measures of Cheap Stock 
 Throughout the paper, I calculate cheap stock using the industry return-adjusted IPO 
offer price and the ROA match return-adjusted IPO offer price.  The adjustments helps reduce 
concerns that differences between the original option exercise prices and the IPO offer price are 
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due to industry and economic factors and firm performance.  As a robustness test, I calculate 
cheap stock using two additional methods.  In the first method, I match each IPO firm on 
industry (three digit SIC code) and sales growth from two years prior to the IPO to the year prior 
to the IPO.  I then adjust the IPO offer price by the matched firm’s return over the time period 
between the option grant date and the IPO date.  I determine the sales growth match return-
adjusted intrinsic value by subtracting the option exercise price from the sales growth match 
return-adjusted offer price.  I then multiply this value by the number of options granted.  In the 
second method, I determine a match firm based on industry (three digit SIC code) and total 
assets in the year prior to the IPO.  I then adjust the IPO offer price by the matched firm’s return 
over the time period between the option grant and the IPO date.  I determine the size match 
return-adjusted intrinsic value by subtracting the option exercise price from the sales growth 
match return-adjusted offer price.  I then multiply this value by the number of options granted.  
Consistent with the other measures used previously, I calculate the Log of Cheap Stock and 
Cheap Stock / Cash Comp, each using the respective adjustments. 
 I present the results using the additional cheap stock measures in Tables 15 and 16.  In 
Table 15, Panel A, I examine the determinants of cheap stock levels for all firms on a per grant 
basis.  In Panel B, I examine the determinants of cheap stock levels for option granting firms 
only.  The results in Panel A are similar to those in Table 3, Panel A.  In Panel A, I find that 
Audit Committee Accounting Expert is negatively and significantly associated with cheap stock 
in each column.  I also find a negative and significant association between Board Independence 
and each measure of cheap stock.  The coefficient on CEO Steward Index is negative and 
significant in Column (3).  I also find a negative and significant association between Valuation 
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and cheap stock in Column (3).  The coefficient on Director Options is positive and significant 
in Columns (1), (2), and (3).   
 In Panel B, I find results generally similar to those in Table 3, Panel B.  The coefficient 
on Audit Committee Accounting Expert is negative and significant in each column, and the 
coefficient on Board Independence is negative and significant in Columns (2) and (4).  The 
coefficient on CEO Steward Index is negative and significant in Column (3), and the coefficient 
on Pre IPO New CEO is positive and significant in Column (4).  I find a negative and significant 
association between cheap stock and Valuation in Column (3).  I also find that cheap stock is 
negatively associated with Director Options in Columns (1), (2), and (4).   
[Insert Table 15 Here] 
 In Table 16, I present results investigating the effect of cheap stock on future 
performance using the four alternative measures of Tot Cheap Stock.  I examine the effect of 
cheap stock on future ROA, cash flows from operations, abnormal returns, and buy and hold 
returns in Panels A, B, C, and D, respectively.  I find that the results are generally consistent with 
those presented in Tables 5 and 6.  In Panel A, I find a negative and significant association 
between Three Year Avg. ROA and cheap stock in Columns (1), (3), and (4).  In Panel B, I find a 
negative and significant association between Three Year Avg. CFO and cheap stock in Columns 
(1) and (3).  In Panel C and Panel D, I find a negative and significant association between each 
measure of cheap stock and Three Year Abnormal Returns and Three Year Buy and Hold 
Returns, respectively.  The results in Tables 15 and 16 confirm that my results are generally 
robust to using alternate measures of cheap stock (i.e., sales growth match return-adjusted IPO 
offer price and size match return-adjusted IPO offer price).   
[Insert Table 16 Here] 
48 
 
5.4 CEO Cheap Stock Calculated Using the Closing Stock Price on the First Day of Trading 
 It can be argued that the closing price of the stock on the IPO date is the true value of the 
IPO firm’s stock, and therefore should be used to determine the value of cheap stock rather than 
the IPO offer price.  As a robustness test, I calculate cheap stock using the closing price of the 
firm’s stock on the first day of trading.  Similar to the other measures of cheap stock used 
previously in the paper, I adjust the IPO firms’ closing price by the industry median return over 
the period the options were outstanding prior to the IPO, and by the ROA matched firm’s return 
over the same period.   
 In Table 17, I present results examining the determinants of cheap stock calculated using 
the first day closing stock price on a per grant basis.  In Panel A, I present results using all 
sample firms, and in Panel B, I present results using option granting firms only.  The results are 
generally consistent with Table 3.  In Panel A, I find that Audit Committee Accounting Expert is 
negatively and significantly associated with cheap stock in each column.  Board Accounting 
Expert Only is also negatively and significantly associated with cheap stock in Columns (3) and 
(4).  The coefficient on Board Independence is negative and significant in Columns (1), (2), and 
(4).  I find that the coefficient on CEO Steward Index is negative and significant in Column (1), 
and the coefficient on Pre IPO New CEO is positive and significant in Columns (2) and (4).  I 
also find that Director Options is positively and significantly associated with cheap stock in each 
column.   
 In Panel B, I find that I find that Audit Committee Accounting Expert is negatively and 
significantly associated with cheap stock in each column.  Board Accounting Expert Only is also 
negatively and significantly associated with cheap stock in Columns (3) and (4).  I find that the 
coefficient on Board Independence is negative and significant in Columns (2), and (4).  The 
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coefficient on CEO Steward Index is negative and significant in Columns (1) and (3), and the 
coefficient on Pre IPO New CEO is positive and significant in Columns (2) and (4).  I also find 
that Director Options is positively and significantly associated with cheap stock in each column. 
[Insert Table 17 Here] 
 In Table 18, I present results investigating the effect of total cheap stock on future 
operating and stock return performance, where cheap stock is calculated using the closing price 
of the stock on first day of trading following the IPO.  I examine the effect of cheap stock on 
future ROA, cash flows from operations, abnormal returns, and buy and hold returns in Panels A, 
B, C, and D, respectively.  I find that the results are generally consistent with those presented in 
Tables 5 and 6.  In Panel A, I find a negative and significant association between Three Year 
Avg. ROA and cheap stock in Columns (1) and (3).  In Panel B, I find a negative and significant 
association between Three Year Avg. CFO and cheap stock in Column (1).  In Panel C and Panel 
D, I find a negative and significant association between each measure of cheap stock and Three 
Year Abnormal Returns and Three Year Buy and Hold Returns, respectively.  The results in 
Tables 17 and 18 confirm that my results are generally robust to calculating cheap stock using 
the closing price on the first day of trading rather than the IPO offer price. 
[Insert Table 18 Here] 
5.5 Director Accounting Expert 
 In previous tests, I examine accounting expertise on the board of directors using two 
separate measures, Audit Committee Accounting Expert and Board Accounting Expert Only.  
Audit Committee Accounting Expert captures the accounting expertise on the audit committee 
and Board Accounting Expert Only captures accounting expertise on the board if there is not an 
accounting expert on the audit committee.  As a robustness test, I replace Audit Committee 
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Accounting Expert and Board Accounting Expert Only with Director Accounting Expert in 
Models (1) and (2).  Director Accounting Expert is an indicator variable equal to one when any 
one director is an accounting expert on the date an option was granted, and zero otherwise. 
The results including Director Accounting Expert in Models (1) and (2) are presented in 
Tables 19 and 20, respectively.  Table 19, Panel A presents results examining the determinants of 
cheap stock for all sample firms on a per grant basis, and Table 19, Panel B examines the 
determinants of cheap stock for option granting firms only.  In Table 19, Panels A and B, I find 
that the coefficient on Director Accounting Expert is negative and significant in each column, 
indicating that accounting experts on the board of directors constrain the level of cheap stock 
grants.  Table 20 presents results examining the determinants of revaluations.  In Table 20, I find 
that the coefficient on Director Accounting Expert is negative, but insignificant in each column.  
Overall, these results are consistent with the with the findings in Tables 3 and 4 that Audit 
Committee Accounting Experts are negatively associated with the level of cheap stock, but not 
associated with revaluations. 
[Insert Tables 19 and 20 Here] 
5.6 CEO Steward Index Components 
  In previous tests, I include CEO Steward Index, which is an index comprised of three 
variables: (a) CEO founder (i.e., the CEO is a firm founder), (b) CEO tenure, and (c) CEO 
duality (i.e., the CEO also serves as the chairman of the board).  In Table 21, I estimate Model 
(1) and replace CEO Steward Index with its components to determine the impact of the 
individual components on the level of cheap stock.  In Panel A, I present results for all sample 
firms, and in Panel B, I present results using option-granting firms only.  In Panel A, I find that 
coefficient on CEO Tenure is negative and significant in Columns (1) and (2), and the coefficient 
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on CEO Chair is negative and significant in Columns (2), (3), and (4).  The coefficient on CEO 
Founder is insignificant in each column.  In Panel B, I find that the coefficient on CEO Tenure is 
negative and significant in each column, and the coefficient on CEO Chair is negative and is 
significant in Column (2), (3), and (4).  The coefficient on CEO Founder not significant.  The 
coefficients on the other variables in the models generally remain the same.   
[Insert Table 21 Here] 
 In Table 22, I present the results estimating Model (2) where CEO Steward Index is 
replaced by its components, CEO Chair, CEO Founder and CEO Tenure to determine whether 
the individual components impact revaluations differently.  The coefficient on CEO Chair is 
negative and significant in Column (1) and the coefficient on CEO Founder is negative and 
significant in Column (2).   
[Insert Table 22 Here] 
5.7 CEO Cheap Stock Grants in the Twelve Months Prior to the IPO 
 Practitioners warn that the SEC is particularly concerned about the valuation of stock 
options granted in the 12 to 18 months prior to an IPO.  In Table 23, as a robustness test, I 
investigate the determinants of cheap stock granted in the 12-month period prior to the IPO 
rather than the 18 month period.  I also investigate the effect of cheap stock granted during the 
12 months prior to the IPO on future operating and stock return performance in Table 24.   
 In Table 23, Panel A, I find that Audit Committee Accounting Expert is negatively and 
significantly associated with cheap stock in each column.  I find that the coefficients on Board 
Independence and CEO Steward Index are negative and significant in Column (1).  I also find 
that Director Options is positively and significantly associated with cheap stock in Columns (2) 
and (4).  In Panel B, I find that Audit Committee Accounting Expert is negatively and 
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significantly associated with cheap stock in each column.  Board Independence is negatively and 
significantly associated with cheap stock in Columns (1) and (2).  The coefficient on CEO 
Steward Index is negative and significant in Column (1), and the coefficient on Valuation is 
negative and significant in Column (3).  I also find that Director Options is positively and 
significantly associated with cheap stock in Columns (1), (2), and (4).   
[Insert Table 23 Here] 
 In Table 24, I present results investigating the effect of cheap stock measured during the 
12-month period prior to the IPO on future operating and stock return performance.  I examine 
the effect of cheap stock on future ROA, cash flows from operations, abnormal returns, and buy 
and hold returns in Panels A, B, C, and D, respectively.  I find that the results are generally 
consistent with those presented in Tables 5 and 6.  In Panel A, I find a negative and significant 
association between Three Year Avg. ROA and cheap stock in each column.  In Panel B, I find a 
negative and significant association between Three Year Avg. CFO and cheap stock in Columns 
(1) and (3).  In Panel C and Panel D, I find a negative and significant association between each 
measure of cheap stock and Three Year Abnormal Returns and Three Year Buy and Hold 
Returns, respectively.  The results in Tables 23 and 24 confirm that my results are generally 
robust to calculating cheap stock over the 12-month period prior to the IPO rather than the 18-
month period, although some results examining the determinants of cheap stock are somewhat 
weaker. 
[Insert Table 24 Here] 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 Pre-IPO firms have incentives to grant CEOs cheap stock, (i.e., undervalued stock 
options) because undervalued stock option options result in lower compensation expense and in 
large cash windfalls to CEOs as the options vest following the IPOs.  Cheap stock is an area of 
concern to the SEC and is a key accounting issue in many IPOs because option undervaluations 
lead to earnings overstatements.  I investigate the effects of corporate governance structures on 
cheap stock.  I find that firms with audit committee accounting experts, with more independent 
boards of directors, with greater CEO intrinsic commitment to the firm, and firms that receive 
contemporaneous independent stock valuations grant lower levels of cheap stock.  Cheap stock is 
greater; however, when directors receive pre-IPO option grants.  I also find some evidence that 
new CEOs receive greater levels of cheap stock.  Overall, these results are consistent my 
expectation that higher quality governance structures constrain opportunistic CEO compensation 
in pre-IPO firms.  
I next investigate the factors that impact the occurrence and magnitude of retrospective 
revaluations of firms’ stock, which result in cheap stock charges.  I find that independent 
valuations on the option grant dates reduce the occurrence and magnitude of revaluations, 
validating the emphasis placed on independent valuations by practitioners and AICPA 
accounting guidance.  I also find that the occurrence and magnitude of revaluations is greater 
when the firm is venture capital backed, suggesting that venture capital firms improve financial 
reporting quality by recognizing grants that were originally undervalued and influencing firms to 
perform revaluations.  Although audit committee accounting experts and Big N auditors do not 
impact the occurrence or magnitude of revaluations, I find in additional analyses that audit 
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committee accounting experts and Big N auditors influence firms to obtain independent stock 
valuations, consistent with these monitors improving accounting quality.   
In my final analyses, I investigate the consequences of CEO cheap stock.   I predict and 
find that greater levels of cheap stock are negatively associated with future operating and stock 
return performance.  These results suggest that greater levels of cheap stock raise concerns about 
the effectiveness of corporate governance in pre-IPO firms in setting executive pay and are an 
indication of rent extraction and agency problems.  They also confirm the concerns of Bebchuk 
et al. (2002, 2) that inefficient pay structures “weaken or distort incentives and that thus, in turn, 
further reduce shareholder value.”  In additional analyses, I also find that IPO underpricing is 
greater when CEOs receive greater levels of cheap stock.  Thus, CEO cheap stock leads to a 
reduction of shareholder value for both pre- and post-IPO shareholders.   
My research contributes to the IPO, corporate governance, and CEO compensation 
literatures.  I identify a setting where CEOs of pre-IPO firms opportunistically influence their 
compensation though weaker corporate governance structures.  My findings illustrate the 
importance of high-quality governance structures and monitoring in pre-IPO firms and inform 
regulators, investors, academics, and practitioners about potential inefficient compensation 
practices in IPO firms that adversely affect shareholder value and overstate earnings. 
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APPENDIX A 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Cheap Stock Grant = The number of stock options in an option grant to the CEO of firm i 
multiplied by the difference between the return-adjusted IPO offer 
price of firm i and the stock option exercise price, where the return-
adjusted IPO offer price is either the IPO offer price adjusted by the 
industry median buy-and-hold return for the period between the 
option grant date and the IPO date or the IPO offer price adjusted 
by buy and hold return between the option grant date and the IPO 
date of a firm matched on industry and ROA in the year prior to the 
IPO. 
Tot Cheap Stockt =  The sum of Cheap Stock Grant of the CEO of firm i for the 18- 
month period prior to the IPO. 
Log of Cheap Stock =  The natural log of Cheap Stock Grant of firm i. 
Cheap Stock / Cash Comp 
= 
Cheap Stock Grant as a percentage of the sum of the CEO’s salary 
and bonus of firm i measured at the fiscal year ended prior to the 
IPO. 
Log of Tot Cheap Stock =  The natural log of Tot Cheap Stock of firm i. 
Tot Cheap Stock / Cash 
Comp = 
Tot Cheap Stock as a percentage of the sum of the CEO’s salary 
and bonus for firm i measured at the fiscal year ended prior to the 
IPO. 
Revaluation Occurrence = An indicator variable equal to one if firm i performed a 
retrospective revaluation of its stock price on the option grant date 
that resulted in a change to the original stock price valuation, and 
zero otherwise.   
Revaluation Amount = The difference, if any, between the revalued stock price on the 
option grant date and the original stock option exercise price 
multiplied by the number of options granted.   
Revaluation % = The difference, if any, between the revalued stock price on the 
option grant date and the original stock option exercise price scaled 
by the original exercise price. 
Three Year Avg. ROAt+2 = Return on assets of firm i averaged over the three fiscal years ended 
subsequent to the IPO, where return on assets is calculated as 
income available to common shareholders before extraordinary 
items deflated by assets at the beginning of the year. 
Three Year Avg. CFOt+2 = Cash flows from operations of firm i averaged over the three fiscal 
years ended subsequent to the IPO, where cash flows from 
operations is calculated as cash flows from operations as a 
percentage of sales for fiscal year t. 
Three Year Buy and Hold 
Returnst+3 = 
The buy-and-hold return of firm i for the three-year period 
following the IPO. 
Three Year Abnormal 
Returnst+3 = 
The buy-and-hold return of firm i for the three-year period 
following the IPO less the buy and hold return for firms within the 
same CRSP decile during the same three year period. 
Audit Committee An indicator variable equal to one if the audit committee of firm i 
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Accounting Expert = includes at least one accounting expert on the option grant date, and 
zero otherwise. 
Board Accounting Expert 
Only = 
An indicator variable equal to one if firm i’s audit committee does 
not include an accounting expert, but least one non-audit committee 
director of firm i on the option grant date is an accounting expert, 
and zero otherwise. 
Board Independence = The percentage of independent directors on the board of directors 
of firm i on the date of the option grant. 
CEO Steward Index = The sum of three categorical variables of firm i: one if the CEO is 
the firm founder or co-founder, one if the CEO’s Tenure is greater 
than the median CEO Tenure, and one if the also serves as the 
chairman of the board of directors. 
Pre IPO New CEO = An indicator variable equal to one if the CEO of firm i has held the 
CEO position for two years or less on the IPO date, and zero 
otherwise. 
Big N = An indicator variable equal to one if firm i is audited by a Big 4 
auditor, and zero otherwise. 
VC Backed = An indicator variable equal to one if firm i is backed by venture 
capital, and zero otherwise. 
Prestigious Underwriter = An indicator variable equal to one if firm i's IPO is underwritten by 
a prestigious underwriter and zero otherwise.   
Valuation = An indicator variable equal to one if the pre-IPO stock option grant 
of firm i was valued by an independent valuation specialist on the 
option grant date, and zero otherwise. 
Director Options = An indicator variable equal to one if firm i's non-employee 
directors received stock option grants during the 18-month period 
prior to the IPO, and zero otherwise. 
Size = The natural log of assets of firm i at the end of the fiscal year prior 
to the IPO. 
Firm Age = The natural log of number of years between firm i's inception and 
the IPO. 
Tech = An indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s industry is a high-
tech industry, and zero otherwise. 
Options Granted = An indicator variable equal to one if firm i's CEO was granted 
stock options during the 18 months prior to the IPO, and zero 
otherwise. 
ROAt-1 = Income available to common shareholders before extraordinary 
items of firm i deflated by assets at t-1. 
OCFt-1 = Cash flows from operations of firm i scaled by sales at year end, 
measured at t-1. 
Salest-1 = Total sales of firm i for the fiscal year ended prior to the IPO. 
MVEt = The market value of equity of firm i, calculated as the stock price 
on the first day after the IPO firm data is available on CRSP 
multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. 
Underpricing = The difference between the closing price of stock on the first day of 
trading and the IPO offer price, scaled by the IPO offer price. 
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IPO Proceeds = The log of the total proceeds from the IPO. 
Internet = An indicator variable equal to one for internet firms as classified by 
Loughran and Ritter (2004), and zero otherwise. 
Leverage = Long-term debt scaled by total assets at the end of the fiscal year 
prior to the IPO. 
Vesting Period = The number of years between the option grant date the vesting date 
of the last stock option vesting tranche. 
Director Accounting 
Expert = 
An indicator variable equal to one if the audit committee of firm i 
includes at least one accounting expert on the option grant date, and 
zero otherwise. 
R&D = Research and development expenditures of firm i for the fiscal year 
ended prior to the IPO scaled by assets at the end of the same 
period. 
Founder = An indicator variable equal to one for firms where the CEO was a 
firm founder or co-founder, and zero otherwise. 
Tenure = The natural log of the number of years the CEO has served as the 
CEO. 
CEO Chair = An indicator variable equal to one if the CEO also serves as the 
board chairperson, and zero otherwise. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
       
Variable Mean Std. Dev Minimum 
25th 
Percentile 
50th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile Maximum 
Panel A: Observations = All sample firms (N=392)           
Options Granted 207,508  519,594  0.000  0.000    43,000  227,152  6,659,143  
Offer Price   13.760      6.793      4.000    10.000    13.000    17.000      85.000  
Tot Cheap Stock (Non adjusted) 1,739,787  4,810,838  0.000  0.000  0.000  1,541,720   58,267,501  
Tot Cheap Stock (Industry Return 
Adj.) 1,407,161  4,047,868  0.000  0.000  0.000  1,148,936  57,282,070  
Tot Cheap Stock (ROA Match 
Return Adj.) 1,424,156  4,501,907  0.000  0.000  0.000  1,163,753   58,267,501  
Total Salary and Bonus 594,633  626,360  1.000  290,285  415,143  696,278  6,250,000  
Big N     0.821      0.383  0.000  1.000  1.000  1.000        1.000  
CEO Steward Index     1.217      1.049  0.000  0.000  1.000  2.000        3.000  
Pre IPO New CEO     0.224      0.418  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000        1.000  
VC Backed     0.497      0.501  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000        1.000  
Prestigious Underwriter     0.783      0.413  0.000  1.000  1.000  1.000        1.000  
Director Options     0.477      0.500  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000        1.000  
ROAt-1 -0.315 1.631 -26.931 -0.362 -0.008 0.063 1.143 
Sizet-1 354.267  943.297  0.263  29.858  69.555  290.063  9,907.000  
MVE 610,089  1,100,288      7,177  191,173  333,123  688,812   16,323,424  
Firm Age   14.818    18.008  0.359  5.637  8.023  16.477    107.674  
R&D     0.251      1.327  0.000  0.000  0.023  0.269      25.258  
Underpricing     0.120      0.196  (0.912) 0.000  0.069  0.196        1.000  
Three Year Avg. ROA -0.221 1.051 -16.481 -0.265 0.017 0.096 0.866 
Three Year Avg. CFO (N=371) -3.201 39.276 -748.538 -0.016 0.064 0.160 30.874 
Three Year Buy and Hold Returns -0.045 1.171 -1.445 -0.652 -0.297 0.260 14.785 
Three Year Abnormal Returns -0.064 1.176 -1.522 -0.682 -0.277 0.248 14.793 
        
  
  
 
6
4
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Minimum 
25th 
Percentile 
50th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile Maximum 
Panel B: Observations = Individual option grants for all sample firms (N=479)  
Options Granted 164,397  416,572  0.000  0.000    50,000  180,958  6,659,143  
Cheap Stock (Non adjusted) 1,423,792  4,081,221  0.000  0.000  131,068  1,200,000   58,267,501  
Cheap Stock (Industry Return Adj.) 1,151,580  3,485,365  0.000  0.000  94,164  1,045,268  57,282,070  
Log Cheap Stock (Industry Return 
Adj.)     7.344      6.866  0.000  0.000  11.453    13.860      17.863  
Cheap Stock / Cash Comp (Industry 
Return Adj.)   96.131  2,026.790  0.000  0.000  0.201      2.347  44,358.030  
Cheap Stock (ROA Match Return 
Adj.) 1,165,489  3,847,441  0.000  0.000  34,500  840,000  58,267,501  
Log of Cheap Stock (ROA Match 
Return Adj.)     7.006      6.847  0.000  0.000  10.449    13.641      17.881  
Cheap Stock / Cash Comp (ROA 
Match Return Adj.)   17.965  319.325  0.000  0.000  0.065      1.938  6,965.980  
Audit Committee Accounting Expert     0.370      0.483  0.000  0.000  0.000      1.000        1.000  
Board Accounting Expert     0.044      0.205  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000        1.000  
Board Independence   67.063    22.987  0.000    60.000    75.000    83.333    100.000  
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Variable Mean Std. Dev Minimum 
25th 
Percentile 
50th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile Maximum 
Panel C: Observations = Option granting firms only (N=213)           
Options Granted 381,893  656,521   312  100,000  203,010  433,344  6,659,143  
Weighted Average Intrinsic Value     6.098      4.986  0.000  2.935  5.389      8.519      39.810  
Weighted Average Exercise Price     5.724      3.968  0.000  2.730  5.172      8.000      20.000  
IPO Offer Price   12.927      5.023  4.000  9.000  12.500    15.000      43.000  
Tot Cheap Stock (Non adjusted) 3,201,862  6,162,974  0.000  286,000  1,250,000  3,652,180  58,267,501  
Tot Cheap Stock (Industry Return 
Adj.) 2,589,704  5,209,899  0.000  225,000  983,931  3,115,015  57,282,070  
Tot Cheap Stock (ROA Match 
Return Adj.) 2,620,983  5,850,460  0.000  160,284  870,000  2,778,125  58,267,501  
Big N     0.859      0.349  0.000  1.000  1.000      1.000   1.000  
CEO Steward Index     1.188      1.052  0.000  0.000  1.000      2.000   3.000  
Pre IPO New CEO     0.221      0.416  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000   1.000  
VC Backed     0.681      0.467  0.000  0.000  1.000      1.000   1.000  
Prestigious Underwriter     0.831      0.376  0.000  1.000  1.000      1.000   1.000  
Valuation     0.197      0.399  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000   1.000  
Director Grants     0.634      0.483  0.000  0.000  1.000      1.000   1.000  
ROAt-1 -0.279 0.537 -3.648 -0.494 -0.134 0.040 1.143 
Sizet-1 236.226  805.855      1.313    26.763    50.155  129.050  9,907.000  
MVEt 529,010  769,432    15,233  190,508  318,163  642,601  9,487,195  
Firm Age   11.262    14.226  0.359  5.460  7.236    10.066    107.674  
R&D     0.244      0.298  0.000  0.000  0.147      0.386   1.873  
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Variable Mean Std. Dev Minimum 
25th 
Percentile 
50th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile Maximum 
Panel D: Observations = Individual option grants for option granting firms only (N= 300)  
Options Granted 257,384  502,631  312  51,133  133,333  303,332  6,659,143  
Option Exercise Price     6.030      4.869      0.000      2.315      5.000      8.750      30.600  
Cheap Stock (Non adjusted) 2,273,322  4,968,923      0.000  201,673  732,330  2,307,976  58,267,501  
Cheap Stock (Industry Return Adj.) 1,838,690  4,260,583  0.000  160,086  617,646  1,975,557  57,282,070  
Log Cheap Stock (Industry Return 
Adj.)   11.727      4.880  0.000  11.983  13.334  14.496      17.863  
Cheap Stock / Cash Comp (Industry 
Return Adj.) 153.489  2,560.910  0.000  0.359  1.537  3.887  44,358.030  
Cheap Stock (ROA Match Return 
Adj.) 1,860,898  4,729,299  0.000    93,608  535,000  1,784,679  58,267,501  
Log of Cheap Stock (ROA Match 
Return Adj.)   11.187      5.293  0.000  11.447  13.190  14.395      17.881  
Cheap Stock / Cash Comp (ROA 
Match Return Adj.)   28.684  403.367  0.000  0.198  1.373  3.741  6,965.980  
Revaluation Occurrence     0.470      0.500  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000   1.000  
Revaluation Amount 269,125  836,325  0.000  0.000  0.000  112,500  8,944,992  
Revaluation %     1.463      5.101  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.483      50.061  
Audit Committee Accounting Expert     0.390      0.489  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000   1.000  
Board Accounting Expert Only     0.043      0.204  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000   1.000  
Board Independence   71.877    16.944  0.000  66.667  76.389  83.333      90.909  
Valuation     0.187      0.390  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000   1.000  
 
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for IPOs completed between 2004 and 2007.  Panel A presents descriptive statistics on 
a firm basis for all sample firms.  Panel B presents descriptive statistics on an individual grant basis for all sample firms.  Panel C 
presents firm level descriptive statistics for option granting firms only, and Panel D presents descriptive statists on an individual grant 
basis for option granting firms only.  Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  In Table 1, I do not take the natural log of 
Firm Aget and Sizet-1. 
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TABLE 2 
Pearson and Spearman Correlations 
 
Panel A: Individual option grants for all sample firms               
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
 
 
       
 
     
  
   
1 Log Cheap Stock (Industry Return 
Adj.) 
 
0.47 0.95 0.47 0.35 0.25 0.24 0.12 -0.02 -0.02 0.20 -0.09 0.04 0.02 0.32 0.10 0.38 0.18 
2 Cheap Stock / Cash Comp (Industry 
Return Adj.) 0.98 
 
0.48 0.93 0.02 0.19 0.13 0.14 -0.07 0.00 0.02 -0.09 0.15 0.01 0.20 0.05 0.11 0.10 
3 Log Cheap Stock (ROA Match 
Return Adj.) 0.96 0.95 
 
0.49 0.36 0.26 0.25 0.14 -0.02 -0.05 0.20 -0.08 0.03 0.01 0.30 0.10 0.36 0.18 
4 Cheap Stock / Cash Comp (ROA 
Match Return Adj.) 0.94 0.97 0.98 
 
0.05 0.21 0.16 0.12 -0.05 0.01 0.05 -0.07 0.10 0.02 0.19 0.03 0.12 0.09 
5 Revaluation Occurrence 0.28 0.31 0.29 0.32  0.47 0.48 0.06 -0.03 -0.05 0.08 -0.06 -0.10 -0.06 0.12 0.04 0.27 0.01 
6 Revaluation Amount 0.38 0.40 0.38 0.40 0.99  0.70 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.09 -0.12 0.02 -0.09 -0.03 0.07 0.18 0.02 
7 Revaluation % 0.36 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.99 0.99  -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 0.06 -0.07 0.00 -0.09 -0.01 0.01 0.19 -0.01 
8 Underpricing 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.00  -0.05 -0.02 0.00 0.15 -0.07 0.15 0.10 0.04 0.16 0.19 
9 Audit Committee Accounting Expert -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02  -0.16 0.17 0.05 -0.02 0.14 0.19 -0.12 0.06 0.06 
10 Board Accounting Expert Only -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 -0.16  0.05 0.08 -0.09 -0.04 -0.01 0.05 0.07 0.00 
11 Board Independence 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.06 0.10 0.10 -0.06 0.16 0.03  -0.01 -0.16 0.11 0.18 0.16 0.29 0.22 
12 CEO Steward Index -0.13 -0.11 -0.10 -0.09 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 0.11 0.04 0.09 -0.01  -0.45 0.14 0.11 -0.14 0.13 -0.02 
13 Pre IPO New CEO 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.04 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.02 -0.02 -0.09 -0.10 -0.46  -0.06 -0.05 0.05 -0.21 0.03 
14 Valuation 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 0.13 0.14 -0.04 0.09 0.14 -0.06  0.15 0.04 0.12 0.09 
15 Director Options 0.30 0.32 0.28 0.30 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.19 -0.01 0.13 0.11 -0.05 0.15  -0.07 0.32 0.04 
16 Big N 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 -0.12 0.05 0.18 -0.14 0.05 0.04 -0.07  0.12 0.38 
17 VC Backed 0.32 0.35 0.32 0.35 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.25 0.12 -0.21 0.12 0.32 0.12  0.18 
18 Prestigious Underwriter 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.16 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.00 0.19 -0.02 0.03 0.09 0.04 0.38 0.18  
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Panel B: Individual option grants for option granting firms only 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
 
 
       
 
     
  
   
1 Log Cheap Stock (Industry Return 
Adj.) 
 
0.38 0.86 0.37 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.17 -0.15 -0.05 -0.09 -0.17 0.16 -0.09 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.14 
2 Cheap Stock / Cash Comp 
(Industry Return Adj.) 0.93 
 
0.37 0.92 -0.08 0.13 0.07 0.16 -0.11 0.01 -0.13 -0.11 0.22 -0.01 0.12 0.02 -0.05 0.07 
3 Log Cheap Stock (ROA Match 
Return Adj.) 0.93 0.88 
 
0.40 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.20 -0.13 -0.09 -0.04 -0.13 0.10 -0.09 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.14 
4 Cheap Stock / Cash Comp (ROA 
Match Return Adj.) 0.87 0.94 0.94 
 
-0.05 0.16 0.10 0.13 -0.09 0.01 -0.06 -0.08 0.15 0.00 0.11 0.01 -0.04 0.06 
5 Revaluation Occurrence 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.11  0.45 0.46 0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.06 -0.11 -0.11 0.01 0.00 0.16 -0.04 
6 Revaluation Amount 0.11 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.97  0.69 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 0.07 -0.15 0.04 -0.13 -0.12 0.07 0.14 -0.01 
7 Revaluation % 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.97 0.98  -0.07 -0.08 -0.05 0.01 -0.08 0.00 -0.13 -0.11 -0.01 0.15 -0.06 
8 Underpricing 0.18 0.20 0.15 0.17 0.01 -0.02 -0.02  -0.07 -0.01 -0.06 0.17 -0.07 0.12 0.08 -0.06 0.15 0.22 
9 Audit Committee Accounting 
Expert 
-0.10 -0.12 -0.10 -0.12 -0.05 -0.04 -0.06 -0.02  -0.17 0.16 0.10 0.00 0.13 0.14 -0.18 -0.01 0.07 
10 Board Accounting Expert Only -0.08 -0.05 -0.08 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 0.00 -0.17  0.03 0.08 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 
11 Board Independence -0.06 -0.09 -0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.13 0.13 0.04  0.13 -0.21 0.05 0.01 0.12 0.20 0.10 
12 CEO Steward Index -0.21 -0.17 -0.16 -0.13 -0.06 -0.09 -0.07 0.16 0.09 0.09 0.07  -0.45 0.17 0.14 -0.14 0.15 0.09 
13 Pre IPO New CEO 0.22 0.20 0.14 0.13 -0.11 -0.10 -0.10 -0.03 0.00 -0.07 -0.14 -0.46  -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 -0.20 0.00 
14 Valuation -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.11 -0.13 -0.13 0.11 0.13 -0.06 0.01 0.17 -0.07  0.11 0.04 0.08 0.08 
15 Director Options 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.12 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.10 0.14 -0.05 0.01 0.13 -0.02 0.11  -0.17 0.19 0.05 
16 Big N 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.18 0.05 0.14 -0.14 -0.01 0.04 -0.17  0.07 0.23 
17 VC Backed -0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.10 -0.01 0.06 0.19 0.14 -0.20 0.08 0.19 0.07  0.12 
18 Prestigious Underwriter 0.17 0.10 0.16 0.09 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.22 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.23 0.12  
 
Notes: This table presents the Pearson (above the diagonal) and Spearman (below the diagonal) correlations between variables.  Significant correlations (p-values < 0.10) are in 
bold.  Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  Panel A consists of 479 grant observations for all sample firms, and Panel B consists of 300 grant observations for option 
granting firms only.
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TABLE 3 
Determinants of Cheap Stock 
 
Panel A: Individual option grants for all sample firms 
  
 
Industry Return Adj.   ROA Match Return Adj. 
Dependent variable: 
 
Log of 
Cheap 
Stock 
Cheap 
Stock / 
Cash Comp 
 
Log of 
Cheap 
Stock 
Cheap 
Stock / 
Cash Comp 
  
 
(1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Intercept ? 0.664 0.226   0.890 0.570 
  
(0.551) (0.895) 
 
(0.455) (0.708) 
Audit Committee Accounting 
Expert - -1.258*** -0.985** 
 
-1.177*** -1.016** 
  
(0.002) (0.021) 
 
(0.005) (0.020) 
Board Accounting Expert Only - -0.824 0.285 
 
-1.712 0.338 
  
(0.188) (0.427) 
 
(0.107) (0.413) 
Board Independence - -0.012** -0.018 
 
-0.007 -0.010 
  
(0.019) (0.103) 
 
(0.188) (0.189) 
CEO Steward Index - -0.363** -0.176 
 
-0.353* -0.174 
  
(0.044) (0.250) 
 
(0.054) (0.245) 
Pre IPO New CEO + 0.297 1.403** 
 
0.171 1.055 
  
(0.291) (0.050) 
 
(0.385) (0.107) 
Valuation - -0.630 0.201 
 
-0.843 -0.034 
  
(0.173) (0.609) 
 
(0.110) (0.482) 
Director Options + 0.926** 1.465*** 
 
0.856** 1.274*** 
  
(0.021) (0.001) 
 
(0.048) (0.003) 
Big N - -0.006 0.165 
 
0.024 -0.123 
  
(0.495) (0.604) 
 
(0.516) (0.432) 
VC Backed - 0.735 -0.112 
 
0.439 -0.262 
  
(0.906) (0.437) 
 
(0.773) (0.356) 
Prestigious Underwriter - 0.974 0.816 
 
1.140 0.766 
  
(0.959) (0.932) 
 
(0.962) (0.911) 
ROA ? 0.443 -0.011 
 
0.299 -0.022 
  
(0.395) (0.978) 
 
(0.576) (0.956) 
Size ? 0.051 0.010 
 
0.024 0.036 
  
(0.791) (0.962) 
 
(0.907) (0.884) 
Firm Age ? -0.277 -0.048 
 
-0.416* -0.197 
  
(0.170) (0.875) 
 
(0.065) (0.474) 
Tech ? -0.037 0.502 
 
0.030 0.424 
  
(0.934) (0.393) 
 
(0.953) (0.462) 
Options granted + 11.260*** 3.508*** 
 
10.663*** 3.311*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
       
Number of observations 
 
479 479 
 
479 479 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.699 0.137   0.638 0.117 
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Panel B: Individual option grants for option granting firms only 
    Industry Return Adj.   ROA Match Return Adj. 
Dependent variable: 
 
Log of 
Cheap 
Stock 
Cheap 
Stock / 
Cash 
Comp 
 
Log of 
Cheap 
Stock 
Cheap 
Stock / 
Cash Comp 
    (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Intercept ? 11.838*** 2.179   11.141*** 2.940 
 
 
(0.000) (0.479) 
 
(0.000) (0.354) 
Audit Committee Accounting 
Expert - -2.201*** -2.221*** 
 
-2.158*** -2.290*** 
 
 
(0.001) (0.007) 
 
(0.003) (0.006) 
Board Accounting Expert Only - -1.757 -0.155 
 
-3.680** -0.657 
 
 
(0.126) (0.469) 
 
(0.019) (0.376) 
Board Independence - -0.029* -0.047** 
 
-0.010 -0.018 
 
 
(0.076) (0.035) 
 
(0.332) (0.252) 
CEO Steward Index - -0.677** -0.327 
 
-0.690** -0.421 
 
 
(0.026) (0.235) 
 
(0.041) (0.183) 
Pre IPO New CEO + 0.222 2.413** 
 
0.035 1.720* 
 
 
(0.403) (0.019) 
 
(0.486) (0.076) 
Valuation - -1.168* -0.207 
 
-1.602* -0.724 
 
 
(0.085) (0.426) 
 
(0.050) (0.263) 
Director Options + 1.435** 2.551*** 
 
1.447** 2.344*** 
 
 
(0.018) (0.002) 
 
(0.031) (0.005) 
Big N - 0.380 0.937 
 
0.331 0.246 
 
 
(0.653) (0.773) 
 
(0.618) (0.576) 
VC Backed - 1.905 0.598 
 
1.034 -0.254 
 
 
(0.983) (0.696) 
 
(0.845) (0.416) 
Prestigious Underwriter - 1.903 1.985 
 
2.566 2.206 
 
 
(0.975) (0.941) 
 
(0.989) (0.953) 
ROA ? 1.151 0.056 
 
0.879 0.078 
 
 
(0.124) (0.955) 
 
(0.301) (0.938) 
Size ? 0.283 0.196 
 
0.152 0.099 
 
 
(0.354) (0.621) 
 
(0.662) (0.809) 
Firm Age ? -0.475 -0.139 
 
-0.935* -0.709 
 
 
(0.276) (0.805) 
 
(0.061) (0.224) 
Tech ? -0.029 0.722 
 
0.250 0.766 
 
 
(0.965) (0.396) 
 
(0.739) (0.381) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
300 300 
 
300 300 
Adjusted R2   0.026 0.019   0.021 0.016 
 
Notes: This table presents regression results from estimating Model (1) in which the dependent 
variables are the Log of Cheap Stock in Columns (1) and (3) and Cheap Stock / Cash Comp in 
Columns (2) and (4).  In Columns (1) and (2), cheap stock is calculated using the industry return-
adjusted IPO offer price and in Columns (3) and (4), cheap stock is calculated using the ROA 
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match return-adjusted IPO offer price.  Panel A reports OLS regression results where the sample 
testing the determinants of cheap stock consists of 479 option-grant observations from all sample 
firms.  Panel B reports Tobit regression results where the sample consists of 300 option-grant 
observations from option granting firms only.  The samples consist of CEO option-grant 
observations for firms that completed IPOs during the calendar years of 2004 through 2007.  P-
values are reported below the coefficient estimates.  All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 
99
th
 percentiles.  Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  Year fixed effects are 
included in the model but are not reported.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 
10% levels, respectively, using a two-tailed t-test, unless a directional prediction is made. 
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TABLE 4 
Determinants of the Occurrence, Magnitude, and Percentage of Stock Price Revaluations 
 
    Revaluation    Revaluation   Revaluation 
Dependent variable: 
 
Occurrence 
 
Amount 
 
Percentage 
    (1)   (2)   (3) 
Intercept ? 1.844** 
 
20.908*** 
 
10.036** 
 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.016) 
Audit Committee Accounting Expert - -0.159 
 
-1.260 
 
-1.367 
 
 
(0.231) 
 
(0.262) 
 
(0.126) 
Board Accounting Expert Only - -0.416 
 
-6.633* 
 
-5.330** 
 
 
(0.180) 
 
(0.087) 
 
(0.038) 
Board Independence ? -0.011* 
 
-0.093 
 
-0.039 
 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.120) 
 
(0.276) 
CEO Steward Index ? -0.299*** 
 
-2.996*** 
 
-1.312** 
 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.024) 
Pre IPO New CEO ? -0.811*** 
 
-8.407*** 
 
-2.936* 
 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.071) 
Valuation - -0.743*** 
 
-7.680*** 
 
-4.450*** 
 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.002) 
Director Options ? 0.156 
 
1.297 
 
-0.509 
 
 
(0.434) 
 
(0.524) 
 
(0.674) 
Big N ? 0.113 
 
0.262 
 
-1.076 
 
 
(0.745) 
 
(0.919) 
 
(0.481) 
VC Backed ? 0.684** 
 
6.753** 
 
4.330*** 
 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.009) 
Prestigious Underwriter ? 0.117 
 
1.320 
 
1.083 
 
 
(0.661) 
 
(0.636) 
 
(0.513) 
ROA ? 0.199 
 
2.817 
 
0.747 
 
 
(0.329) 
 
(0.164) 
 
(0.529) 
Size ? -0.244** 
 
-2.759*** 
 
-1.687*** 
 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.003) 
Firm Age ? -0.154 
 
-2.178 
 
-1.491* 
 
 
(0.286) 
 
(0.120) 
 
(0.083) 
Tech ? -0.151 
 
-0.376 
 
-1.074 
 
 
(0.460) 
 
(0.839) 
 
(0.334) 
 
 
 
 
   
Number of observations 
 
300 
 
260 
 
260 
Adjusted R2   0.215  0.063   0.079 
 
Notes: This table presents results from estimating Model (2).  Column (1) presents probit 
regression results where the dependent variable is Revaluation Occurrence, Column (2) presents 
Tobit regression results where the dependent variable is Revaluation Amount, and Column (3) 
presents Tobit regression results where the dependent variable is Revaluation %.  P-values are 
reported below the coefficient estimates.  In Column (1), the sample testing the determinants of 
Revaluation Occurrence consists of 300 grant observations from firms completing an IPO 
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between 2004 through 2007.  In Columns (2) and (3) the sample consists of 260 grant 
observations; I exclude 40 observations from these tests where the firm disclosed a revaluation, 
but did not disclose the revalued stock price.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 
and 99
th
 percentiles.  Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  Year fixed effects are 
included in the model but are not reported.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 
10% levels, respectively, using a two-tailed t-test, unless a directional prediction is made. 
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TABLE 5 
The Associations between Cheap Stock and Future Operating Performance 
 
Panel A: Three year average ROA 
Dependent variable:   Three Year Avg. ROA  
Cheap stock adjustment: 
 
Industry Return Adj. 
 
ROA Match Return Adj. 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Intercept ? -0.873*** -0.869***   -0.876*** -0.863*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Log of Tot Cheap Stock ? -0.006*** 
  
-0.006*** 
 
 
 
(0.001) 
  
(0.003) 
 
Tot Cheap Stock / Cash 
Comp ? 
 
-0.004** 
  
-0.004** 
 
 
 
(0.025) 
  
(0.026) 
MVEt ? 0.071*** 0.069***  
0.071*** 0.068*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
ROAt-1 ? 0.524*** 0.524***  
0.524*** 0.524*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Salest-1 ? -0.000 0.000  
0.000 0.000 
 
 
(0.985) (0.468) 
 
(0.898) (0.405) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
392 392 
 
392 392 
Adjusted R2   0.779 0.776   0.778 0.776 
 
 
Panel B: Three year average cash flows from operations 
Dependent variable:   Three Year Avg. CFO  
Cheap stock adjustment:   Industry Return Adj.   ROA Match Return Adj. 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Intercept ? -11.697*** -10.795***   -11.385*** -10.781*** 
 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Log of Tot Cheap Stock ? -0.088*** 
  
-0.057* 
 
 
 
(0.002) 
  
(0.051) 
 
Tot Cheap Stock / Cash 
Comp ? 
 
-0.014 
  
-0.015 
 
 
 
(0.466) 
  
(0.457) 
MVEt ? 0.910*** 0.797***  
0.868*** 0.796*** 
 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
CFOt-1 ? 0.090 0.094  
0.091 0.094 
 
 
(0.112) (0.101) 
 
(0.108) (0.101) 
Salest-1 ? -0.000 0.000  
-0.000 0.000 
 
 
(0.415) (0.490) 
 
(0.845) (0.467) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
362 362 
 
362 362 
Adjusted R2   0.235 0.222   0.227 0.222 
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Notes: This table presents OLS regression results from estimating Models (3a) and (3b).  Panel A 
presents results estimating Model (3a) where the dependent variable is Three Year Avg. ROAt+2, 
and Panel B presents results estimating Model (3b) where the dependent variable is Three Year 
Avg. CFOt+2.  Cheap stock is measured as the Log of Cheap Stock in Columns (1) and (3) and 
Cheap Stock / Cash Comp in Columns (2) and (4).  In Columns (1) and (2), cheap stock is 
calculated using the industry return-adjusted IPO offer price and in Columns (3) and (4), cheap 
stock is calculated using the ROA match return-adjusted IPO offer price.  P-values are reported 
below the coefficient estimates.  In Panel A, the sample consists of 392 firm-IPO observations 
between 2004 through 2007, and 362 firm-IPO IPO observations between 2004 through 2007 in 
Panel B.  All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  Variable definitions are 
provided in Appendix A.  Year fixed effects are included in the model but are not reported.  ***, 
**, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, using a two-tailed t-test 
unless a directional prediction is made. 
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TABLE 6 
The Associations between Cheap Stock and Future Stock Return Performance 
 
Panel A: Three year buy and hold abnormal returns 
Dependent variable:  Three Year Abnormal Returns 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Intercept ? -1.413 -0.979  -1.606 -1.183 
  (0.176) (0.302)  (0.143) (0.242) 
Log of Tot Cheap Stockt - -0.016*   -0.013  
  (0.095)   (0.144)  
Tot Cheap Stock / Cash 
Compt 
- 
 -0.023*   -0.023* 
   (0.091)   (0.092) 
ROAt-1 ? 0.068*** 0.065***  0.062*** 0.059*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.002) (0.002) 
MVEt ? 0.101 0.102  0.113 0.113 
  (0.213) (0.211)  (0.184) (0.191) 
       
Number of observations  100 100  100 100 
Adjusted R
2
  0.101 0.095  0.014 0.011 
 
Panel B: Three year buy and hold returns 
Dependent variable:   Three Year Returns 
Cheap stock adjustment: 
 
Industry Return Adj.   ROA Match Return Adj. 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Intercept ? -1.360** -1.486** 
 
-1.383** -1.463** 
 
 
(0.019) (0.012) 
 
(0.019) (0.014) 
Log of Tot Cheap Stock ? -0.015** 
  
-0.014** 
 
 
 
(0.012) 
  
(0.018) 
 
Tot Cheap Stock / Cash 
Comp ? 
 
-0.015*** 
  
-0.014*** 
 
 
 
(0.002) 
  
(0.004) 
ROAt-1 ? 0.001 -0.001  
0.000 -0.000 
 
 
(0.987) (0.991) 
 
(0.999) (0.997) 
MVEt ? 0.113** 0.120***  
0.114** 0.117** 
 
 
(0.014) (0.010) 
 
(0.014) (0.012) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
392 392 
 
392 392 
Adjusted R2   0.127 0.125   0.125 0.123 
 
Notes: This table presents OLS regression results from estimating Model (4).  Panel A presents 
results where the dependent variable is Three Year Abnormal Returnst+3.  Panel B presents 
results where the dependent variable is Three Year Buy and Hold Returnst+3.  Cheap stock is 
measured as the Log of Cheap Stock in Columns (1) and (3) and Cheap Stock / Cash Comp in 
Columns (2) and (4).  In Columns (1) and (2), cheap stock is calculated using the industry return-
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adjusted IPO offer price and in Columns (3) and (4), cheap stock is calculated using the ROA 
match return-adjusted IPO offer price.  P-values are reported below the coefficient estimates.  
The sample consists of 392 firm-IPO observations between 2004 through 2007.  All variables are 
winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  Year 
fixed effects are included in the model but are not reported.  ***, **, and * represent significance 
at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, using a two-tailed t-test unless a directional prediction is 
made. 
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Table 7 
Determinants of Independent Valuations 
 
Dependent variable:   Valuation 
 
 
All grants 
 
Option 
Granting 
    (1)   (2) 
Intercept ? -1.244** 
 
-1.013 
 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.223) 
Audit Committee Accounting Expert + 0.313** 
 
0.342* 
 
 
(0.034) 
 
(0.064) 
Board Accounting Expert Only + -0.179 
 
-0.263 
 
 
(0.681) 
 
(0.694) 
Board Independence ? 0.004 
 
-0.004 
 
 
(0.362) 
 
(0.553) 
CEO Steward Index ? 0.153 
 
0.109 
 
 
(0.108) 
 
(0.368) 
Pre IPO New CEO ? 0.201 
 
0.032 
 
 
(0.424) 
 
(0.925) 
Director Options ? 0.217 
 
0.132 
 
 
(0.236) 
 
(0.606) 
Big N + 0.618*** 
 
0.820** 
 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.011) 
VC Backed ? 0.056 
 
0.169 
 
 
(0.828) 
 
(0.664) 
Prestigious Underwriter ? 0.275 
 
0.143 
 
 
(0.282) 
 
(0.657) 
ROA ? 0.534** 
 
0.526* 
 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.074) 
Size ? -0.214*** 
 
-0.151 
 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.197) 
Firm Age ? 0.094 
 
0.142 
 
 
(0.419) 
 
(0.468) 
Tech ? -0.034 
 
0.001 
 
 
(0.857) 
 
(0.996) 
  
   
Number of observations 
 
479 
 
300 
Adjusted R2   0.186   0.198 
 
Notes: This table presents regression results from estimating Model (6) in which the dependent 
variable is Valuation.  Column A reports results where the sample testing the determinants of 
Valuation consists of 479 option-grant observations from all sample firms.  Panel B reports 
results where the sample consists of 300 option-grant observations from option granting firms 
only.  The samples consist of CEO option-grant observations for firms that completed IPOs 
during the calendar years of 2004 through 2007.  P-values are reported below the coefficient 
estimates.  All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  Variable definitions are 
provided in Appendix A.  Year fixed effects are included in the model but are not reported.  ***, 
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**, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, using a two-tailed t-test, 
unless a directional prediction is made.  
 80 
 
TABLE 8 
Determinants of IPO Underpricing 
 
Panel A: Individual option grants for all sample firms 
Dependent variable:   Underpricing 
Cheap stock adjustment:   Industry Return Adj.   ROA Match Return Adj. 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Intercept ? -0.199*** -0.193***   -0.200*** -0.195*** 
 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Log of Cheap Stock + 0.000 
  
0.001 
 
 
 
(0.373) 
  
(0.280) 
 
Cheap Stock / Cash Comp + 
 
0.002* 
  
0.001 
 
 
 
(0.099) 
  
(0.254) 
Audit Committee 
Accounting Expert ? -0.017 -0.015 
 
-0.016 -0.016 
 
 
(0.375) (0.420) 
 
(0.386) (0.396) 
Board Accounting Expert 
Only ? -0.021 -0.024 
 
-0.020 -0.023 
 
 
(0.562) (0.519) 
 
(0.584) (0.531) 
Board Independence ? -0.000 -0.000 
 
-0.000 -0.000 
 
 
(0.437) (0.459) 
 
(0.419) (0.432) 
CEO Steward Index ? 0.015 0.015 
 
0.015 0.015 
 
 
(0.209) (0.189) 
 
(0.203) (0.206) 
Pre IPO New CEO ? 0.009 0.005 
 
0.009 0.008 
 
 
(0.662) (0.804) 
 
(0.666) (0.717) 
Valuation ? 0.048* 0.047* 
 
0.049* 0.048* 
 
 
(0.093) (0.098) 
 
(0.091) (0.095) 
Director Options ? -0.000 -0.004 
 
-0.002 -0.001 
 
 
(0.981) (0.835) 
 
(0.935) (0.951) 
Big N ? -0.008 -0.007 
 
-0.008 -0.007 
 
 
(0.771) (0.815) 
 
(0.769) (0.808) 
VC Backed ? 0.021 0.020 
 
0.020 0.021 
 
 
(0.370) (0.394) 
 
(0.385) (0.357) 
Prestigious Underwriter ? 0.042** 0.041* 
 
0.041* 0.042* 
 
 
(0.049) (0.061) 
 
(0.054) (0.053) 
ROA ? 0.033*** 0.033*** 
 
0.033*** 0.033*** 
 
 
(0.002) (0.003) 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Size ? -0.068*** -0.065*** 
 
-0.067*** -0.067*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age ? 0.020*** 0.021*** 
 
0.021*** 0.020*** 
 
 
(0.005) (0.003) 
 
(0.004) (0.004) 
IPO Proceeds ? 0.121*** 0.116*** 
 
0.120*** 0.119*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Tech ? -0.038* -0.040* 
 
-0.038* -0.039* 
 
 
(0.074) (0.062) 
 
(0.076) (0.068) 
Internet ? 0.046 0.046 
 
0.048 0.045 
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(0.145) (0.145) 
 
(0.135) (0.151) 
Leverage ? -0.022 -0.021 
 
-0.023 -0.022 
 
 
(0.263) (0.281) 
 
(0.253) (0.265) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
392 392 
 
392 392 
Adjusted R2  0.192 0.196   0.192 0.193 
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Panel B: Individual option grants for option granting firms only 
Dependent variable:   Underpricing 
Cheap stock adjustment:   Industry Return Adj.   ROA Match Return Adj. 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Intercept ? -0.222** -0.173*   -0.211** -0.184* 
 
 
(0.038) (0.089) 
 
(0.044) (0.074) 
Log of Cheap Stock + 0.004** 
  
0.005*** 
 
 
 
(0.024) 
  
(0.006) 
 
Cheap Stock / Cash Comp + 
 
0.003* 
  
0.002 
 
 
 
(0.061) 
  
(0.189) 
Audit Committee Accounting 
Expert ? -0.016 -0.019 
 
-0.017 -0.020 
 
 
(0.534) (0.466) 
 
(0.528) (0.458) 
Board Accounting Expert 
Only ? -0.002 -0.017 
 
0.003 -0.014 
 
 
(0.966) (0.763) 
 
(0.951) (0.799) 
Board Independence ? -0.001 -0.001 
 
-0.001 -0.001 
 
 
(0.396) (0.416) 
 
(0.319) (0.316) 
CEO Steward Index ? 0.014 0.011 
 
0.014 0.011 
 
 
(0.387) (0.482) 
 
(0.385) (0.495) 
Pre IPO New CEO ? 0.011 -0.000 
 
0.012 0.004 
 
 
(0.708) (0.988) 
 
(0.688) (0.891) 
Valuation ? 0.018 0.012 
 
0.019 0.014 
 
 
(0.612) (0.725) 
 
(0.591) (0.693) 
Director Options ? -0.015 -0.017 
 
-0.016 -0.013 
 
 
(0.589) (0.540) 
 
(0.566) (0.637) 
Big N ? -0.026 -0.025 
 
-0.026 -0.025 
 
 
(0.558) (0.576) 
 
(0.567) (0.580) 
VC Backed ? 0.019 0.025 
 
0.022 0.026 
 
 
(0.551) (0.409) 
 
(0.489) (0.396) 
Prestigious Underwriter ? 0.079*** 0.082*** 
 
0.077*** 0.083*** 
 
 
(0.004) (0.003) 
 
(0.005) (0.003) 
ROA ? 0.051 0.057* 
 
0.052 0.054* 
 
 
(0.114) (0.074) 
 
(0.113) (0.089) 
Size ? -0.081*** -0.078*** 
 
-0.077*** -0.081*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age ? 0.034*** 0.033*** 
 
0.037*** 0.033*** 
 
 
(0.008) (0.007) 
 
(0.003) (0.008) 
IPO Proceeds ? 0.121*** 0.117*** 
 
0.114*** 0.125*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Tech ? -0.038 -0.043 
 
-0.038 -0.041 
 
 
(0.185) (0.133) 
 
(0.184) (0.152) 
Internet ? 0.046 0.039 
 
0.049 0.040 
 
 
(0.283) (0.374) 
 
(0.246) (0.359) 
Leverage ? -0.026 -0.023 
 
-0.027 -0.026 
 
 
(0.359) (0.415) 
 
(0.325) (0.349) 
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Number of observations 
 
213 213 
 
213 213 
Adjusted R2   0.228 0.232   0.233 0.223 
 
Notes: This table presents regression results from estimating Model (5) in which the dependent 
variable is Underpricing.  Cheap stock is measured as the Log of Cheap Stock in Columns (1) 
and (3) and Cheap Stock / Cash Comp in Columns (2) and (4).  In Columns (1) and (2), cheap 
stock is calculated using the industry return-adjusted IPO offer price and in Columns (3) and (4), 
cheap stock is calculated using the ROA match return-adjusted IPO offer price.  Panel A reports 
OLS regression results where the sample testing the determinants of cheap stock consists of 479 
option-grant observations from all sample firms.  Panel B reports OLS regression results where 
the sample consists of 300 option-grant observations from option granting firms only.  The 
samples consist of CEO option-grant observations for firms that completed IPOs during the 
calendar years of 2004 through 2007.  P-values are reported below the coefficient estimates.  All 
variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  Variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix A.  Year fixed effects are included in the model but are not reported.  ***, **, and * 
represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, using a two-tailed t-test, unless a 
directional prediction is made. 
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Table 9 
Determinants of Stock Option Vesting Periods 
 
Dependent variable:   Vesting Period 
Cheap stock adjustment:   Industry Return Adj.   ROA Match Return Adj. 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Intercept ? 3.698*** 3.708***   3.634*** 3.685*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Log of Cheap Stock - 0.003 
  
0.009 
 
 
 
(0.591) 
  
(0.758) 
 
Cheap Stock / Cash Comp - 
 
0.009 
  
0.014 
 
 
 
(0.763) 
  
(0.883) 
Audit Committee Accounting 
Expert ? 0.081 0.088 
 
0.090 0.098 
 
 
(0.610) (0.560) 
 
(0.562) (0.517) 
Board Accounting Expert Only ? -0.046 -0.052 
 
-0.025 -0.056 
 
 
(0.860) (0.847) 
 
(0.924) (0.843) 
Board Independence + -0.007 -0.007 
 
-0.007 -0.007 
 
 
(0.956) (0.947) 
 
(0.957) (0.953) 
CEO Steward Index ? -0.196** -0.197** 
 
-0.193** -0.195** 
 
 
(0.016) (0.014) 
 
(0.017) (0.014) 
Pre IPO New CEO - -0.255 -0.275 
 
-0.256 -0.280 
 
 
(0.162) (0.146) 
 
(0.161) (0.139) 
Valuation ? -0.152 -0.157 
 
-0.144 -0.154 
 
 
(0.563) (0.540) 
 
(0.584) (0.547) 
Director Options ? 0.202 0.188 
 
0.196 0.180 
 
 
(0.207) (0.242) 
 
(0.219) (0.261) 
Big N ? -0.052 -0.057 
 
-0.053 -0.053 
 
 
(0.801) (0.786) 
 
(0.797) (0.802) 
VC Backed ? 0.494* 0.500* 
 
0.492* 0.507* 
 
 
(0.089) (0.075) 
 
(0.085) (0.071) 
Prestigious Underwriter ? 0.352 0.346 
 
0.340 0.339 
 
 
(0.109) (0.115) 
 
(0.118) (0.125) 
ROA ? -0.115 -0.109 
 
-0.118 -0.108 
 
 
(0.500) (0.526) 
 
(0.497) (0.531) 
Size ? 0.006 0.006 
 
0.006 0.006 
 
 
(0.943) (0.947) 
 
(0.947) (0.950) 
Firm Age ? 0.072 0.071 
 
0.077 0.077 
 
 
(0.619) (0.625) 
 
(0.594) (0.594) 
Tech ? 0.036 0.030 
 
0.035 0.028 
 
 
(0.777) (0.812) 
 
(0.787) (0.828) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
300 300 
 
300 300 
Adjusted R2   0.044 0.046   0.045 0.050 
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Notes: This table presents regression results from estimating Model (7) in which the dependent 
variable is Vesting Period.  Cheap stock is measured as the Log of Cheap Stock in Columns (1) 
and (3) and Cheap Stock / Cash Comp in Columns (2) and (4).  In Columns (1) and (2), cheap 
stock is calculated using the industry return-adjusted IPO offer price, and in Columns (3) and (4), 
cheap stock is calculated using the ROA match return-adjusted IPO offer price.  The sample 
consists of 300 option-grant observations from option granting firms only.  The samples consist 
of CEO option-grant observations for firms that completed IPOs during the calendar years of 
2004 through 2007.  P-values are reported below the coefficient estimates.  All variables are 
winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  Year 
fixed effects are included in the model but are not reported.  ***, **, and * represent significance 
at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, using a two-tailed t-test, unless a directional prediction 
is made. 
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Table 10 
Stock Option Vesting and Future Intrinsic Value 
 
Panel A: Option vesting period distribution 
Vesting Period Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Immediate 13 4.3% 4.3% 
1 year 9 3.0% 7.3% 
2 years 6 2.0% 9.3% 
3 years 30 10.0% 19.3% 
4 years 201 67.0% 86.3% 
5 years 38 12.7% 99.0% 
6 years 2 0.7% 99.7% 
7 years 1 0.3% 100.0% 
Total 300 100.0% 
  
Panel B: Future intrinsic value 
 
N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile Maximum 
IPO Date Intrinsic Value per 
Share 300 7.168  5.183  0.000  4.065  6.775    10.310  40.080  
Year 1 Intrinsic Value per Share 300 8.686  7.408  0.000  3.595  7.565    11.970  48.050  
Year 2 Intrinsic Value per Share 300 8.871  9.303  0.000  0.743  6.722    13.480  64.007  
Year 3 Intrinsic Value per Share 300 8.686    12.613  0.000  0.000  4.230    12.510   117.060  
Year 4 Intrinsic Value per Share 300 8.611    13.742  0.000  0.000  2.325    12.385  91.750  
Year 5 Intrinsic Value per Share 300 8.467    15.263  0.000  0.000  1.185  9.520   100.200  
IPO Date Total Intrinsic Value 300 2,273,322   4,968,923  0.000  201,673  732,330  2,307,976  58,267,501  
Year 1 Total Intrinsic Value 300 2,313,922   5,447,659  0.000  182,723  701,011  2,376,875  77,712,199  
Year 2 Total Intrinsic Value 300 2,206,342   4,381,388  0.000  51,882  576,966  2,154,379  36,400,000  
Year 3 Total Intrinsic Value 300 2,143,587  5,490,022  0.000  0.000  427,250  1,683,072  54,695,115  
Year 4 Total Intrinsic Value 300 2,559,800  7,728,239  0.000  0.000  227,875  1,881,118  72,717,842  
Year 5 Total Intrinsic Value 300 2,600,117  12,480,980  0.000  0.000    84,922  1,585,887  192,515,823  
  
 
8
7 
 
Notes:  Panel A provides the distribution of option vesting periods, where the vesting period is rounded to the nearest year.  Panel B 
provides the descriptive statists for the intrinsic values of stock options on the IPO date and the first, through fifth year anniversaries 
of the option grant.  The sample consists of 300 option-grant observations from option granting firms only.  Variable definitions are 
provided in Appendix A.  
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Table 11 
Univariate Comparison of Non-option Granting and Option Granting Firms 
 
 
  
Non-
option 
granting 
(N=179) 
Option 
granting 
(N=213)       
    Mean Mean Difference t-stat p-value 
Audit Committee Accounting 
Expert 
 
0.335 0.385 -0.050 -1.020 0.308 
Board Accounting Expert 
Only 
 
0.045 0.042 0.002 0.118 0.906 
Board Independence 
 
58.995 70.775 -11.780 -4.972 0.000*** 
CEO Steward Index 
 
1.251 1.188 0.064 0.597 0.551 
Pre IPO New CEO 
 
0.229 0.221 0.008 0.198 0.843 
Big N 
 
0.777 0.859 -0.083 -2.134 0.033** 
VC Backed 
 
0.279 0.681 -0.401 -8.617 0.000*** 
Prestigious Underwriter 
 
0.726 0.831 -0.105 -2.520 0.012** 
Director Options   0.291 0.634 -0.343 -7.196 0.000*** 
ROA 
 
-0.230 -0.281 0.052 0.563 0.574 
Size 
 
4.886 4.175 0.711 4.386 0.000*** 
Firm Age 
 
2.461 2.046 0.415 4.547 0.000*** 
Tech   0.223 0.366 -0.143 -3.098 0.002*** 
 
Note: This table presents the univariate comparison of non-option granting and option granting 
firms.  The sample consists of 300 option-grant observations from option granting firms only.  
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 
5, and 10% levels, respectively, using a two-tailed t-test   
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Table 12 
Heckman Two-stage Estimation of the Determinants of Cheap Stock 
 
Panel A: First stage results 
Dependent variable: 
  
Option 
Grant 
Intercept ? -0.254 
 
 
(0.571) 
Audit Committee Accounting Expert ? -0.111 
 
 
(0.464) 
Board Accounting Expert Only ? -0.220 
 
 
(0.499) 
Board Independence ? 0.010*** 
 
 
(0.003) 
CEO Steward Index ? -0.081 
 
 
(0.274) 
Pre IPO New CEO ? 0.195 
 
 
(0.318) 
Valuation ? -0.071 
 
 
(0.711) 
Director Options ? 0.624*** 
 
 
(0.000) 
Big N ? -0.001 
 
 
(0.997) 
VC Backed ? 0.604*** 
 
 
(0.000) 
Prestigious Underwriter ? 0.450** 
 
 
(0.032) 
ROA ? 0.125 
 
 
(0.475) 
Size ? -0.112* 
 
 
(0.072) 
Firm Age ? -0.239*** 
 
 
(0.002) 
Tech ? 0.070 
 
 
(0.648) 
R&D + 0.722** 
 
 
(0.050) 
 
 
 
Number of observations 
 
479 
Adjusted R2   0.258 
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Panel B:  Second stage results 
    Industry Return Adj.   ROA Match Return Adj. 
Dependent variable: 
 
Log of 
Cheap 
Stock 
Cheap 
Stock / 
Cash 
Comp 
 
Log of 
Cheap 
Stock 
Cheap 
Stock / 
Cash Comp 
    (3) (4)   (3) (4) 
Intercept ? 2.715 -0.474   2.872 -1.805 
 
 
(0.199) (0.886) 
 
(0.225) (0.574) 
Audit Committee Accounting 
Expert - -1.163*** -1.018** 
 
-1.085** -1.126** 
 
 
(0.005) (0.022) 
 
(0.013) (0.015) 
Board Accounting Expert Only - -0.636 0.221 
 
-1.531 0.121 
 
 
(0.251) (0.444) 
 
(0.131) (0.469) 
Board Independence - -0.026** -0.013 
 
-0.020 0.006 
 
 
(0.044) (0.319) 
 
(0.128) (0.406) 
CEO Steward Index - -0.270 -0.208 
 
-0.263 -0.282 
 
 
(0.130) (0.198) 
 
(0.147) (0.136) 
Pre IPO New CEO + 0.125 1.461 
 
0.005 1.254* 
 
 
(0.413) (0.052) 
 
(0.497) (0.092) 
Valuation - -0.556 0.176 
 
-0.772 -0.120 
 
 
(0.206) (0.407) 
 
(0.134) (0.438) 
Director Options + 0.264 1.691** 
 
0.217 2.040** 
 
 
(0.372) (0.037) 
 
(0.412) (0.019) 
Big N - -0.088 0.193 
 
-0.056 -0.028 
 
 
(0.432) (0.622) 
 
(0.462) (0.484) 
VC Backed - 0.034 0.127 
 
-0.239 0.551 
 
 
(0.516) (0.545) 
 
(0.603) (0.679) 
Prestigious Underwriter - 0.468 0.988 
 
0.651 1.353 
 
 
(0.753) (0.873) 
 
(0.785) (0.929) 
ROA ? 0.488 -0.026 
 
0.342 -0.073 
 
 
(0.351) (0.946) 
 
(0.523) (0.851) 
Size ? 0.202 -0.042 
 
0.170 -0.140 
 
 
(0.409) (0.893) 
 
(0.525) (0.679) 
Firm Age ? 0.027 -0.152 
 
-0.123 -0.549 
 
 
(0.940) (0.783) 
 
(0.769) (0.270) 
Tech ? -0.096 0.522 
 
-0.027 0.493 
 
 
(0.834) (0.374) 
 
(0.959) (0.404) 
Options granted + 11.235*** 3.517*** 
 
10.639*** 3.340*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Inverse Mills Ratio ? -1.970 0.672 
 
-1.904 2.282 
 
 
(0.284) (0.792) 
 
(0.367) (0.366) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
479 479 
 
479 479 
Adjusted R2   0.699 0.135   0.638 0.117 
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Note: This table presents results of the Heckman (1979) model.  The first stage results examining 
the determinants of the decision to grant pre-IPO stock options to the CEO are presented in Panel 
A.  Second stage results examining the determinants of cheap stock grants are presented in Panel 
B, where I include the Inverse Mills Ratio.  The dependent variables in Panel 2 are the Log of 
Cheap Stock in Columns (1) and (3) and Cheap Stock / Cash Comp in Columns (2) and (4).  In 
Columns (1) and (2), cheap stock is calculated using the industry return-adjusted IPO offer price 
and in Columns (3) and (4), cheap stock is calculated using the ROA match return-adjusted IPO 
offer price.  The samples consist of CEO option-grant observations for firms that completed 
IPOs during the calendar years of 2004 through 2007.  P-values are reported below the 
coefficient estimates.  All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  Variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix A.  Year fixed effects are included in the model but are not 
reported.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, using a 
two-tailed t-test, unless a directional prediction is made. 
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Table 13 
The Association between Cheap Stock and Future Operating Performance: 
Include Governance Control Variables 
 
Panel A: Three year average ROA 
Dependent variable:   Three Year Avg. ROA  
Cheap stock adjustment: 
 
Industry Return Adj. 
 
ROA Match Return Adj. 
    (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
Intercept ? -0.754*** -0.767***   -0.755*** -0.764*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Log of Tot Cheap Stock ? -0.004** 
  
-0.004** 
 
 
 
(0.022) 
  
(0.043) 
 
Tot Cheap Stock / Cash Comp ? 
 
-0.003 
  
-0.003 
 
 
 
(0.114) 
  
(0.117) 
MVEt ? 0.051*** 0.052***  
0.051*** 0.051*** 
 
 
(0.001) (0.002) 
 
(0.001) (0.002) 
ROAt-1 ? 0.516*** 0.516***  
0.516*** 0.516*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Salest-1 ? -0.000 -0.000  
-0.000 -0.000 
 
 
(0.201) (0.276) 
 
(0.226) (0.313) 
Audit Committee Accounting 
Expert ? -0.038 -0.038 
 
-0.038 -0.038 
 
 
(0.226) (0.234) 
 
(0.231) (0.231) 
Board Accounting Expert Only ? 0.004 0.013 
 
0.003 0.013 
 
 
(0.952) (0.854) 
 
(0.968) (0.852) 
Board Independence ? 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
 
(0.827) (0.965) 
 
(0.819) (0.917) 
CEO Steward Index ? 0.049*** 0.051*** 
 
0.049*** 0.051*** 
 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Pre IPO New CEO ? 0.077** 0.080** 
 
0.076** 0.078** 
 
 
(0.022) (0.020) 
 
(0.023) (0.021) 
Big N ? 0.056 0.053 
 
0.055 0.052 
 
 
(0.214) (0.236) 
 
(0.217) (0.247) 
VC Backed ? -0.114*** -0.125*** 
 
-0.117*** -0.126*** 
 
 
(0.001) (0.000) 
 
(0.001) (0.000) 
Prestigious Underwriter ? 0.067* 0.063 
 
0.067* 0.063 
 
 
(0.077) (0.101) 
 
(0.079) (0.102) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
392 392 
 
392 392 
Adjusted R2   0.791 0.789   0.790 0.789 
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Panel B: Three year average cash flows from operations 
Dependent variable:   Three Year Avg. CFO  
Cheap stock adjustment:   Industry Return Adj.   ROA Match Return Adj. 
    (3) (4)   (3) (4) 
Intercept ? -10.146** -9.613**   -9.831** -9.622** 
 
 
(0.010) (0.015) 
 
(0.010) (0.015) 
Log of Tot Cheap Stock ? -0.060*** 
  
-0.026 
 
 
 
(0.006) 
  
(0.383) 
 
Tot Cheap Stock / Cash Comp ? 
 
-0.005 
  
-0.006 
 
 
 
(0.758) 
  
(0.732) 
MVEt ? 0.766** 0.709**  
0.731** 0.709** 
 
 
(0.023) (0.033) 
 
(0.022) (0.033) 
CFOt-1 ? 0.091* 0.092*  
0.092* 0.092* 
 
 
(0.097) (0.091) 
 
(0.094) (0.091) 
Salest-1 ? -0.001** -0.000**  
-0.000** -0.000** 
 
 
(0.018) (0.042) 
 
(0.030) (0.041) 
Audit Committee Accounting 
Expert ? 0.188 0.206 
 
0.200 0.205 
 
 
(0.750) (0.725) 
 
(0.733) (0.726) 
Board Accounting Expert Only ? 2.662* 2.784* 
 
2.714* 2.786* 
 
 
(0.068) (0.061) 
 
(0.065) (0.061) 
Board Independence ? -0.005 -0.006 
 
-0.005 -0.006 
 
 
(0.468) (0.338) 
 
(0.399) (0.350) 
CEO Steward Index ? 0.295 0.327 
 
0.316 0.327 
 
 
(0.149) (0.120) 
 
(0.125) (0.120) 
Pre IPO New CEO ? 0.973* 0.923* 
 
0.933* 0.922* 
 
 
(0.055) (0.068) 
 
(0.062) (0.068) 
Big N ? -1.070 -1.082 
 
-1.078 -1.086 
 
 
(0.155) (0.150) 
 
(0.152) (0.149) 
VC Backed ? -1.339*** -1.583*** 
 
-1.496*** -1.582*** 
 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Prestigious Underwriter ? 1.533 1.488 
 
1.510 1.488 
 
 
(0.194) (0.208) 
 
(0.205) (0.209) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
362 362 
 
362 362 
Adjusted R2   0.256 0.250   0.251 0.250 
 
Notes: This table presents OLS regression results from estimating Models (8a) and (8b).  Panel A 
presents results estimating Model (8a) where the dependent variable is Three Year Avg. ROAt+2, 
and Panel B presents results estimating Model (8b) where the dependent variable is Three Year 
Avg. CFOt+2.  Cheap stock is measured as the Log of Cheap Stock in Columns (1) and (3) and 
Cheap Stock / Cash Comp in Columns (2) and (4).  In Columns (1) and (2), cheap stock is 
calculated using the industry return-adjusted IPO offer price and in Columns (3) and (4), cheap 
stock is calculated using the ROA match return-adjusted IPO offer price.  P-values are reported 
below the coefficient estimates.  In Panel A, the sample consists of 392 firm-IPO observations 
between 2004 through 2007, and 362 firm-IPO IPO observations between 2004 through 2007 in 
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Panel B.  All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  Variable definitions are 
provided in Appendix A.  Year fixed effects are included in the model but are not reported.  ***, 
**, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, using a two-tailed t-test 
unless a directional prediction is made. 
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Table 14   
The Associations between Cheap Stock and Future Stock Return Performance: 
Include Governance Control Variables 
 
Panel A: Three year buy and hold abnormal returns 
Dependent variable:   Three Year Abnormal Returns 
Cheap stock adjustment:   Industry Return Adj.   ROA Match Return Adj. 
    (3) (4)   (3) (4) 
Intercept ? -0.944 -1.074   -0.960 -1.048 
 
 
(0.193) (0.141) 
 
(0.189) (0.152) 
Log of Tot Cheap Stock ? -0.012* 
  
-0.011 
 
 
 
(0.088) 
  
(0.106) 
 
Tot Cheap Stock / Cash Comp ? 
 
-0.014*** 
  
-0.012** 
 
 
 
(0.005) 
  
(0.016) 
ROAt-1 ? -0.023 -0.026  
-0.024 -0.025 
 
 
(0.820) (0.796) 
 
(0.811) (0.805) 
MVEt ? 0.052 0.063  
0.053 0.060 
 
 
(0.390) (0.306) 
 
(0.386) (0.329) 
Audit Committee Accounting 
Expert ? 0.058 0.056 
 
0.059 0.057 
 
 
(0.518) (0.532) 
 
(0.509) (0.522) 
Board Accounting Expert Only ? 0.060 0.090 
 
0.055 0.090 
 
 
(0.833) (0.750) 
 
(0.847) (0.749) 
Board Independence ? -0.003 -0.003* 
 
-0.003 -0.003 
 
 
(0.134) (0.098) 
 
(0.138) (0.111) 
CEO Steward Index ? 0.056 0.060 
 
0.057 0.060 
 
 
(0.200) (0.172) 
 
(0.191) (0.167) 
Pre IPO New CEO ? 0.061 0.079 
 
0.059 0.071 
 
 
(0.580) (0.473) 
 
(0.591) (0.517) 
Big N ? 0.079 0.066 
 
0.078 0.065 
 
 
(0.588) (0.647) 
 
(0.592) (0.654) 
VC Backed ? -0.042 -0.060 
 
-0.050 -0.072 
 
 
(0.698) (0.551) 
 
(0.636) (0.474) 
Prestigious Underwriter ? 0.255* 0.245* 
 
0.255* 0.244* 
 
 
(0.054) (0.066) 
 
(0.054) (0.067) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
392 392 
 
392 392 
Adjusted R2   0.019 0.022   0.018 0.018 
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Panel B: Three year buy and hold returns 
Dependent variable:   Three Year Returns 
Cheap stock adjustment: 
 
Industry Return Adj.   ROA Match Return Adj. 
    (3) (4)   (3) (4) 
Intercept ? -0.802 -0.931   -0.818 -0.907 
 
 
(0.236) (0.173) 
 
(0.230) (0.186) 
Log of Tot Cheap Stock ? -0.013* 
  
-0.012* 
 
 
 
(0.053) 
  
(0.071) 
 
Tot Cheap Stock / Cash Comp ? 
 
-0.014*** 
  
-0.012** 
 
 
 
(0.004) 
  
(0.012) 
ROAt-1 ? -0.014 -0.017  
-0.015 -0.016 
 
 
(0.875) (0.849) 
 
(0.863) (0.859) 
MVEt ? 0.057 0.068  
0.058 0.065 
 
 
(0.314) (0.241) 
 
(0.312) (0.261) 
Audit Committee Accounting 
Expert ? 0.043 0.042 
 
0.045 0.043 
 
 
(0.627) (0.636) 
 
(0.615) (0.626) 
Board Accounting Expert Only ? 0.111 0.143 
 
0.106 0.144 
 
 
(0.698) (0.612) 
 
(0.712) (0.611) 
Board Independence ? -0.003 -0.003 
 
-0.003 -0.003 
 
 
(0.153) (0.108) 
 
(0.157) (0.122) 
CEO Steward Index ? 0.049 0.054 
 
0.050 0.054 
 
 
(0.252) (0.213) 
 
(0.240) (0.207) 
Pre IPO New CEO ? 0.075 0.093 
 
0.073 0.085 
 
 
(0.479) (0.384) 
 
(0.492) (0.423) 
Big N ? 0.044 0.032 
 
0.043 0.030 
 
 
(0.755) (0.821) 
 
(0.761) (0.830) 
VC Backed ? -0.055 -0.079 
 
-0.065 -0.090 
 
 
(0.602) (0.423) 
 
(0.530) (0.356) 
Prestigious Underwriter ? 0.262** 0.251* 
 
0.262** 0.250* 
 
 
(0.048) (0.059) 
 
(0.049) (0.061) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
392 392 
 
392 392 
Adjusted R2   0.112 0.113   0.111 0.110 
 
Notes: This table presents OLS regression results from estimating Model (9).  Panel A presents 
results where the dependent variable is Three Year Abnormal Returnst+3.  Panel B presents 
results where the dependent variable is Three Year Buy and Hold Returnst+3.  Cheap stock is 
measured as the Log of Cheap Stock in Columns (1) and (3) and Cheap Stock / Cash Comp in 
Columns (2) and (4).  In Columns (1) and (2), cheap stock is calculated using the industry return-
adjusted IPO offer price and in Columns (3) and (4), cheap stock is calculated using the ROA 
match return-adjusted IPO offer price.  P-values are reported below the coefficient estimates.  
The sample consists of 392 firm-IPO observations between 2004 through 2007.  All variables are 
winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  Year 
fixed effects are included in the model but are not reported.  ***, **, and * represent significance 
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at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, using a two-tailed t-test unless a directional prediction is 
made. 
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Table 15 
Determinants of Cheap Stock: Alternative Cheap Stock Measures 
 
Panel A: Individual option grants for all sample firms 
    
Sales Growth Match 
Return Adj.   Size Match Return Adj. 
Dependent variable: 
 
Log of 
Cheap 
Stock 
Cheap 
Stock / 
Cash Comp 
 
Log of 
Cheap 
Stock 
Cheap 
Stock / 
Cash Comp 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Intercept ? 0.516 0.980   1.684 0.772 
 
 
(0.687) (0.583) 
 
(0.154) (0.527) 
Audit Committee Accounting 
Expert - -0.971** -0.884** 
 
-1.141*** -0.744** 
 
 
(0.028) (0.042) 
 
(0.009) (0.021) 
Board Accounting Expert Only - -0.259 0.590 
 
-1.079 0.042 
 
 
(0.394) (0.370) 
 
(0.150) (0.484) 
Board Independence - -0.011* -0.027* 
 
-0.010* -0.012* 
 
 
(0.065) (0.058) 
 
(0.079) (0.083) 
CEO Steward Index - -0.197 -0.234 
 
-0.313* -0.141 
 
 
(0.204) (0.229) 
 
(0.090) (0.243) 
Pre IPO New CEO + 0.316 0.941 
 
-0.045 0.883* 
 
 
(0.309) (0.169) 
 
(0.528) (0.065) 
Valuation - -0.388 -0.311 
 
-0.915* 0.000 
 
 
(0.285) (0.343) 
 
(0.093) (0.500) 
Director Options + 0.989** 1.831*** 
 
0.547 1.064*** 
 
 
(0.030) (0.001) 
 
(0.145) (0.002) 
Big N - -0.063 -0.070 
 
-0.131 0.379 
 
 
(0.454) (0.464) 
 
(0.405) (0.804) 
VC Backed - 0.696 -0.124 
 
0.329 -0.232 
 
 
(0.888) (0.440) 
 
(0.704) (0.317) 
Prestigious Underwriter - 1.207* 0.997 
 
1.333** 0.654 
 
 
(0.965) (0.940) 
 
(0.979) (0.918) 
ROA ? 0.141 -0.211 
 
0.473 0.178 
 
 
(0.784) (0.630) 
 
(0.375) (0.554) 
Size ? 0.089 0.083 
 
-0.044 -0.124 
 
 
(0.669) (0.739) 
 
(0.827) (0.425) 
Firm Age ? -0.117 -0.111 
 
-0.478** -0.102 
 
 
(0.591) (0.719) 
 
(0.025) (0.629) 
Tech ? 0.118 0.507 
 
-0.099 0.152 
 
 
(0.807) (0.474) 
 
(0.844) (0.725) 
Options granted + 10.708*** 3.498*** 
 
10.767*** 2.873*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
423 423 
 
479 479 
Adjusted R2   0.664 0.118   0.634 0.155 
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Panel B: Individual option grants for option granting firms only 
    
Sales Growth Match 
Return Adj.   Size Match Return Adj. 
Dependent variable: 
 
Log of 
Cheap 
Stock 
Cheap 
Stock / 
Cash Comp 
 
Log of 
Cheap 
Stock 
Cheap 
Stock / 
Cash Comp 
    (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Intercept ? 8.251*** 1.647   13.798*** 4.058* 
 
 
(0.004) (0.672) 
 
(0.000) (0.089) 
Audit Committee Accounting 
Expert - -1.964** -2.098** 
 
-2.087*** -1.669*** 
 
 
(0.015) (0.041) 
 
(0.005) (0.008) 
Board Accounting Expert Only - -0.900 0.477 
 
-2.384 -0.564 
 
 
(0.303) (0.581) 
 
(0.090) (0.358) 
Board Independence - -0.030 -0.085*** 
 
-0.022 -0.028* 
 
 
(0.110) (0.005) 
 
(0.175) (0.081) 
CEO Steward Index - -0.458 -0.257 
 
-0.655* -0.297 
 
 
(0.150) (0.332) 
 
(0.052) (0.198) 
Pre IPO New CEO + 0.149 1.813 
 
-0.461 1.315* 
 
 
(0.450) (0.127) 
 
(0.671) (0.073) 
Valuation - -0.963 -1.085 
 
-1.737** -0.515 
 
 
(0.190) (0.229) 
 
(0.039) (0.275) 
Director Options + 1.804** 3.466*** 
 
0.793 1.804*** 
 
 
(0.020) (0.002) 
 
(0.157) (0.004) 
Big N - 0.493 0.859 
 
0.013 0.942 
 
 
(0.661) (0.705) 
 
(0.505) (0.835) 
VC Backed - 2.044 0.710 
 
0.945 -0.082 
 
 
(0.964) (0.679) 
 
(0.819) (0.464) 
Prestigious Underwriter - 2.701 2.906 
 
2.726 1.696 
 
 
(0.982) (0.952) 
 
(0.992) (0.956) 
ROA ? 0.583 -0.731 
 
1.293 0.525 
 
 
(0.549) (0.579) 
 
(0.134) (0.496) 
Size ? 0.405 0.409 
 
0.049 -0.152 
 
 
(0.270) (0.404) 
 
(0.890) (0.620) 
Firm Age ? -0.199 -0.205 
 
-1.046** -0.421 
 
 
(0.733) (0.792) 
 
(0.039) (0.337) 
Tech ? 0.213 0.876 
 
0.049 0.270 
 
 
(0.794) (0.419) 
 
(0.949) (0.683) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
244 244 
 
300 300 
Adjusted R2   0.021 0.021   0.019 0.018 
 
Notes: This table presents regression results from estimating Model (1) in which the dependent 
variables are the Log of Cheap Stock in Columns (1) and (3) and Cheap Stock / Cash Comp in 
Columns (2) and (4).  In Columns (1) and (2), cheap stock is calculated using the sales growth 
match return-adjusted IPO offer price and in Columns (3) and (4), cheap stock is calculated using 
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the size match return-adjusted IPO offer price.  Panel A reports OLS regression results where the 
sample testing the determinants of cheap stock consists of 429 option-grant observations in 
Columns (1) and (2) and 479 option-grant observations in Columns (3) and (4) from all sample 
firms.  Panel B reports Tobit regression results where the sample consists of 244option-grant 
observations in Columns (1) and (2) and 300 option-grant observations in Columns (3) and (4) 
from option granting firms only.  The samples consist of CEO option-grant observations for 
firms that completed IPOs during the calendar years of 2004 through 2007.  P-values are 
reported below the coefficient estimates.  All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 
percentiles.  Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  Year fixed effects are included in 
the model but are not reported.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, 
respectively, using a two-tailed t-test, unless a directional prediction is made. 
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Table 16 
The Associations between Cheap Stock and Operating Performance:  
Alternative Cheap Stock Measures 
 
Panel A: Three year average ROA 
Dependent variable:   Three Year Avg. ROA  
Cheap stock adjustment: 
 
Sales Growth Match 
Return Adj.   Size Match Return Adj. 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Intercept ? -0.930*** -0.922***   -0.874*** -0.879*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Log of Tot Cheap Stock ? -0.003* 
  
-0.006*** 
 
 
 
(0.088) 
  
(0.001) 
 
Tot Cheap Stock / Cash Comp ? 
 
-0.002 
  
-0.007** 
 
 
 
(0.193) 
  
(0.019) 
MVEt ? 0.068*** 0.066***  
0.071*** 0.070*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
ROAt-1 ? 0.522*** 0.522***  
0.523*** 0.523*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Salest-1 ? -0.000 0.000  
0.000 0.000 
 
 
(0.725) (0.924) 
 
(0.936) (0.565) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
360 360 
 
392 392 
Adjusted R2   0.789 0.788   0.779 0.777 
 
Panel B: Three year average cash flows from operations 
Dependent variable:   Three Year Avg. CFO  
Cheap stock adjustment:   
Sales Growth Match 
Return Adj.   Size Match Return Adj. 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Intercept ? -10.174*** -10.000*** 
 
-11.590*** -10.915*** 
 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Log of Tot Cheap Stock ? -0.075*** 
  
-0.079*** 
 
 
 
(0.008) 
  
(0.005) 
 
Tot Cheap Stock / Cash Comp ? 
 
-0.003 
  
-0.032 
 
 
 
(0.835) 
  
(0.365) 
MVEt ? 0.828*** 0.727***  
0.894*** 0.810*** 
 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
CFOt-1 ? 0.074 0.077  
0.090 0.093 
 
 
(0.168) (0.156) 
 
(0.111) (0.102) 
Salest-1 ? -0.000 0.000  
-0.000 0.000 
 
 
(0.244) (0.654) 
 
(0.588) (0.579) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
343 343 
 
362 362 
Adjusted R2   0.187 0.176   0.232 0.223 
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Panel C: Three year buy and hold abnormal returns 
Dependent variable:   Three Year Abnormal Returns 
Cheap stock adjustment:   
Sales Growth Match 
Return Adj.   Size Match Return Adj. 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Intercept ? -1.710*** -1.849*** 
 
-1.520** -1.616** 
 
 
(0.006) (0.003) 
 
(0.017) (0.012) 
Log of Tot Cheap Stock ? -0.013** 
  
-0.015** 
 
 
 
(0.042) 
  
(0.017) 
 
Tot Cheap Stock / Cash Comp ? 
 
-0.016*** 
  
-0.021*** 
 
 
 
(0.002) 
  
(0.004) 
ROAt-1 ? -0.019 -0.024  
-0.009 -0.010 
 
 
(0.854) (0.815) 
 
(0.931) (0.918) 
MVEt ? 0.123** 0.132***  
0.111** 0.116** 
 
 
(0.013) (0.008) 
 
(0.027) (0.021) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
360 360 
 
392 392 
Adjusted R2   0.023 0.028   0.022 0.022 
 
Panel D: Three year buy and hold returns 
Dependent variable:   Three Year Returns 
Cheap stock adjustment: 
 
Sales Growth Match 
Return Adj.   Size Match Return Adj. 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Intercept ? -1.546*** -1.677*** 
 
-1.377** -1.466** 
 
 
(0.007) (0.004) 
 
(0.018) (0.013) 
Log of Tot Cheap Stock ? -0.013** 
  
-0.016*** 
 
 
 
(0.032) 
  
(0.007) 
 
Tot Cheap Stock / Cash Comp ? 
 
-0.015*** 
  
-0.021*** 
 
 
 
(0.003) 
  
(0.003) 
ROAt-1 ? -0.009 -0.014  
-0.001 -0.002 
 
 
(0.916) (0.874) 
 
(0.995) (0.986) 
MVEt ? 0.124*** 0.132***  
0.114** 0.119** 
 
 
(0.007) (0.004) 
 
(0.013) (0.011) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
360 360 
 
392 392 
Adjusted R2   0.128 0.131   0.129 0.126 
 
Notes: This table presents OLS regression results from estimating Models (3a), (3b), and (4).  
Panels A an B presents results estimating Models (3a) and (3b), respectively, where the 
dependent variable is Three Year Avg. ROAt+2 in Panel A and Three Year Avg. CFOt+2 in Panel 
B.  Panels C and D present results estimating Model (4) where the dependent variable is Three 
Year Abnormal Returnst+3 in Panel C and Three Year Buy and Hold Returnst+3 in Panel D.  In 
each panel, cheap stock is measured as the Log of Cheap Stock in Columns (1) and (3) and 
Cheap Stock / Cash Comp in Columns (2) and (4).  In Columns (1) and (2), cheap stock is 
calculated using the industry return-adjusted IPO offer price and in Columns (3) and (4), cheap 
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stock is calculated using the ROA match return-adjusted IPO offer price.  P-values are reported 
below the coefficient estimates.  In Panels A, C, and D the sample consists of 360 firm-IPO 
observations in Columns (1) and (2) and 392 firm-IPO observations in Columns in Columns (3) 
and (4).  In Panel B, the sample consists of 343 firm-IPO observations in Columns (1) and (2) 
and 362 firm-IPO observations in Columns in Columns (3) and (4).  The sample consists of IPOs 
between 2004 through 2007.  All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  Year fixed effects are included in the model 
but are not reported.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, 
respectively, using a two-tailed t-test unless a directional prediction is made. 
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Table 17 
Determinants of Cheap Stock:   
Cheap Stock Measured Using the Closing Stock at the End of the First Day of Trading 
 
Panel A: Individual option grants for all sample firms 
    Industry Return Adj.   ROA Match Return Adj. 
Dependent Variable: 
 
Log of 
Cheap 
Stock 
Cheap 
Stock / 
Cash Comp 
 
Log of 
Cheap 
Stock 
Cheap 
Stock / 
Cash Comp 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Intercept ? 0.894 -0.115   0.955 0.368 
 
 
(0.332) (0.960) 
 
(0.363) (0.853) 
Audit Committee Accounting 
Expert - -0.984*** -1.261** 
 
-1.231*** -1.154** 
 
 
(0.006) (0.022) 
 
(0.002) (0.026) 
Board Accounting Expert Only - -0.453 0.545 
 
-1.898* -1.314** 
 
 
(0.263) (0.608) 
 
(0.077) (0.028) 
Board Independence - -0.009** -0.023* 
 
-0.004 -0.021* 
 
 
(0.039) (0.097) 
 
(0.292) (0.066) 
CEO Steward Index - -0.339** -0.067 
 
-0.256 -0.196 
 
 
(0.039) (0.425) 
 
(0.109) (0.266) 
Pre IPO New CEO + 0.168 2.048** 
 
0.203 1.498* 
 
 
(0.380) (0.028) 
 
(0.366) (0.066) 
Valuation - 0.036 0.345 
 
-0.293 -0.125 
 
 
(0.527) (0.642) 
 
(0.311) (0.445) 
Director Options + 0.808** 1.981*** 
 
0.834** 1.551*** 
 
 
(0.033) (0.001) 
 
(0.048) (0.003) 
Big N - 0.196 0.373 
 
0.412 0.476 
 
 
(0.663) (0.698) 
 
(0.786) (0.766) 
VC Backed - 0.575 -0.184 
 
0.486 0.143 
 
 
(0.882) (0.415) 
 
(0.820) (0.580) 
Prestigious Underwriter - 0.792 1.441 
 
0.842 1.593 
 
 
(0.946) (0.982) 
 
(0.937) (0.992) 
ROA ? 0.940* 0.134 
 
0.647 0.093 
 
 
(0.067) (0.785) 
 
(0.205) (0.843) 
Size ? -0.079 -0.144 
 
-0.095 -0.089 
 
 
(0.653) (0.566) 
 
(0.614) (0.750) 
Firm Age ? -0.151 0.121 
 
-0.338* -0.011 
 
 
(0.343) (0.763) 
 
(0.087) (0.974) 
Tech ? -0.313 0.474 
 
-0.628 0.128 
 
 
(0.440) (0.532) 
 
(0.184) (0.847) 
Options granted + 11.881*** 4.384*** 
 
11.272*** 3.846*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
479 479 
 
479 479 
Adjusted R2   0.741 0.138   0.687 0.136 
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Panel B: Individual option grants for option granting firms only 
    Industry Return Adj.   ROA Match Return Adj. 
Dependent Variable: 
 
Log of 
Cheap 
Stock 
Cheap 
Stock / 
Cash Comp 
 
Log of 
Cheap 
Stock 
Cheap 
Stock / 
Cash Comp 
    (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Intercept ? 12.605*** 2.596   12.366*** 2.800 
 
 
(0.000) (0.497) 
 
(0.000) (0.430) 
Audit Committee Accounting 
Expert - -1.598** -2.489** 
 
-2.130*** -2.391** 
 
 
(0.005) (0.013) 
 
(0.001) (0.011) 
Board Accounting Expert Only - -0.982 0.342 
 
-3.825*** -4.081** 
 
 
(0.240) (0.445) 
 
(0.009) (0.044) 
Board Independence - -0.019 -0.055** 
 
-0.004 -0.045* 
 
 
(0.144) (0.044) 
 
(0.425) (0.067) 
CEO Steward Index - -0.712** -0.221 
 
-0.522* -0.465 
 
 
(0.012) (0.348) 
 
(0.074) (0.188) 
Pre IPO New CEO + -0.143 3.214** 
 
0.109 2.500* 
 
 
(0.569) (0.014) 
 
(0.454) (0.032) 
Valuation - -0.079 0.309 
 
-0.594 -0.670 
 
 
(0.459) (0.411) 
 
(0.250) (0.300) 
Director Options + 1.233** 3.354*** 
 
1.435** 2.627*** 
 
 
(0.023) (0.001) 
 
(0.021) (0.005) 
Big N - 0.715 1.700 
 
1.055 2.088 
 
 
(0.793) (0.861) 
 
(0.854) (0.924) 
VC Backed - 1.773 0.706 
 
1.308 1.092 
 
 
(0.985) (0.685) 
 
(0.921) (0.788) 
Prestigious Underwriter - 1.337 2.640 
 
1.589 3.122 
 
 
(0.935) (0.953) 
 
(0.942) (0.983) 
ROA ? 2.378*** 0.938 
 
1.750** 0.871 
 
 
(0.001) (0.460) 
 
(0.024) (0.458) 
Size ? 0.006 -0.104 
 
-0.077 -0.012 
 
 
(0.984) (0.833) 
 
(0.807) (0.979) 
Firm Age ? -0.191 0.302 
 
-0.707 -0.151 
 
 
(0.628) (0.666) 
 
(0.118) (0.817) 
Tech ? -0.503 0.479 
 
-0.975 -0.085 
 
 
(0.399) (0.652) 
 
(0.153) (0.932) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
300 300 
 
300 300 
Adjusted R2   0.026 0.018   0.022 0.019 
 
Notes: This table presents regression results from estimating Model (1) in which the dependent 
variables are the Log of Cheap Stock in Columns (1) and (3) and Cheap Stock / Cash Comp in 
Columns (2) and (4).  In Columns (1) and (2), cheap stock is calculated using the industry return-
adjusted closing price and in Columns (3) and (4), cheap stock is calculated using the ROA 
match return-adjusted closing price.  Panel A reports OLS regression results where the sample 
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testing the determinants of cheap stock consists of 479 option-grant observations from all sample 
firms.  Panel B reports Tobit regression results where the sample consists of 300 option-grant 
observations from option granting firms only.  The samples consist of CEO option-grant 
observations for firms that completed IPOs during the calendar years of 2004 through 2007.  P-
values are reported below the coefficient estimates.  All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 
99
th
 percentiles.  Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  Year fixed effects are 
included in the model but are not reported.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 
10% levels, respectively, using a two-tailed t-test, unless a directional prediction is made. 
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Table 18  
The Associations between Cheap Stock and Future Operating Performance: 
Cheap Stock Measured Using the Closing Stock at the End of the First Day of Trading 
 
Panel A: Three year average ROA 
Dependent variable:   Three Year Avg. ROA  
Cheap stock adjustment: 
 
Industry Return Adj. 
 
ROA Match Return Adj. 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Intercept ? -0.861*** -0.842***   -0.861*** -0.848*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Log of Tot Cheap Stock ? -0.005*** 
  
-0.005*** 
 
 
 
(0.004) 
  
(0.008) 
 
Tot Cheap Stock / Cash Comp ? 
 
-0.002 
  
-0.002 
 
 
 
(0.114) 
  
(0.223) 
MVEt ? 0.070*** 0.066***  
0.069*** 0.066*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
ROAt-1 ? 0.525*** 0.525***  
0.524*** 0.525*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Salest-1 ? 0.000 0.000  
0.000 0.000 
 
 
(0.867) (0.363) 
 
(0.762) (0.339) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
392 392 
 
392 392 
Adjusted R2   0.778 0.774   0.777 0.774 
 
 
Panel B: Three year average cash flows from operations 
Dependent variable:   Three Year Avg. CFO  
Cheap stock adjustment:   Industry Return Adj.   ROA Match Return Adj. 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Intercept ? -11.363*** -10.514***   -11.303*** -10.897*** 
 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Log of Tot Cheap Stock - -0.067** 
  
-0.052 
 
 
 
(0.010) 
  
(0.121) 
 
Tot Cheap Stock / Cash Comp - 
 
0.002 
  
-0.017 
 
 
 
(0.833) 
  
(0.504) 
MVEt ? 0.874*** 0.770***  
0.856*** 0.804*** 
 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
CFOt-1 ? 0.091 0.094  
0.092 0.093 
 
 
(0.109) (0.100) 
 
(0.109) (0.102) 
Salest-1 ? -0.000 0.000  
0.000 0.000 
 
 
(0.662) (0.356) 
 
(0.920) (0.445) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
362 362 
 
362 362 
Adjusted R2   0.230 0.222   0.226 0.222 
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Panel C: Three year buy and hold abnormal returns 
Dependent variable:   Three Year Abnormal Returns 
Cheap stock adjustment:   Industry Return Adj.   ROA Match Return Adj. 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Intercept ? -1.499** -1.621** 
 
-1.517** -1.653** 
 
 
(0.018) (0.012) 
 
(0.018) (0.013) 
Log of Tot Cheap Stock ? -0.013** 
  
-0.013** 
 
 
 
(0.035) 
  
(0.030) 
 
Tot Cheap Stock / Cash Comp ? 
 
-0.010*** 
  
-0.010** 
 
 
 
(0.003) 
  
(0.020) 
ROAt-1 ? -0.005 -0.008  
-0.007 -0.009 
 
 
(0.960) (0.934) 
 
(0.941) (0.927) 
MVEt ? 0.109** 0.116**  
0.110** 0.117** 
 
 
(0.030) (0.021) 
 
(0.028) (0.023) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
392 392 
 
392 392 
Adjusted R2   0.019 0.019   0.020 0.016 
 
Panel D: Three year buy an hold returns 
Dependent variable:   Three Year Returns 
Cheap stock adjustment: 
 
Industry Return Adj.   ROA Match Return Adj. 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Intercept ? -1.312** -1.449** 
 
-1.332** -1.468** 
 
 
(0.023) (0.014) 
 
(0.021) (0.015) 
Log of Tot Cheap Stock - -0.014** 
  
-0.014** 
 
 
 
(0.018) 
  
(0.016) 
 
Tot Cheap Stock / Cash Comp - 
 
-0.008*** 
  
-0.008** 
 
 
 
(0.004) 
  
(0.023) 
ROAt-1 ? 0.005 0.000  
0.002 -0.001 
 
 
(0.958) (0.998) 
 
(0.981) (0.995) 
MVEt ? 0.109** 0.116**  
0.110** 0.116** 
 
 
(0.017) (0.012) 
 
(0.016) (0.014) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
392 392 
 
392 392 
Adjusted R2   0.111 0.108   0.112 0.105 
 
Notes: This table presents OLS regression results from estimating Models (3a), (3b), and (4).  
Panels A and B present results estimating Models (3a) and (3b), respectively, where the 
dependent variable is Three Year Avg. ROAt+2 in Panel A and Three Year Avg. CFOt+2 in Panel 
B.  Panels C and D present results estimating Model (4) where the dependent variable is Three 
Year Abnormal Returnst+3 in Panel C and Three Year Buy and Hold Returnst+3 in Panel D.  In 
each panel, cheap stock is measured as the Log of Cheap Stock in Columns (1) and (3) and 
Cheap Stock / Cash Comp in Columns (2) and (4).  In Columns (1) and (2), cheap stock is 
calculated using the industry return-adjusted closing price and in Columns (3) and (4), cheap 
stock is calculated using the ROA match return-adjusted closing price.  P-values are reported 
below the coefficient estimates.  In Panels A, C, and D the sample consists of 392 firm-IPO 
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observations, and Panel B consists of 362 firm-IPO observations.  The sample consists of IPOs 
between 2004 through 2007.  All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  Year fixed effects are included in the model 
but are not reported.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, 
respectively, using a two-tailed t-test unless a directional prediction is made. 
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Table 19 
Determinants of Cheap Stock: Director Accounting Expert 
 
Panel A: Individual option grants for all sample firms 
    Industry Return Adj.   ROA Match Return Adj. 
Dependent variable: 
  
Log of 
Cheap 
Stock 
Cheap 
Stock / 
Cash Comp 
 
Log of 
Cheap 
Stock 
Cheap 
Stock / 
Cash Comp 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Intercept ? 0.890 -0.131   0.961 0.369 
 
 
(0.333) (0.955) 
 
(0.362) (0.853) 
Director Accounting Expert - -0.918*** -1.033** 
 
-1.315*** -1.174** 
 
 
(0.006) (0.043) 
 
(0.001) (0.016) 
Board Independence - -0.009** -0.023* 
 
-0.004 -0.021* 
 
 
(0.039) (0.098) 
 
(0.291) (0.066) 
CEO Steward Index - -0.332** -0.043 
 
-0.265* -0.198 
 
 
(0.042) (0.453) 
 
(0.100) (0.260) 
Pre IPO New CEO + 0.158 2.016** 
 
0.214 1.501* 
 
 
(0.386) (0.029) 
 
(0.358) (0.065) 
Valuation - 0.021 0.292 
 
-0.273 -0.120 
 
 
(0.515) (0.621) 
 
(0.322) (0.446) 
Director Options + 0.793** 1.931*** 
 
0.853** 1.555*** 
 
 
(0.036) (0.001) 
 
(0.042) (0.002) 
Big N - 0.214 0.435 
 
0.389 0.470 
 
 
(0.677) (0.736) 
 
(0.774) (0.765) 
VC Backed - 0.585 -0.150 
 
0.473 0.140 
 
 
(0.887) (0.430) 
 
(0.627) (0.578) 
Prestigious Underwriter - 0.788 1.426 
 
0.847 1.594 
 
 
(0.946) (0.980) 
 
(0.938) (0.992) 
ROA ? 0.941* 0.137 
 
0.646 0.093 
 
 
(0.067) (0.780) 
 
(0.203) (0.843) 
Size ? -0.082 -0.155 
 
-0.091 -0.088 
 
 
(0.638) (0.538) 
 
(0.629) (0.753) 
Firm Age ? -0.149 0.127 
 
-0.341* -0.011 
 
 
(0.348) (0.749) 
 
(0.087) (0.973) 
Tech ? -0.314 0.470 
 
-0.626 0.128 
 
 
(0.438) (0.534) 
 
(0.185) (0.847) 
Options granted + 11.877*** 4.369*** 
 
11.278*** 3.848*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
479 479 
 
479 479 
Adjusted R2   0.741 0.137   0.688 0.138 
 
 
  
 111 
 
Panel B: Individual option grants for option granting firms only 
    Industry Return Adj.   ROA Match Return Adj. 
Dependent variable: 
 
Log of 
Cheap 
Stock 
Cheap 
Stock / 
Cash Comp 
 
Log of 
Cheap 
Stock 
Cheap 
Stock / 
Cash Comp 
    (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Intercept ? 12.588*** 2.520   12.404*** 2.826 
 
 
(0.000) (0.510) 
 
(0.000) (0.426) 
Director Accounting Expert - -1.522** -2.137** 
 
-2.336*** -2.589*** 
 
 
(0.006) (0.023) 
 
(0.000) (0.005) 
Board Independence - -0.019* -0.056** 
 
-0.003 -0.044* 
 
 
(0.141) (0.042) 
 
(0.439) (0.071) 
CEO Steward Index - -0.703** -0.181 
 
-0.546* -0.485 
 
 
(0.013) (0.375) 
 
(0.065) (0.178) 
Pre IPO New CEO + -0.154 3.161** 
 
0.139 2.530* 
 
 
(0.575) (0.015) 
 
(0.441) (0.031) 
Valuation - -0.100 0.219 
 
-0.540 -0.620 
 
 
(0.448) (0.437) 
 
(0.270) (0.313) 
Director Options + 1.213** 3.266*** 
 
1.493** 2.689*** 
 
 
(0.024) (0.002) 
 
(0.017) (0.004) 
Big N - 0.729 1.760 
 
1.013 2.040 
 
 
(0.798) (0.869) 
 
(0.844) (0.919) 
VC Backed - 1.782 0.749 
 
1.278 1.052 
 
 
(0.986) (0.695) 
 
(0.915) (0.780) 
Prestigious Underwriter - 1.349 2.697 
 
1.555 3.085 
 
 
(0.937) (0.956) 
 
(0.938) (0.982) 
ROA ? 2.388*** 0.990 
 
1.720** 0.835 
 
 
(0.001) (0.436) 
 
(0.027) (0.476) 
Size ? -0.001 -0.137 
 
-0.059 0.005 
 
 
(0.996) (0.781) 
 
(0.852) (0.992) 
Firm Age ? -0.190 0.305 
 
-0.708 -0.151 
 
 
(0.629) (0.664) 
 
(0.117) (0.817) 
Tech ? -0.489 0.548 
 
-1.010 -0.110 
 
 
(0.413) (0.607) 
 
(0.139) (0.912) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
300 300 
 
300 300 
Adjusted R2   0.026 0.017   0.022 0.019 
 
Notes: This table presents regression results from estimating Model (1) except that Audit 
Committee Accounting Expert and Board Accounting Expert Only are replaced by Director 
Accounting Expert.  The dependent variables are the Log of Cheap Stock in Columns (1) and (3) 
and Cheap Stock / Cash Comp in Columns (2) and (4).  In Columns (1) and (2), cheap stock is 
calculated using the industry return-adjusted IPO offer price and in Columns (3) and (4), cheap 
stock is calculated using the ROA match return-adjusted IPO offer price.  Panel A reports OLS 
regression results where the sample testing the determinants of cheap stock consists of 479 
option-grant observations from all sample firms.  Panel B reports Tobit regression results where 
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the sample consists of 300 option-grant observations from option granting firms only.  The 
samples consist of CEO option-grant observations for firms that completed IPOs during the 
calendar years of 2004 through 2007.  P-values are reported below the coefficient estimates.  All 
variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  Variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix A.  Year fixed effects are included in the model but are not reported.  ***, **, and * 
represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, using a two-tailed t-test, unless a 
directional prediction is made. 
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Table 20 
Determinants of the Occurrence, Magnitude, and Percentage of Stock Price Revaluations: 
Director Accounting Expert 
 
    Revaluation    Revaluation   Revaluation 
Dependent variable: 
 
Occurrence 
 
Amount 
 
Percentage 
    (1)   (2)   (3) 
Intercept ? 1.850** 
 
15.175** 
 
7.159* 
 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.049) 
 
(0.095) 
Director Accounting Expert - -0.194 
 
-1.077 
 
-1.331 
 
 
(0.176) 
 
(0.305) 
 
(0.129) 
Board Independence ? -0.011* 
 
-0.038 
 
-0.011 
 
 
(0.064) 
 
(0.551) 
 
(0.761) 
CEO Steward Index ? -0.302*** 
 
-2.358** 
 
-0.953 
 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.111) 
Pre IPO New CEO ? -0.803*** 
 
-5.970** 
 
-1.586 
 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.335) 
Valuation - -0.734*** 
 
-7.369*** 
 
-4.168*** 
 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
Director Options ? 0.162 
 
0.320 
 
-0.947 
 
 
(0.412) 
 
(0.883) 
 
(0.428) 
Big N ? 0.107 
 
-0.187 
 
-1.187 
 
 
(0.757) 
 
(0.949) 
 
(0.461) 
VC Backed ? 0.677** 
 
4.576 
 
3.094* 
 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.135) 
 
(0.070) 
Prestigious Underwriter ? 0.110 
 
1.461 
 
1.016 
 
 
(0.679) 
 
(0.627) 
 
(0.539) 
ROA ? 0.194 
 
1.998 
 
0.374 
 
 
(0.342) 
 
(0.376) 
 
(0.761) 
Size ? -0.241** 
 
-2.888*** 
 
-1.700*** 
 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.006) 
Firm Age ? -0.154 
 
-1.221 
 
-0.959 
 
 
(0.288) 
 
(0.437) 
 
(0.281) 
Tech ? -0.156 
 
-0.566 
 
-1.147 
 
 
(0.446) 
 
(0.781) 
 
(0.311) 
 
 
 
 
   
Number of observations 
 
300 
 
300 
 
300 
Adjusted R2   0.214  0.038   0.054 
 
Notes: This table presents results from estimating Model (2) except that Audit Committee 
Accounting Expert and Board Accounting Expert Only are replaced by Director Accounting 
Expert.  Column (1) presents probit regression results where the dependent variable is 
Revaluation Occurrence, Column (2) presents Tobit regression results where the dependent 
variable is Revaluation Amount, and Column (3) presents Tobit regression results where the 
dependent variable is Revaluation %.  P-values are reported below the coefficient estimates.  In 
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Column (1), the sample testing the determinants of Revaluation Occurrence and Revaluation 
Amount consists of 300 grant observations from firms completing an IPO between 2004 through 
2007.  In Columns (2) and (3) the sample consists of 260 grant observations; I exclude 40 
observations where the firm disclosed a revaluation, but did not disclose the revalued stock price.  
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  Variable definitions are 
provided in Appendix A.  Year fixed effects are included in the model but are not reported.  ***, 
**, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, using a two-tailed t-test, 
unless a directional prediction is made.
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Table 21 
Determinants of Cheap Stock: Components of the CEO Steward Index 
 
Panel A: Individual option grants for all sample firms 
    Industry Return Adj.   ROA Match Return Adj. 
Dependent variable: 
  
Log of 
Cheap 
Stock 
Cheap 
Stock / 
Cash Comp 
 
Log of 
Cheap 
Stock 
Cheap 
Stock / 
Cash Comp 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Intercept ? 1.156 0.395   1.479 0.642 
 
 
(0.350) (0.820) 
 
(0.267) (0.691) 
Audit Committee Accounting 
Expert - -1.275*** -1.052** 
 
-1.205*** -1.086** 
 
 
(0.002) (0.014) 
 
(0.004) (0.013) 
Board Accounting Expert Only - -0.852 0.108 
 
-1.778* 0.153 
 
 
(0.174) (0.528) 
 
(0.094) (0.540) 
Board Independence - -0.011* -0.016 
 
-0.005 -0.008 
 
 
(0.028) (0.140) 
 
(0.251) (0.250) 
CEO Founder - -0.083 0.709 
 
0.152 0.704 
 
 
(0.429) (0.906) 
 
(0.614) (0.909) 
CEO Tenure - -0.472* -0.331 
 
-0.587* -0.263 
 
 
(0.069) (0.205) 
 
(0.057) (0.264) 
CEO Chair - -0.560 -0.840** 
 
-0.659* -0.866** 
 
 
(0.102) (0.046) 
 
(0.087) (0.048) 
Pre IPO New CEO + -0.254 0.962 
 
-0.558 0.715 
 
 
(0.637) (0.173) 
 
(0.759) (0.253) 
Valuation - -0.600 0.140 
 
-0.821 -0.106 
 
 
(0.180) (0.573) 
 
(0.114) (0.446) 
Director Options + 0.954** 1.588*** 
 
0.904** 1.402*** 
 
 
(0.020) (0.001) 
 
(0.041) (0.002) 
Big N - 0.008 0.254 
 
0.056 -0.031 
 
 
(0.506) (0.665) 
 
(0.539) (0.482) 
VC Backed - 0.633 -0.410 
 
0.268 -0.561 
 
 
(0.881) (0.294) 
 
(0.680) (0.226) 
Prestigious Underwriter - 0.952 0.767 
 
1.111 0.715 
 
 
(0.956) (0.921) 
 
(0.958) (0.898) 
ROA ? 0.469 0.012 
 
0.342 -0.009 
 
 
(0.358) (0.974) 
 
(0.513) (0.981) 
Size ? 0.046 0.020 
 
0.019 0.048 
 
 
(0.808) (0.922) 
 
(0.924) (0.842) 
Firm Age ? -0.247 -0.001 
 
-0.368* -0.156 
 
 
(0.214) (0.997) 
 
(0.096) (0.578) 
Tech ? -0.040 0.500 
 
0.034 0.418 
 
 
(0.927) (0.389) 
 
(0.945) (0.462) 
Options granted + 11.250*** 3.593*** 
 
10.673*** 3.401*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
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Number of observations 
 
479 479 
 
479 479 
Adjusted R2   0.699 0.140   0.639 0.120 
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Panel B: Individual option grants for option granting firms only 
    Industry Return Adj.   ROA Match Return Adj. 
Dependent variable: 
 
Log of 
Cheap 
Stock 
Cheap 
Stock / 
Cash Comp 
 
Log of 
Cheap 
Stock 
Cheap 
Stock / 
Cash Comp 
    (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Intercept ? 13.772*** 4.513   13.543*** 5.188 
 
 
(0.000) (0.163) 
 
(0.000) (0.120) 
Audit Committee Accounting 
Expert - -2.291*** -2.539*** 
 
-2.325*** -2.631*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.002) 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Board Accounting Expert Only - -1.743 -0.679 
 
-3.846** -1.351 
 
 
(0.132) (0.367) 
 
(0.016) (0.261) 
Board Independence - -0.025 -0.041* 
 
-0.005 -0.012 
 
 
(0.108) (0.053) 
 
(0.417) (0.319) 
CEO Founder - 0.023 1.791 
 
0.536 1.751 
 
 
(0.512) (0.961) 
 
(0.724) (0.952) 
CEO Tenure - -1.697*** -1.787** 
 
-1.973*** -1.561* 
 
 
(0.010) (0.028) 
 
(0.009) (0.054) 
CEO Chair - -0.897 -1.440* 
 
-1.258* -1.767** 
 
 
(0.107) (0.061) 
 
(0.063) (0.033) 
Pre IPO New CEO + -1.736 0.106 
 
-2.321 -0.281 
 
 
(0.913) (0.474) 
 
(0.945) (0.566) 
Valuation - -1.021 -0.128 
 
-1.454* -0.685 
 
 
(0.116) (0.454) 
 
(0.067) (0.274) 
Director Options + 1.444** 2.863*** 
 
1.550** 2.712*** 
 
 
(0.019) (0.001) 
 
(0.026) (0.002) 
Big N - 0.638 1.510 
 
0.710 0.803 
 
 
(0.745) (0.885) 
 
(0.740) (0.732) 
VC Backed - 1.647 -0.224 
 
0.553 -1.173 
 
 
(0.960) (0.427) 
 
(0.697) (0.176) 
Prestigious Underwriter - 1.829 1.817 
 
2.439 2.003 
 
 
(0.971) (0.926) 
 
(0.986) (0.938) 
ROA ? 1.260* 0.205 
 
1.016 0.208 
 
 
(0.090) (0.836) 
 
(0.227) (0.837) 
Size ? 0.229 0.128 
 
0.084 0.024 
 
 
(0.451) (0.745) 
 
(0.809) (0.952) 
Firm Age ? -0.331 0.045 
 
-0.763 -0.571 
 
 
(0.454) (0.938) 
 
(0.131) (0.334) 
Tech ? 0.033 0.824 
 
0.327 0.824 
 
 
(0.959) (0.332) 
 
(0.662) (0.346) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
300 300 
 
300 300 
Adjusted R2   0.029 0.024   0.025 0.020 
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Notes: This table presents regression results from estimating Model (1) except that CEO Steward 
Index is replaced by its components (i.e., CEO Founder, CEO Tenure, and CEO Chair).  The 
dependent variables are the Log of Cheap Stock in Columns (1) and (3) and Cheap Stock / Cash 
Comp in Columns (2) and (4).  In Columns (1) and (2), cheap stock is calculated using the 
industry return-adjusted IPO offer price and in Columns (3) and (4), cheap stock is calculated 
using the ROA match return-adjusted IPO offer price.  Panel A reports OLS regression results 
where the sample testing the determinants of cheap stock consists of 479 option-grant 
observations from all sample firms.  Panel B reports Tobit regression results where the sample 
consists of 300 option-grant observations from option granting firms only.  The samples consist 
of CEO option-grant observations for firms that completed IPOs during the calendar years of 
2004 through 2007.  P-values are reported below the coefficient estimates.  All variables are 
winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  Year 
fixed effects are included in the model but are not reported.  ***, **, and * represent significance 
at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, using a two-tailed t-test, unless a directional prediction 
is made. 
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Table 22 
Determinants of Revaluations: Components of the CEO Steward Index 
 
    Revaluation    Revaluation   Revaluation 
Dependent variable: 
 
Occurrence 
 
Amount 
 
Percentage 
    (1)   (2)   (3) 
Intercept ? 2.182*** 
 
17.232** 
 
7.669* 
 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.085) 
Audit Committee Accounting Expert - -0.204 
 
-0.194 
 
-0.853 
 
 
(0.173) 
 
(0.465) 
 
(0.245) 
Board Accounting Expert Only - -0.491 
 
-4.418 
 
-4.245* 
 
 
(0.137) 
 
(0.203) 
 
(0.082) 
Board Independence ? -0.011* 
 
-0.037 
 
-0.010 
 
 
(0.077) 
 
(0.563) 
 
(0.776) 
CEO Chair ? -0.426* 
 
-1.244 
 
-0.565 
 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.584) 
 
(0.656) 
CEO Founder ? -0.098 
 
-4.422* 
 
-1.532 
 
 
(0.708) 
 
(0.075) 
 
(0.264) 
CEO Tenure ? -0.305 
 
-2.576 
 
-0.938 
 
 
(0.170) 
 
(0.276) 
 
(0.479) 
Pre IPO New CEO ? -1.066*** 
 
-8.495** 
 
-2.472 
 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.280) 
Valuation - -0.739*** 
 
-6.974*** 
 
-4.095*** 
 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.005) 
Director Options ? 0.167 
 
-0.348 
 
-1.197 
 
 
(0.404) 
 
(0.877) 
 
(0.334) 
Big N ? 0.159 
 
-0.227 
 
-1.138 
 
 
(0.672) 
 
(0.939) 
 
(0.485) 
VC Backed ? 0.580* 
 
5.629* 
 
3.467* 
 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.082) 
 
(0.056) 
Prestigious Underwriter ? 0.089 
 
1.390 
 
1.007 
 
 
(0.746) 
 
(0.641) 
 
(0.542) 
ROA ? 0.180 
 
2.164 
 
0.416 
 
 
(0.368) 
 
(0.332) 
 
(0.734) 
Size ? -0.258** 
 
-2.914*** 
 
-1.714*** 
 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.005) 
Firm Age ? -0.134 
 
-1.147 
 
-0.935 
 
 
(0.352) 
 
(0.482) 
 
(0.316) 
Tech ? -0.161 
 
-0.612 
 
-1.158 
 
 
(0.427) 
 
(0.765) 
 
(0.312) 
 
 
 
 
   
Number of observations 
 
300 
 
300 
 
300 
Adjusted R2   0.217  0.041   0.056 
 
Notes: This table presents results from estimating Model (2) except that CEO Steward Index is 
replaced by its components (i.e., CEO Founder, CEO Tenure, and CEO Chair).  Column (1) 
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presents probit regression results where the dependent variable is Revaluation Occurrence, 
Column (2) presents Tobit regression results where the dependent variable is Revaluation 
Amount, and Column (3) presents Tobit regression results where the dependent variable is 
Revaluation %.  P-values are reported below the coefficient estimates.  In Column (1), the 
sample testing the determinants of Revaluation Occurrence and Revaluation Amount consists of 
300 grant observations from firms completing an IPO between 2004 through 2007.  In Columns 
(2) and (3) the sample consists of 260 grant observations; I exclude 40 observations where the 
firm disclosed a revaluation, but did not disclose the revalued stock price.  All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  Variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix A.  Year fixed effects are included in the model but are not reported.  ***, **, and * 
represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, using a two-tailed t-test, unless a 
directional prediction is made.
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Table 23 
Determinants of Cheap Stock:  
Stock Options Granted in the Twelve Months Prior to the IPO  
 
Panel A: Individual option grants for all sample firms 
    Industry Return Adj.   ROA Match Return Adj. 
Dependent Variable: 
 
Log of 
Cheap 
Stock 
Cheap 
Stock / 
Cash Comp 
 
Log of 
Cheap 
Stock 
Cheap Stock 
/ Cash 
Comp 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Intercept ? 0.631 -0.122   0.943 0.232 
 
 
(0.554) (0.942) 
 
(0.389) (0.867) 
Audit Committee Accounting 
Expert - -1.055*** -0.868** 
 
-0.997** -0.829** 
 
 
(0.006) (0.022) 
 
(0.011) (0.019) 
Board Accounting Expert Only - -0.160 0.489 
 
-0.691 0.462 
 
 
(0.422) (0.634) 
 
(0.248) (0.641) 
Board Independence - -0.011** -0.015 
 
-0.006 -0.009 
 
 
(0.022) (0.117) 
 
(0.194) (0.154) 
CEO Steward Index - -0.284** -0.064 
 
-0.245 -0.059 
 
 
(0.084) (0.383) 
 
(0.124) (0.374) 
Pre IPO New CEO + -0.038 0.671 
 
-0.018 0.188 
 
 
(0.532) (0.167) 
 
(0.514) (0.373) 
Valuation - -0.397 -0.222 
 
-0.522 -0.271 
 
 
(0.259) (0.328) 
 
(0.206) (0.284) 
Director Options + 0.513 1.175*** 
 
0.299 0.874*** 
 
 
(0.113) (0.002) 
 
(0.250) (0.007) 
Big N - -0.282 -0.071 
 
-0.267 -0.226 
 
 
(0.271) (0.451) 
 
(0.296) (0.355) 
VC Backed - 0.499 0.238 
 
0.259 0.133 
 
 
(0.849) (0.656) 
 
(0.697) (0.594) 
Prestigious Underwriter - 0.556 0.016 
 
0.675 -0.116 
 
 
(0.834) (0.512) 
 
(0.869) (0.590) 
ROA ? 0.065 -0.169 
 
-0.056 -0.187 
 
 
(0.883) (0.634) 
 
(0.900) (0.581) 
Size ? 0.204 0.247 
 
0.144 0.286 
 
 
(0.193) (0.233) 
 
(0.392) (0.205) 
Firm Age ? -0.262 -0.089 
 
-0.398** -0.229 
 
 
(0.131) (0.762) 
 
(0.036) (0.350) 
Tech ? -0.178 0.397 
 
-0.210 0.163 
 
 
(0.675) (0.464) 
 
(0.647) (0.736) 
Options granted + 11.575*** 3.610*** 
 
11.059*** 3.272*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
442 442 
 
442 442 
Adjusted R2   0.736 0.157   0.691 0.150 
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Panel B: Individual option grants for option granting firms only 
    
Industry Return Adj.   
ROA Match Return 
Adj. 
Dependent Variable: 
 
Log of 
Cheap 
Stock 
Cheap 
Stock / 
Cash Comp 
 
Log of 
Cheap 
Stock 
Cheap 
Stock / 
Cash Comp 
    (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Intercept ? 11.793*** 1.601   12.076*** 3.108 
 
 
(0.000) (0.639) 
 
(0.000) (0.325) 
Audit Committee Accounting 
Expert - -2.316*** -2.281*** 
 
-2.393*** -2.138*** 
 
 
(0.002) (0.009) 
 
(0.004) (0.009) 
Board Accounting Expert Only - -0.573 0.592 
 
-1.842 0.446 
 
 
(0.376) (0.608) 
 
(0.181) (0.587) 
Board Independence - -0.037* -0.053** 
 
-0.014 -0.028 
 
 
(0.056) (0.029) 
 
(0.291) (0.138) 
CEO Steward Index - -0.619* -0.150 
 
-0.551 -0.189 
 
 
(0.067) (0.382) 
 
(0.115) (0.342) 
Pre IPO New CEO + -0.188 1.463 
 
0.009 0.375 
 
 
(0.568) (0.132) 
 
(0.497) (0.379) 
Valuation - -1.145 -0.906 
 
-1.485* -1.127 
 
 
(0.127) (0.228) 
 
(0.092) (0.159) 
Director Options + 1.088 2.549*** 
 
0.702 1.795** 
 
 
(0.092) (0.005) 
 
(0.220) (0.025) 
Big N - -0.091 0.577 
 
-0.258 -0.220 
 
 
(0.470) (0.655) 
 
(0.423) (0.434) 
VC Backed - 1.434 1.088 
 
0.398 0.402 
 
 
(0.907) (0.796) 
 
(0.630) (0.629) 
Prestigious Underwriter - 2.043 1.227 
 
2.600 0.926 
 
 
(0.957) (0.802) 
 
(0.975) (0.756) 
ROA ? 0.281 -0.444 
 
-0.033 -0.478 
 
 
(0.761) (0.698) 
 
(0.974) (0.649) 
Size ? 0.607 0.654 
 
0.365 0.651 
 
 
(0.112) (0.154) 
 
(0.390) (0.127) 
Firm Age ? -0.683 -0.437 
 
-1.190** -0.944* 
 
 
(0.180) (0.476) 
 
(0.036) (0.098) 
Tech ? -0.192 0.564 
 
-0.052 0.274 
 
 
(0.808) (0.552) 
 
(0.953) (0.755) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
225 225 
 
225 225 
Adjusted R2   0.022 0.019   0.017 0.016 
 
Notes: This table presents regression results from estimating Model (1) in which the dependent 
variables are the Log of Cheap Stock in Columns (1) and (3) and Cheap Stock / Cash Comp in 
Columns (2) and (4).  In Columns (1) and (2), cheap stock is calculated using the industry return-
adjusted IPO offer price and in Columns (3) and (4), cheap stock is calculated using the ROA 
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match return-adjusted IPO offer price.  Panel A reports OLS regression results where the sample 
testing the determinants of cheap stock consists of 442 option-grant observations from all sample 
firms.  Panel B reports Tobit regression results where the sample consists of 225 option-grant 
observations from option granting firms only.  The samples consist of CEO option-grant 
observations during the 12 months prior to the IPO for firms that completed IPOs during the 
calendar years of 2004 through 2007.  P-values are reported below the coefficient estimates.  All 
variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  Variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix A.  Year fixed effects are included in the model but are not reported.  ***, **, and * 
represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, using a two-tailed t-test, unless a 
directional prediction is made. 
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Table 24 
The Associations between Cheap Stock and Future Performance: 
 Stock Options Granted in the Twelve Months Prior to the IPO  
 
Panel A: Three year average ROA 
Dependent variable:   Three Year Avg. ROA  
Cheap stock adjustment: 
 
Industry Return Adj. 
 
ROA Match Return Adj. 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Intercept ? -0.920*** -0.899***   -0.919*** -0.906*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Log of Tot Cheap Stock ? -0.009*** 
  
-0.008*** 
 
 
 
(0.000) 
  
(0.000) 
 
Tot Cheap Stock / Cash Comp ? 
 
-0.006*** 
  
-0.008*** 
 
 
 
(0.003) 
  
(0.000) 
MVEt ? 0.075*** 0.071***  
0.075*** 0.072*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
ROAt-1 ? 0.523*** 0.523***  
0.522*** 0.523*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Salest-1 ? -0.000 0.000  
-0.000 0.000 
 
 
(0.817) (0.512) 
 
(0.919) (0.451) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
392 392 
 
392 392 
Adjusted R2   0.784 0.778   0.783 0.779 
 
Panel B: Three year average cash flows from operations 
Dependent variable:   Three Year Avg. CFO  
Cheap stock adjustment:   Industry Return Adj.   ROA Match Return Adj. 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Intercept 
? 
-11.564*** 
-
10.809*** 
  -11.438*** -10.800*** 
 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Log of Tot Cheap Stock - -0.070** 
  
-0.060* 
 
 
 
(0.047) 
  
(0.085) 
 
Tot Cheap Stock / Cash Comp - 
 
-0.017 
  
-0.018 
 
 
 
(0.447) 
  
(0.440) 
MVEt ? 0.885*** 0.798***  
0.869*** 0.797*** 
 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.000) (0.001) 
CFOt-1 ? 0.091 0.093  
0.091 0.093 
 
 
(0.111) (0.101) 
 
(0.110) (0.101) 
Salest-1 ? -0.000 0.000  
-0.000 0.000 
 
 
(0.799) (0.446) 
 
(0.980) (0.420) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
362 362 
 
362 362 
Adjusted R2   0.230 0.222   0.227 0.222 
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Panel C: Three year buy and hold abnormal returns 
Dependent variable:   Three Year Abnormal Returns 
Cheap stock adjustment:   Industry Return Adj.   ROA Match Return Adj. 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Intercept ? -1.576** -1.689*** 
 
-1.592** -1.675*** 
 
 
(0.014) (0.009) 
 
(0.014) (0.009) 
Log of Tot Cheap Stock ? -0.017*** 
  
-0.018*** 
 
 
 
(0.006) 
  
(0.006) 
 
Tot Cheap Stock / Cash Comp ? 
 
-0.020*** 
  
-0.020*** 
 
 
 
(0.000) 
  
(0.001) 
ROAt-1 ? -0.009 -0.011  
-0.011 -0.011 
 
 
(0.929) (0.913) 
 
(0.915) (0.914) 
MVEt ? 0.116** 0.121**  
0.117** 0.120** 
 
 
(0.023) (0.015) 
 
(0.022) (0.017) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
392 392 
 
392 392 
Adjusted R2   0.027 0.027   0.027 0.024 
 
Panel D: Three year buy and hold returns 
Dependent variable:   Three Year Returns 
Cheap stock adjustment: 
 
Industry Return Adj.   ROA Match Return Adj. 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Intercept ? -1.434** -1.540*** 
 
-1.449** -1.530*** 
 
 
(0.015) (0.009) 
 
(0.014) (0.010) 
Log of Tot Cheap Stock - -0.019*** 
  
-0.019*** 
 
 
 
(0.003) 
  
(0.003) 
 
Tot Cheap Stock / Cash Comp - 
 
-0.020*** 
  
-0.020*** 
 
 
 
(0.000) 
  
(0.000) 
ROAt-1 ? -0.001 -0.002  
-0.002 -0.002 
 
 
(0.994) (0.980) 
 
(0.979) (0.980) 
MVEt ? 0.119** 0.124***  
0.120** 0.123*** 
 
 
(0.011) (0.007) 
 
(0.011) (0.008) 
 
 
     
Number of observations 
 
392 392 
 
392 392 
Adjusted R2   0.119 0.117   0.119 0.115 
 
Notes: This table presents OLS regression results from estimating Models (3a), (3b), and (4).  
Panels A and B presents results estimating Models (3a) and (3b), respectively, where the 
dependent variable is Three Year Avg. ROAt+2 in Panel A and Three Year Avg. CFOt+2 in Panel 
B.  Panels C and D present results estimating Model (4) where the dependent variable is Three 
Year Abnormal Returnst+3 in Panel C and Three Year Buy and Hold Returnst+3 in Panel D.  In 
each panel, cheap stock is measured as the Log of Cheap Stock in Columns (1) and (3) and 
Cheap Stock / Cash Comp in Columns (2) and (4) for options granted during 12 months prior to 
the IPO.  In Columns (1) and (2), cheap stock is calculated using the industry return-adjusted 
IPO offer price and in Columns (3) and (4), cheap stock is calculated using the ROA match 
return-adjusted IPO offer price.  P-values are reported below the coefficient estimates.  In Panels 
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A, C, and D the sample consists of 392 firm-IPO observations, and Panel B consists of 362 firm-
IPO observations.  The sample consists of IPOs between 2004 through 2007.  All variables are 
winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  Year 
fixed effects are included in the model but are not reported.  ***, **, and * represent significance 
at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, using a two-tailed t-test unless a directional prediction is 
made. 
